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For as long as man has been building cities, 
families wealthy enough to arrange it have 
sought to escape the clangers and discomforts of 
urban life by removing themselves to the suburbs. 
As early as the 1820s, American real estate 
firms were advertising suburban homes for the 
commuter who wished to combine the advan­
tages of life in the country with the conveniences 
of the city; and throughout the nineteenth cen­
tury, extensive suburban settlements grew up 
around every American city. By the end of the 
period, indeed, settlements that had once marked 
the outer limit of the urban fringe had been 
passed over by newer waves of refugees, all in 
eager pursuit of the new and inevitably larger 
homes that had become accessible as a result of 
the steady extension of the rail and trolley lines. 
Unfortunately, the once bucolic residences 
abandoned by the wealthy turned rather quickly 
into wretched slums. A tangle of telephone poles 
replaced the once luxuriant trees; factories and 
stores usurped the few remaining open spaces; 
and the old, spacious houses of the suburbanites 
were subdivided into smaller quarters intended 
for less affluent dwellers. 
In the 1930s, during the administration of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the federal gov­
ernment undertook a major project in city plan­
ning that was designed to alter, radically and 
dramatically, what had become a wasteful and 
unhealthy pattern of urban growth. The plan was 
to establish, at locations separated at a consider­
able distance from the sprawling and crowded 
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INTRODUCTION

As long as mankind has been building cities, wealthy 
families have been escaping the resultant dangers and discom­
forts by removing themselves to suburbs. Suburban estates sur­
rounded the Summerian city of Ur, Imperial Rome, Renaissance 
Florence, and Elizabethan London. By the 1820s, American 
real estate firms were advertising suburban houses for com­
muters who wished to combine the advantages of the country­
side with the conveniences of the city. Extensive suburban set­
tlements developed during the nineteenth century—infiltrating 
nearby villages, creeping out along highways and rail lines, and 
gradually filling in the open fields. By the end of the century 
many of these settlements on the urban fringe had been passed 
over by new waves of suburbanites seeking newer and larger 
homes now available through the extension of railroads and trol­
ley lines. Increasing numbers of old suburban settlements had 
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degenerated into slums—the trees replaced by telephone poles, 
the remaining open spaces filled with factories and stores, the 
old spacious houses subdivided for new, less affluent residents. 
A few settlements, like Greenwich Village or Georgetown, sur­
vive as quaint (and now very popular) islands in the concrete 
vastitude; but most were completely submerged. The gasoline 
engine and superhighway, the enormous growth of urban popu­
lation, and the desire for more and yet more space has greatly 
accelerated the rate of urban expansion. The cycle of expansion 
and decay spiraled rapidly and covered much larger areas. The 
affluent now remove themselves deeper into the countryside, 
remote from the city and from each other. Central cities and 
old suburbs are converted into super-slums and ghettos on a 
scale undreamed of at the turn of the century. In spatial terms 
alone, the rich and poor have never been so far apart. 
This study describes one major city planning project under­
taken by the federal government in the 1930s in the hope that 
it would force a fundamental shift in the wasteful and un­
healthy pattern of urban growth. The greenbelt towns were 
built to demonstrate that urban expansion by the construction 
of complete new towns would provide superior safety, conven­
ience, beauty, and a deep sense of community spirit—all at a 
new low cost. These new suburban towns would therefore pro­
vide a superior environment for families heretofore condemned 
to live in urban slums. New towns would stop urban decay and 
end the economic segregation of the suburbs. They would, 
above all, restore to all classes the warm community life of the 
rural village without sacrificing the economic advantages of a 
metropolitan location. 
This new deal in the suburbs failed. The Roosevelt adminis­
tration never completed the project, and the three half-finished 
towns were thereby robbed of their full impact. The real estate 
and construction industry remained unmoved by the greenbelt 
town demonstration. The federal government washed its hands 
of new towns until 1968 when it authorized a few very modest 
aids to new town developers. Why did the New Deal abandon 
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the greenbelt town program? Why did the towns elicit so little 
response from the public and such a negative one from the real 
estate and construction interests? Was it the nature of the par­
ticular program under which the towns were built or was it 
something about the towns themselves? Was the central prob­
lem perhaps the habits of mind of those who saw the towns? 
To answer these questions requires an analysis of the interac­
tion between the New Deal, city planners, and the welter of 
interest groups and individuals comprising the American peo­
ple. The specific issue appeared to involve only a few small sub­
urban communities; but the larger implications of the program 
escaped few of the interested parties. An established pattern of 
urban life was being challenged. Understanding the history of 
the greenbelt town program provides a broad hint as to why the 
suburban developers of the 1970s offer us little more than was 
offered suburbanites fifty or one hundred years ago. 

The New Deal in the Suburbs 

1

# SUBURBS AND NEW TOWNS

BEFORE THE NEW DEAL

The men who laid out the greenbelt towns in the 1930s 
drew on a rich international heritage of town planning theory 
and experimentation. In the second half of the nineteenth cen­
tury increasing numbers of thoughtful people focused their at­
tention on the problems and possibilities of suburban growth. 
The streetcar and commuter railroad allowed many affluent 
families to move beyond the edge of the city. The problem was 
to maintain the rural nature of an area once it came within 
reach of commuters. One readily apparent answer was to build 
whole new suburban towns or villages of sufficient size and co­
hesion to resist encroachments. For those who could afford it, 
nineteenth-century architects and planners devised a striking 
series of residential suburbs. Llewellyn Park, New Jersey 
(1859), and Riverside and Lake Forest, Illinois (1869 and 1873), 
were built under the influence of Andrew Jackson Downing's 
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visions of suburban rusticity. It is to Downing and his brilliant 
associates, Calvert Vaux and Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr., that 
we owe the curvilinear street pattern and studied informality of 
the contemporary suburban development.1 
Industrialists seeking larger tracts of land at lower cost vied 
with residential developers for choice pieces of suburban real 
estate. Some captains of industry followed in the footsteps of 
the New England textile manufacturers and built towns along­
side of the factories. Pullman, Illinois, which was built in the 
1880s to house over 8,000 people, was the largest and most fa­
mous industrial suburb of the era. George F. Pullman, the rail­
road car manufacturer, developed the town to give his employ­
ees a healthy environment while turning a profit for himself. 
The great Pullman strike of 1894-95 convinced other industrial­
ists that company towns, regardless of the quality of construc­
tion, were troublesome and to be avoided whenever possible.2 
When Gary, Indiana, was built by the United States Steel Cor­
poration a decade after the Pullman strike, company officials 
turned the entire town building task over to independent con­
struction and real estate operators who laid out a prosaic grid­
iron city which soon became an ugly and unhealthy industrial 
community.3 Slum reformers were divided in their opinions con­
cerning company towns, particularly in areas adjacent to large 
cities where alternative employment was possible. The sociolo­
gists Adna F. Weber and Graham Taylor agreed that the move­
ment of factories to the urban fringe offered the best means of 
ending overcrowding and the resultant economic and social 
evils. Taylor was convinced, however, that company towns were 
less satisfactory than communities owned by working men 
themselves—individually or cooperatively. Edith Elmer Wood, 
a housing reformer writing a few years later, said simply that 
company towns were "medieval, undemocratic and un-Ameri­
can."4 
British manufacturers also experimented with the construc­
tion of industrial suburbs, but while the results were satisfactory 
for all concerned, they were not generally imitated by the busi­
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ness leadership. Saltaire, in the English Midlands, was com­
pleted in 1871 and with over 4,000 residents became England's 
largest new town. It was universally praised for its careful plan­
ning and hailed as an important factor in breaking down class 
antagonism. At the end of the century two other major British 
new towns, Bournville and Port Sunlight, were developed with 
equally happy results, but with few imitators. Efforts to encour­
age industrial decentralization were made by a Society for Pro­
moting Industrial Villages (founded in 1888); but it was the 
publication of Ebenezer Howard's small book, The Peaceful 
Path to Real Reform, in 1898 that stimulated wide interest in 
Great Britain and throughout the industrialized world.5 
Born in 1858, Howard lived all his life in the vicinity of Lon­
don, except for a brief sojourn in the United States. A man of 
practical affairs (he was a skilled legal reporter), Howard was 
dismayed with the current structure of industrial cities but be­
lieved that socialization of factories offered no fundamental so­
lution. The real path to reform lay in removal of factories and 
homes to inexpensive rural land in a manner which would pre­
serve the best qualities of the urban and rural environments. 
Howard owed an intellectual debt to a wide variety of sources. 
He was deeply impressed by Henry George's Progress and Pov­
erty and also by Alfred Marshall's economic studies of urban 
decentralization. His writings reveal a debt to Ruskin and Tols­
toy's idealization of village life which was in itself part of a 
broad intellectual movement to get back to nature. This should 
not be overstated since Howard clearly emphasized the funda­
mental urban nature of his garden cities and never doubted the 
basic liberating effects of the industrial revolution.6 
Howard's book, soon republished under the title Garden 
Cities of Tomorrow, laid out a concrete financial plan for the 
construction of a system of complete industrial cities on inexpen­
sive land surrounding a central metropolis. Each community 
would be limited in area and population density. When a pop­
ulation of about 32,000 was reached, a new and separate city 
would be built. The land in these "garden cities"7 would be 
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mutually owned by the residents, who would thereby control 
its use by homeowners as well as factory and shop owners. 
Open spaces could be preserved and new houses or factories 
constructed only by majority consent of the residents exercising 
control through a land trust. Increasing real estate values would 
accrue for the whole community, thereby lowering costs and al­
lowing families with small incomes to buy or rent garden city 
homes. To protect each city from undesirable encroachments, a 
wide belt of green fields and trees would surround the commu­
nity. These greenbelts would serve as buffers between cities, 
establishing clear physical boundaries which would encourage 
community identity and local civic pride. Strong physical de­
lineation and cooperative land tenure were the bases upon which 
Howard envisioned the rise of a deep spirit of communitarian­
ism.8 
Howard's proposal sparked almost immediate responses in 
Great Britain. Letchworth, the first garden city, was opened 
outside London in 1906. It stimulated the interest of many na­
tions including the United States. The Garden City Association 
of America was founded the same year. Its president was a 
former New York state senator, Louis Childs, and its vice-presi­
dent, Ralph Peters, was the head of the Long Island Railroad. 
Other officers and members included Josiah Strong, who had 
visited Letchworth during construction in 1904; Henry Potter, 
Episcopal bishop of New York; Felix Adler of Columbia Uni­
versity; and the banker, August Belmont. The association 
selected five locations for the construction of garden cities. Plans 
materialized most rapidly at an 800 acre tract near Farming-
dale, Long Island. Thirty percent of a $500,000 limited dividend 
stock issue was sold in about six months, and the first factory had 
been promised. Unfortunately, the panic of 1907 disrupted 
these plans, and the garden cities were never built. The associ­
ation became solely a disseminator of information through its 
publication The Village; both faded out in 1921. Its last and 
most noteworthy effort was a highly critical analysis of the new 
town of Gary, Indiana, showing how much unearned increment 
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had accrued to private real estate interests between 1906 and 
1921.9 
During the early years of the twentieth century the garden 
city movement made no headway in the United States. Journals 
of the day often presented a distorted picture of Howard's con­
cept. The magazine, International Studio, which advertised it­
self as "An Illustrated Monthly of Fine and Applied Arts," en­
dorsed the garden city plan but urged that "the friends of any 
future Garden City or suburb should make up their minds to 
aschew the attempt to 'catch customers' by dangling the bait 
of cheapness before their eyes. It always means bad building 
and almost always bad design."10 Other journals associated 
the garden city with an escape from the city into semirural 
suburban villages. Writing in The Craftsman in 1909, Gustav 
Stickley described the garden city as "a spontaneous movement 
of the people back to the land"; while Wilhelm Miller, a regular 
contributor to Country Life, emphasized the "'garden" rather 
than urban aspects of the movement. While housing reformers 
such as Frederic C. Howe and Lawrence Veiller called public 
attention to the social reform goal of Howard's garden city, 
most American writers could visualize only middle-class resi­
dents being able to afford such attractive surroundings.11 
Several "garden suburbs" (residential communites adjacent 
to industrial areas) constructed during the first decades of the 
twentieth century appeared to confirm the notion that spacious, 
well-planned communities were too expensive for the average 
worker. Goodyear Heights outside of Akron, Ohio, was designed 
for the company's employees by Warren H. Manning. The Nor­
ton Grinding Company employed John Nolan to build a garden 
suburb for its employees outside Worcester, Massachusetts. 
Aside from the fact that these garden suburbs were little more 
than attractive subdivisions instead of separate communities, 
they were so expensive that only foremen and skilled laborers 
could afford to live in them. Forest Hills, Long Island, built as a 
model garden suburb by the Russell Sage Foundation in 1912, 
was not for low-income residents. Its location on valuable urban 
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property, its well-planned and carefully constructed homes, and 
its beautiful interior parks and playgrounds were delightful; but 
it offered no solution for the poor. The president of the Forest 
Hills Garden Housing Association, Robert W. DeForest, said the 
foundation might have something for the laboring man in the 
future, but not at Forest Hills Gardens. Even Letchworth was 
unable to house the unskilled laborer, in spite of Howard's de­
sire to do so.12 
By the time of the First World War, it was clear that few, if 
any, garden cities or suburbs would be built to siphon workers 
as well as the affluent out of congested areas. Garden city advo­
cates began to recognize what Edward Bellamy's followers had 
learned somewhat earlier—that communal ownership of real 
estate cut against a very tough American grain.13 In the case of 
the garden city, it was a seriously retarding factor. The physical 
planning alone was so revolutionary that it sounded somewhat 
impractical, and the public land ownership made the proposal 
sound socialistic or communistic. The notion that garden city 
publicists and planners were impractical visionaries or danger­
ous radicals was reinforced by testimony given before a Senate 
subcommittee in 1917. A subcommittee of the Senate Commit­
tee on Agriculture and Forestry held hearings on the progress 
of garden cities and suburbs in Europe and America and was 
given an excellent account of the movement by Richard 
Watrous, secretary of the American Civic Association. Watrous 
was followed, however, by a Mr. William T. Lone, who de­
scribed his pet project at Lomax, Illinois—a vast garden city of 
25,000 acres surrounded by 75,000 acres of farmland—all of it 
to be financed by what the senators correctly judged to be the 
most dubious stock arrangements. One senator told Mr. Lone 
that these sorts of projects were "drifting into socialism."14 
Planners and urban reformers noted that industrialists would 
not remove their factories to garden cities until they could be as­
sured it would result in lower costs and higher profits. Until 
this could be proved to corporate executives, the reliance on 
philanthropy to draw factories out of central cities was regarded 
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even by the reform-minded city planner Henry Wright as "some­
what visionary."15 Those who did build factories in suburban 
areas maximized profits by ignoring any obligation to plan for 
the residential areas which grew around the factory gates. The 
result, wrote Carol Aronovici, was simply "the slumification of 
the countryside," with sanitary conditions as bad or worse than 
a city slum.16 
America's entry into the First World War offered a unique 
opportunity to demonstrate the advantages of building entire 
communities for working-class families. The demands of the 
military for war materiel put a severe strain on American indus­
try, particularly the shipbuilding trades. Thousands of laborers 
migrated to industrial centers but, upon finding no living ac­
commodations, often left their jobs. Neither local private real 
estate people or the large corporations holding war contracts 
could house the laborers and their families. They turned to the 
federal government for aid. Faced with slowdowns in war pro­
duction due to this housing situation, the government took the 
unprecedented step of building entire communities for war 
workers. 
The two agencies created for this task were the United 
States Housing Authority and the Emergency Fleet Corpora­
tion. The U.S.H.A. obtained the services of Frederick Law 
Olmsted, Jr.; and the E.F.C. employed Frederic L. Ackerman, 
recently returned from Britain with plans of British war housing 
projects. The government allotted $175,000,000 in 1917 and 
1918, and together the two agencies built seventy-nine projects 
in fifty-two localities constructing over fifteen thousand units of 
low-rent housing. The projects varied in size and quality; but 
the two best—the Bridgeport, Connecticut, projects designed by 
Jacob Crane, and Yorkship Village in Camden, New Jersey-
provided war laborers with housing and town planning avail­
able in the past only to the middle class. While they were not 
garden cities, the two towns brought together all the latest prin­
ciples of design being experimented with in England and Amer­
ica—curvilinear streets, cul-de-sacs, interior parks, row houses, 
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and many other features. The program provided a whole gener­
ation of architects and planners with extremely valuable infor­
mation and experience.17 
The war housing program proved that the federal govern­
ment could, if it wished, build excellent housing or even whole 
communities for moderate income families. There was hope on 
the part of housing reformers and planners that in view of the 
start already made, a permanent federal bureau of housing 
would be established to continue research and experimenta­
tion. Congress, on the other hand, was vociferously opposed. 
The House Committee on Buildings and Grounds was convinced 
that the U.S. Housing Authority had exceeded its mandate and 
hired droves of crackpots and Utopians. "College professors 
and alleged experts in various lines were called in," declared 
the Committee Report, "and designated as "town planners, town 
managers,' etc., ad nauseum and ad absurdum."18 The Senate 
committee was likewise furious that the war agencies had en­
gaged in demonstrations of model housing, presumably feeling 
that military-type barracks would have been more suitable. The 
war housing projects were quickly disposed of and requests for 
a permanent agency rejected. Aside from the planners and a 
few other individuals, there was no pressure to reverse the view 
of Congress. Not even the American Federation of Labor spoke 
out in favor of the housing-planning bureau. The New York 
Federation merely asked that the war projects be retained for 
the laboring men who lived in them.19 
The suburban trend became dominant in the years following 
the First World War. The growth rate of the suburbs finally 
surpassed that of the central cities in the 1920s. Suburban com­
munities burgeoned from New York to Los Angeles; growth 
rates of four or five hundred percent were not uncommon, 
while during the same period the number of wage earners in 
some central core areas began to decline. By the end of the dec­
ade, 5,176,000 persons had moved to suburban homes. The 
automobile and concrete highway opened thousands of here­
tofore inaccessible acres of land around the cities, and the in­
J O S E P H L. ARNOLD 11 
crease of motor vehicle registrations from 9.2 million in 1920 
to 26.5 million in 1930 gives a rough picture of the number of 
Americans who were able to live beyond the end of the street­
car line.20 
The suburban movement remained, however, a fundamen­
tally upper-middle-class trend. The cost of an automobile was 
still too high for most families. Beyond that, suburban houses 
required a large down payment and monthly charges which put 
them even farther out of reach. The average laborer could not 
buy a suburban home. One careful estimator contended that 
close to three-quarters of the suburban houses built in 1924 
were within reach of only one-tenth of the nation's families.21 
Well-planned suburbs of the 1920s catered exclusively to 
the small class of upper-income families. Mariemount, Ohio, 
outside Cincinnati was launched by the philanthropic widow of 
a Cincinnati industrialist, who wished to bring a wholesome 
community life to "all classes of people." The famed planner, 
John Nolan, was called in to lay out the community. As the proj­
ect developed, particularly after its sponsor's death, the cost of 
its houses rose until it was open only to upper-income buyers.22 
The most famous of all planned suburbs (from the point of 
view of real estate developers) was the Country Club District 
of Kansas City whose developer, Jesse Nicholes, was a charter 
member of the American Institute of Planners and a national 
leader among real estate developers. His 6,000 acre community 
on the edge of Kansas City pioneered the construction of sub­
urban shopping centers, control of land use through deed re­
strictions, and comprehensive delivery of community services— 
everything from garbage removal to recreational services. Ob­
viously, the working classes did not seek homes in the Country 
Club District, and blacks were carefully prohibited by perpet­
ual deed covenants.23 
Some lower-income families did manage to buy suburban 
homes. Outside of Detroit, auto workers secured building per­
mits for "garage dwellings" and lived the suburban life in one 
or two room shacks on land purchased at inflated prices. Those 
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who did manage to buy a house often purchased aflimsy struc­
ture squeezed onto a tiny lot in a gridiron pattern that raised 
the cost of both streets and utilities. Ugly, expensive, and 
poorly constructed, most suburbs of the 1920s were an easy 
mark for critics.24 
At the opening of the decade, an article in The Atlantic 
Monthly attacked upper-class suburbs for their garishness and 
banality as well as for their snobbery and introversion. Behind 
their facade of relaxed friendliness was "a hardness and selfish­
ness beyond belief."25 The young critic Lewis Mumford wrote 
in The New Republic of "The Wilderness of Suburbia," which 
he claimed was only part of a deeper urban malaise. The mod­
em industrial agglomeration, with none of the cultural re­
sources of the great cities of the past, was "the negation of a 
city," and the new suburbs were "a negation of that negation." 
Suburbia was not a new and better type of city; it was "the city 
become a traffic thoroughfare; the home, a dormitory; and the 
neighborhood, a stony wilderness a vast aimless drift of 
human beings." Having failed to create a decent life in the 
cities, Americans built suburbia, which, instead of offering a 
remedy, was "an aggravation of the disease."26 
Popular magazines and writers attacked the exclusiveness of 
wealthy suburbs and shoddiness of less affluent ones. Sociol­
ogists, architects, planners, and other urban reformers exam­
ined concrete alternatives to the slipshod methods of the sub­
urban developers. Two of the decade's most deft satirists trained 
their sights on the new suburbs. Ring Lardner's Own Your Own 
Home (1917) exposed the stupidity and criminality of 'easy 
finance" home ownership, while Sinclair Lewis created one of 
the enduring stereotypes of the age with his creation of George 
Babbitt, dealer in suburban real estate.27 
Literary attacks on the shortcomings of suburbs were sup­
ported by evidence from the social sciences. In 1925 Harlan 
Paul Douglas published The Suburban Trend, a pioneering 
study of suburban society. While deploring the physical and 
financial sins of suburbs resulting from "almost criminal misdi­
JOSEPH L. ARNOLD J 3 
rection of effort and investment/' Douglas found their most 
serious problem to be a lack of community identity. He noted 
the divided loyalties of the suburbanite between the commu­
nity where he lives and the city where he works and spends most 
of his waking hours. Unlike rural towns which were centers for 
an agricultural hinterland, the modern suburb had no com­
parable town center in which its residents could meet. He found 
suburbs that were built around former small agricultural towns 
with their old traditions, institutions, and machinery for social 
life appeared to be significantly different from suburbs built on 
raw land. Finally, he found that the high cost of suburban 
homes not only excluded the poor but also young married fam­
ilies and retired couples, which, aside from its effects on the ex­
cluded groups, rendered suburbia socially unbalanced.28 
The gasoline-fueled suburban boom impelled metropolitan 
areas to establish regional planning agencies to at least tie the 
growing suburbs into some system of highways and utility lines. 
Between 1923 and 1929 almost every large metropolitan area 
of the nation created such an agency under private auspices, 
such as the Chicago Regional Planning Association, or as a 
public bureau such as the Los Angeles County Regional Plan­
ning Commission.29 The first, and most famous of these com­
missions was the New York Regional Plan Commission, which 
was established in 1921 by Charles D. Norton and financed by 
the Russell Sage Foundation. Norton died in 1923 (being re­
placed by Frederic A. Delano, an uncle of Franklin Roose­
velt); but he had already set the project in motion by selecting 
as its research director the former secretary of the British Gar­
den City Association, Thomas Adams. The multivolume Re­
gional Plan of New York and its Environs was the most compre­
hensive regional investigation ever undertaken. The Regional 
Plan steered a middle course between timid acquiescence to 
prevailing methods and patterns of metropolitan growth and a 
plan which would so fundamentally alter existing trends that it 
would not be taken seriously. Encompassing an area of 5,528 
square miles, the plan yielded to already established directions 
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of metropolitan growth but suggested controlling these move­
ments through comprehensive zoning, anticipatory purchases 
of park land, and prior construction of highways, streets, and 
utility lines. As might be expected, Adams suggested the con­
struction of entire satellite cities, but this was not a paramount 
part of the plan.30 There were no suggestions for new ways to 
finance suburban homes for working-class families beyond the 
well-worn call for limited-dividend housing corporations.31 
None of the regional planning commissions of the 1920s was 
(or could have been) as boldly comprehensive as most planners 
wished, for they lived at the behest of local business and politi­
cal leaders. No commission presented plans which aimed at 
diverting the growth of metropolitan cities because their spon­
sors never questioned the assumption that bigger was better. 
The regional commissions were supposed to facilitate growth 
by making certain that when real estate developers and indus­
trialists moved into new areas, they would soon have the neces­
sary streets and utilities. 
It was therefore logical that the most radically comprehen­
sive regional planning would, in the 1920s, be carried out by a 
private organization—the Regional Planning Association of 
America. Founded in 1923 by a group of architects and planners 
living in the New York area, the RPAA drew to its informal 
gatherings architects Henry Wright, Clarence Stein, Frederick 
L. Ackerman, Robert D. Kohn, and Frederick Bigger; the econ­
omist Stuart Chase; the reform-minded real estate developer 
Alexander Bing; the naturalist Benton McKaye; and the man 
of many talents, Lewis Mumford. They were later joined by 
Tracy Augur, fresh from the Harvard School of Landscape Ar­
chitecture, and Edith Elmer Wood and Catherine Bauer, both 
of whom were drawn to the group by an interest in low-income 
housing. Stein, Wright, Kohn, Bigger, Augur, and Bauer later 
served as planners or consultants to the greenbelt town pro­
gram. Lewis Mumford perhaps overstated the case years later 
in claiming that without the RPAA, the greenbelt town program 
of the 1930s 'would have been inconceivable"; but the intellec­
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tual debt was very great.32 The RPAA resembled the old Garden 
City Association of America in its advocacy of new towns,33 
but did so in the framework of regional-ecological theories un­
dreamed of by the earlier group. Likewise, the RPAA conceived 
far more detailed and sophisticated plans of the new towns 
themselves.34 On the regional scale it was argued that the motor 
vehicle and electric power transmission lines now permitted 
industrial and commercial enterprises to move far into the coun­
try. New towns (or carefully expanded villages) could now have 
all the modern necessities but planned to preserve their rural 
character. In this manner the large cities would cease their un­
healthy growth rates and millions of Americans would not have 
to forgo modern conveniences or economic necessities to re­
main in the countryside. Within metropolitan areas such 
growth as did occur should be channelled into satellite towns 
close enough for commutation, but built on tracts which would 
interlace the residential areas with parks and open spaces to 
provide a rural atmosphere and delimitate clear neighborhoods, 
villages, and towns. This would prevent compact urban centers 
from dissolving into the formless anticities Mumford decried 
in 1920.35 
The RPAA apparently never formulated a concrete plan for 
a rural new town; but Stein and Wright, in conjunction with 
Alexander Bing's City Housing Corporation, determined to 
build a demonstration satellite town outside New York City. A 
1,258 acre tract was assembled near Fairlawn, New Jersey, near 
a major approach to the George Washington Bridge (then un­
der construction). Construction of the new town of Radburn be­
gan in 1928, and the first of a projected 25,000 residents moved 
in during the summer of the fateful year 1929. 
The Radburn plan embodied many elements built into the 
greenbelt towns.38 The entire town was divided into three ma­
jor villages, each having its own elementary school. Each vil­
lage was divided into more basic neighborhood units by creat­
ing superblocks of thirty-five and forty acres with the houses 
facing away from the street towards interior parks. Neighbors 
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would face each other across grassy parkways rather than traf­
fic thoroughfares. Streets varied according to use: narrow lanes 
for direct access to the buildings, secondary roads around the 
superblocks, main streets connecting the large neighborhoods, 
and express highways linking Radburn with the outside world. 
All pedestrian and vehicular traffic was separated—the walk­
ways often running through the interior parks and crossing roads 
through underpasses. 
Radburn differed from the classic garden city in several 
ways. Common public landholding was rejected in favor of in­
dividual ownership. The City Housing Corporation held title 
only until the area was subdivided, but in so doing it continued 
to control overall town planning. The limited financial resources 
of the corporation forced abandonment of both the encircling 
greenbelt and an industrial area. These were partially compen­
sated by the extensive interior park system and the availability 
of factory sites adjacent to the town. Finally, the town lacked a 
separate government, but developed an active homeowners as­
sociation. 
Not wishing to build another attractive suburb open only 
to the affluent, Radbum's planners designed both the super­
blocks and houses to take advantage of every possible economy. 
Nevertheless, each acre of park or open space increased land 
prices for the residential lots, and homes at Radbum were still 
beyond the reach of the average family.37 Such financial exclu­
siveness was unavoidable. The corporation had to show a de­
cent profit if the project was to be taken seriously by the real 
estate industry. The RPAA was no more successful than any 
other groups in devising ways that moderate-income families 
(not to speak of the poor) could be adequately housed at a 
profit. The RPAA joined slum housing reformers in advocating 
some form of public subsidy for the construction of new 
towns.38 
The Great Depression destroyed Radburn long before it was 
even half finished. Only two superblocks were completed. Like 
thousands of other real estate developers, the City Housing 
Corporation went into receivership in 1933 and was forced to 
J O S E P H L. ARNOLD 17 
dispose of almost all of its undeveloped land. A number of 
Radburn's middle-class wage earners lost their jobs and conse­
quently lost their new homes. The town thus suffered blows 
at every level. The only rapidly growing new towns in America 
in 1933 were the tarpaper "Hoovervilles."' 
Herbert Hoover's administration showed no interest in giv­
ing direct aid to new town developers or to builders. During 
his years as secretary of commerce, the president took an active 
interest in preparing and distributing information on housing 
and city planning. The publication of a Standard City Planning 
enabling act was a significant achievement.39 These aids, he 
thought, were the proper limit of federal encouragement to the 
real estate and construction industries. After the collapse of 
1929, all the technical information seemed superfluous. To 
meet the crises Hoover suggested the creation of a Home Loan 
Bank System which, in normal times, might have been helpful, 
but was woefully inadequate in 1931. Curiously, in the midst 
of the depression when residential construction had virtually 
ceased, Hoover launched his most ambitious research project, 
the President's Conference on Home Building and Home Own­
ership. On December 2, 1931, Hoover opened the conference 
by addressing over a thousand delegates representing govern­
mental, housing, labor, and city planning groups. He lauded 
the character-building role of home ownership, saying, "To own 
one's own home is a physical expression of individualism, of 
enterprise, of independence, and of freedom of spirit."40 Turn­
ing finally to the problem of home financing, the president took 
almost no note of the depression, alleging instead that the 
"chief problem" related to people who could only afford a ten 
to twenty percent down payment. His proposed creation of the 
Home Loan Bank System would solve this problem and thus 
destroy the last hurdle to universal home ownership. He saw no 
necessity for further aid. The purpose of the conference, he 
warned the delegates, was "to stimulate individual endeavor' 
and not "to set up government in the building of homes."41 
Hoover remained a life-long opponent of public housing. 
Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of Reviews and chairman 
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of the Conference Committee on Education and Service (the 
committee charged with publicizing the conference's findings), 
wrote that he was confident the conference would show how 
"millions of workers may own homes with gardens." He too 
warned that "this cannot be done by building barracks as in 
Russia" or "by such re-housing schemes at municipal and na­
tional expense [as] adopted in Great Britain." Shaw concluded, 
"The American plan is to train and develop the individual in the 
capacity and ambition to own his own decent home."42 Ob­
viously, the conference did not begin on a very hopeful note. 
Many conference delegates disagreed with Hoover and 
Shaw. Two major conference committees reported for sweeping 
changes. The Committee on City Planning and Zoning, which 
included John Nolan, Jacob Crane, and Henry Wright, pictured 
Radburn on the frontispiece of its report and called for the con­
struction of new towns as the best way to build a decent envi­
ronment at reasonable cost.43 The Committee on Slums, Blighted 
Areas, and Decentralization recommended the construction of 
subsidized low income housing on the urban fringe.44 
In the opinion of one delegate, Hoover's plea for rugged in­
dividualism fell on deaf ears, for "the spirit of the conference 
was for a right-about-face on this principle."45 A large number 
of delegates spoke in favor of direct government action to build 
homes. Hoover's own secretary of the interior, Ray L. Wilbur, 
concluded at the conference that publically financed housing 
was "inevitable'' unless private builders could somehow meet 
the demand for low-cost housing.46 Other committees, such as 
the important Committee on Home Finance, were presided over 
by conservatives who did not share this view. The conference, 
like the nation itself, hovered indecisively between old methods 
and new experiments. The President's Conference did bring 
together the widely scattered professionals interested in hous­
ing and city planning, and a wealth of material was gathered 
and published. The conference reports distilled over thirty 
years of housing and city planning experiments, and synthesized 
the research of hundreds of urban investigators. President 
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Hoover, locked into an outmoded conception of limited govern­
ment, was unwilling to use this data to launch his own housing 
and urban planning programs. The conference material, and 
many of the architects and planners who wrote it, remained un­
employed until the coming of the New Deal. 
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# ORIGINS OF THE SUBURBAN 
RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM 
The greenbelt towns owe their existence to Rexford 
Tugwell. In the spring of 1935 he convinced President Roose­
velt to pay for their construction out of the unemployment 
appropriation currently being considered by the Congress. The 
greenbelt idea germinated at a time when a number of rural 
land-use and community construction agencies were consolo­
dated by Tugwell, Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, and Roose­
velt into a single organization—the Resettlement Administra­
tion. The agencies absorbed by the R.A. were the Subsistance 
Homesteads Division of the Department of Interior, the Rural 
Rehabilitation Division of the Federal Emergency Relief Ad­
ministration, the Land Utilization Division, also under the 
F.E.R.A., and the Land Policy Section of the Agricultural Ad­
justment Administration. The greenbelt town program was the 
only fundamentally new activity to be undertaken by the Reset­
tlement Administration.1 
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The purpose of the Resettlement Administration as seen by 
Tugwell and its other officials was threefold. First, it was to 
provide aid for marginal but economically "savable'' farms 
through small loans, educational programs, and technical aid. 
The Rural Rehabilitation Division had already made a start in 
these activities, and those programs were expanded. Second, 
the Resettlement Administration was to execute a land reform 
program allowing rural families to move from unproductive 
land and resettle in more fertile areas—on individual farms or 
in cooperative farm communities. The unproductive lands 
which they left were to be used for some nonfarming purpose. 
The Land Utilization Division had been purchasing unproduc­
tive land before it came under the Resettlement Administration, 
but had not developed a program for resettling those families 
whose land had been purchased. The Rural Rehabilitation Di­
vision had constructed a few small farm communities; but the 
Subsistence Homesteads Division, engaged exclusively in rural 
community building, had been far more active. Both programs 
were eventually completed after being coordinated under the 
Resettlement Administration.2 Third, it was obvious to Tugwell 
that the basic rural problem was the increasing technological 
efficiency of farming which, each year, drove thousands of fam­
ilies out of agriculture. These unfortunate families could not 
be resettled in any substantial numbers on more productive 
land because they would simply increase total farm output and 
further depress the market. Therefore, in spite of a temporary 
halt in the migration to urban areas, business would again pick 
up and the inevitable cityward trend would reappear.3 The 
rural family, forced by economic circumstances to seek a living 
in the city, had usually joined other low-income families in 
the urban slums. Slums, like the submarginal farms, persisted 
because no institution offered slum dwellers an alternative 
which they could afford. They paid a high proportion of their in­
come for very low quality housing—tiny apartments unsafely 
crowded together because the land on which they stood was 
valuable and highly taxed. But in the countryside land was in­
expensive and unencumbered by outmoded street patterns and 
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buildings. A builder could construct a large number of homes 
plus all the facilities of urban neighborhoods on inexpensive 
suburban land. There would be room for trees, grass, and sun­
light—all available for the same rent paid in the city slums. 
Tugwell, like Roosevelt, believed that resettling thousands 
of slum dwellers in semiagricultural communities was eco­
nomically unfeasible. Employment would continue to concen­
trate in the urban areas because industries would not move out 
to aggregations of willing workers in rural areas.4 The suburban 
fringe was the only location where the advantages of the coun­
tryside could be combined with the employment opportunities 
of the city.5 Ebenezer Howard had seen this years before when 
he located his garden cities within commuting distance of a 
large central metropolis. However, when Howard's ideas for 
metropolitan planning were combined with the rural resettle­
ment plans of the R.A., a broad program emerged that would 
"make America over."6 
It is not surprising that Roosevelt approved both the coordi­
nation of the existing programs and the inauguration of a new 
program to build suburban towns. He had long been interested 
in city and regional planning. Alfred Bettman, in his Presidential 
Address to the 1933 National Conference on City Planning, 
said that "the outstanding item" in America's city and regional 
planning was "a President who knows and cares about plan­
ning."7 Roosevelt said in 1932 that as a young man he had 
listened to his uncle Frederic Delano discuss city planning with 
the giants of the field and had thereafter kept a vital interest 
not only in the "mere planning of a single city, but in the larger 
aspects of planning."8 He was quite aware of past mistakes in 
the physical planning of our existing structures and the need for 
imaginative solutions. 
We go gaily into projects for putting up new buildings with­
out realizing that there is a limit beyond which we are cut­
ting off more than we are adding on. And this is true not only 
in the city, but in the suburbs and the country. 
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I am convinced that one of the greatest values of this total 
regional planning is the fact that it dares us to make experi­
ments, for this country will remain progressive just so long 
as we are willing to make experiments.9 
In his second Inaugural Address as governor of New York, 
Roosevelt called attention to the failure of local government to 
meet the needs of the modern metropolis. He saw "the unparal­
leled growth of city populations" and the "birth of a new type of 
community known as the suburban area'' creating a host of new 
requirements for highways, sewers, water, and schools.10 
In his Annual Message to the New York Legislature in Janu­
ary, 1931, he told them that the machinery of local government 
"is now obsolete' and recommended a constitutional amend­
ment allowing local governments greater freedom in adopting 
"'modern forms of government."11 
As governor of New York, Roosevelt was an outspoken critic 
of the slums and conceded that private philanthropy in the 
housing of the poor was a failure, but he did not suggest a spe­
cific solution.12 During the 1932 presidential campaign he fol­
lowed a cautious policy in discussing public housing. He en­
dorsed the construction of slum clearance projects for the poor 
but mainly as a means to alleviate unemployment.13 The Demo­
cratic Platform of 1932 approved a federal public works pro­
gram for flood control and waterways, but made no mention of 
housing for the poor, urban decentralization, or new towns.14 
Roosevelt did show concern for what he told the 1931 Gov­
ernor's Conference was "the dislocation of a proper balance be­
tween urban and rural life."15 In his Inaugural Address to the 
nation on March 4, 1933, he said "We must frankly recognize 
the overbalance of population in our industrial centers."18 The 
word "balance'' may be the most descriptive term not only for 
Roosevelt's idea of urban-rural relationships but also for the en­
tire philosophy underlying the New Deal. Several historians 
have remarked on the desire of the New Dealers to strike a 
balance of power between the traditionally antithetical factions 
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of the nation—urban and rural, management and labor, as well 
as interindustrial competition.17 Roosevelt was concerned not 
only with the economic imbalance of society but with the 
physical imbalance of people unnecessarily crowded into con­
gested city slums and those in isolated or unproductive rural 
areas. 
The president was not an advocate of the back-to-the-land 
movement. While he had a deep feeling for rural life and en­
couraged the "breaking down of artifical and unnecessary bar­
riers between the rural and urban communities," he saw the 
futility of attempting to move large numbers of urbanites to 
farms.18 He thought the back-to-the-land question was too nar­
rowly debated between the advocates of either strictly urban 
or strictly rural communities. He saw ''a definite place for an 
intermediate type between the urban and rural, namely a rural-
industrial group."19 Whether he was thinking specifically of a 
garden city or greenbelt type of community is not clear, but it 
is very likely that he was aware of them through his uncle or 
through Thomas Adams, the director of the Regional Plan of 
New York and former secretary of the British Garden City As­
sociation.20 Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt must certainly have had 
some knowledge of the garden city movement and the work of 
the Regional Planning Association of America through her po­
sition as a board member of Alexander Bing's City Housing 
Corporation, the limited dividend company which built Rad-
burn, New Jersey.21 Eleanor Roosevelt was later to become one 
of the most valuable defenders of the greenbelt town programs. 
The Resettlement Administration itself was officially created 
by Executive Order 7027 on April 30, 1935. Subsequent execu­
tive orders transferred the land programs, rural rehabilitation 
programs, rural communities, and subsistence homesteads to 
the Resettlement Administration.22 Tugwell retained his post 
as undersecretary of agriculture, but under E.O. 7027 he also 
became the administrator of the Resettlement Administration, 
responsible only to Roosevelt. Three of the R.A.'s four divisions 
were transfers from other agencies—Land Utilization, Rural Re­
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habilitation, and Rural Resettlement. The fourth division was 
named the Suburban Resettlement Division. It's task was the 
construction of the greenbelt towns under authority granted in 
section (a) of E.O. 7027 which empowered the R.A. to 
administer approved projects involving resettlement of des­
titute or low-income families from rural and urban areas, 
including the establishment, maintenance, and operation, in 
such connection, of communities in rural and suburban 
23 areas.
Tugwell was assisted in the overall Resettlement program 
and in the Suburban Division specifically by personnel trans­
ferred into the R.A. from the three existing agencies and by 
others brought in from outside the government. His deputy ad­
ministrator, a southern liberal named Will W. Alexander, came 
to the R.A. from Dillard University in New Orleans where he 
had been president since 1931. There were a number of assis­
tant administrators, but the most important was Calvin B. Bald­
win, who had been an administrative aid to Henry Wallace. 
Baldwin handled most of the internal administration of the Re­
settlement Administration including personnel problems, a 
number of which arose in the Suburban Division in 1935.24 
First Alexander, and then Baldwin, was to succeed Tugwell as 
administrator of the Resettlement Administration. 
The Suburban Division was headed by John S. Lansill, the 
former chief of the Land Utilization Division of the F.E.R.A. 
and an old friend of Tugwell. The two men met at the Wharton 
School of Finance, but while Tugwell remained in the aca­
demic profession, Lansill went to work on Wall Street. When 
they met again in 1933, Lansill was independently wealthy. 
Lansill had read about TugwelTs new role as an advisor to the 
New Deal administration and stopped to greet him in Washing­
ton before he and Mrs. Lansill sailed for Europe. Tugwell was 
delighted to see his old friend and immediately offered him 
the job of directing the F.E.R.A.'s land program. Lansill de­
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murred, saying he did not want a job with the government. As a 
Republican he was not sure he agreed with the New Deal pro­
gram, and he knew very little about land-use planning. Tugwell 
and Harry Hopkins (who was administrator of the F.E.R.A.) 
finally prevailed on him to take the job on a temporary basis. 
He remained in the government until the spring of 1938 and 
became an enthusiastic advocate of both the land utilization 
program and the suburban town program as well as an admirer 
of Roosevelt.25 
Like Tugwell, John Lansill was strikingly handsome and 
well dressed; but his gentlemanly manner and warm Kentucky 
accent were in sharp contrast to Tugwell's brusque self-confi­
dence—indeed, arrogance—which so often infuriated friend and 
foe alike. Lansill was well suited to handle the administration 
of a project in which so many formerly self-employed and in­
dividualistic architects were forced to work out daily compro­
mises with each other and with the Resettlement Administra­
tion. Controversies would often become so heated that Lansill 
would adjourn them to his home where—over potently refresh­
ing mint juleps—compromises emerged.26 
When Lansill became chief of the Suburban Division, he 
took with him two former assistants from the Land Utilization 
Division. Wallace Richards, Lansill's administrative assistant 
in the land program, remained one of Lansill's closest advisors 
and became the coordinator of the first suburban project— 
Greenbelt, Maryland. The other assistant was Tilford E. Dud­
ley, who became chief of the Land Acquisition Section of the 
Suburban Division. Dudley's experience in assembling large 
tracts of land for the government was to prove crucial to the 
entire suburban program. 
In June, 1935, the Suburban Division established a Research 
Section to determine the location for the projects. Its director 
was Warren J. Vinton, a bright, young economist from Colum­
bia University and a sharp leftwing critic of the New Deal. Vin­
ton remained in the field of public housing and later became 
chief of research for the Public Housing Administration. His 
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opinions carried great weight in the Surburban Division and 
with the directors of the Resettlement Administration.27 
Placement of the greenbelt town program in Tugwell's 
agency was not entirely advantageous. The Suburban Division 
was given unusual freedom in the planning and construction of 
the towns—which it would not have had if placed (perhaps 
more logically) under the direction of Harold Ickes's P.W.A. 
Housing Division. The chief disadvantage of the Suburban 
Division was its association with the more controversial (and 
less successful) programs of the Resettlement Administration. 
From the inception of the R.A. its programs were controver­
sial—as was everything which involved the name of Rexford 
Tugwell. He had a reputation as Roosevelt's most leftist advisor. 
During the 1936 campaign Tugwell was described as "a visible 
and personal link, as it were, between the Comintern in Moscow 
and the aspiring young reformers in Washington."28 When the 
press dubbed the greenbelt towns "Tugwelltowns," it was 
enough to convince many Americans of their sinister portent. 
As a product of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 
1935, the R.A. became a pawn in the larger controversy sur­
rounding the New Deal relief programs. This relief act of 1935 
was the largest single peacetime appropriation in the history of 
the nation. Its size, $4,880,000, and the wide discretionary 
powers given President Roosevelt in its use marked a turning 
point in the New Deal and in the long struggle between the 
two branches of government located at either end of Pennsyl­
vania Avenue.29 During the debate on the Appropriation Act, 
Democratic Congressman James P. Buchanan, a House confer­
ence manager of the bill, said that at his request the comptroller 
general had issued an opinion stating that the president was 
not bound to a strict interpretation of the types of projects he 
could authorize. The president could "adopt any otherwise law­
ful Federal projects he desired" with the work relief funds. 
Congressmen John W. Taber and Bertrand Snell, speaking for 
the Republican opposition, agreed with the comptroller and 
thought it all the more reason to scuttle the bill.30 
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In September, 1935, the Resettlement Administration itself 
provided opponents with more ammunition. The president was 
asked to further widen the R.A.'s authority under E.O. 7027, 
the order originally creating the R.A. to initiate and administer 
soil erosion, stream pollution, and several other types of pro­
jects; the words "'and other useful projects" were added.31 Stan­
ley Reed, acting attorney general of the United States had 
himself questioned the "very broad" power granted by the addi­
tional phrase. He was told "informally" by the R.A. that the 
phrase was needed so that the agency could administer some 
projects for the white-collar class which were not directly au­
thorized by the original Executive Order 7027. There is no direct 
mention of the greenbelt towns, but they were the only white-
collar projects undertaken by the Resettlement Administration. 
It may have been thought that the authorization in paragraph 
(a) to build suburban projects for the "resettlement of destitute 
or low-income families" would prohibit the R.A. from placing 
any higher-income families in the greenbelt towns.32 
The additional phrase did not pass unnoticed. Felix Bruner 
of the Washington Post pointed to it in the first of an extremely 
influential series of articles on the Resettlement Administration. 
He said that the unpublicized addition to E.O. 7027 gave Tug-
well the power to "initiate and administer anything." Tugwell, 
he warned, possessed almost every power "except the power to 
declare war."33 
Thus the New Deal's new town program was created in the 
midst of increasingly bitter political conflict, with its creator 
and chief administrator the object of some of the most heated 
attacks. The R.A. itself existed on a tenuous grant of presi­
dential authority with no assurance of congressional support. 
Its funds, allocated from unemployment relief appropriations, 
placed the greenbelt program in the ambiguous position of both 
an efficient demonstration of planning and construction and a 
speedy make-work project for the unemployed. 
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# CONFLICTS IN THE FORMATION

OF THE GREENBELT TOWN PROGRAM

The R.A. administrators did not immediately turn to 
city planners for design staffs or advisors. Only after consider­
able planning had been done did members of the old Regional 
Planning Association of America and other planners even learn 
of the program. Their entrance resulted in a major reorganiza­
tion of the Suburban Division and a very marked improvement 
in the quality of the towns. 
The planning of the towns began on an unusually warm 
day in February, 1935, when Tugwell took John Lansill and 
Wallace Richards out to the Beltsville National Agricultural 
Research Center. It was located a few miles outside Washing­
ton in a rolling terrain that was still quite rural. As the three 
men walked across the windblown fields adjacent to the center, 
Tugwell explained for the first time his idea for the construc­
tion of a model community that could be built on this land. 
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The town could house not only the employees in the expanding 
research center, but low-income families from Washington's 
slums. He discussed the feasibility of Lansill's Land Utilization 
Division building such model towns outside a number of metro­
politan areas. Tugwell concluded with a confidential offer to 
incorporate Lansill's division into a new agency which he would 
soon suggest to the president—the agency that emerged three 
months later as the Resettlement Administration. The initial 
funds would come from the Emergency Relief Appropriation 
Act then being debated in the Congress.1 
Lansill and Richards knew little about model suburban 
towns but were enthusiastic. By March 12, the Land Utilization 
Division began taking options adjacent to the Agricultural Cen­
ter for what they called Maryland Special Project No. 1. On 
April 2, Tugwell, Lansill, and Richards met again to discuss the 
Beltsville project. Tugwell told them in confidence that the pres­
ident had approved his idea for a Resettlement Administration 
authorized to build several suburban community projects. Tug-
well had second thoughts on the desirability of building a large 
project so close to Washington where it would be under the 
daily scrutiny of the Washington press, the Congress, and all 
the other government agencies. Lansill agreed with Tugwell, 
but Wallace Richards thought this a minor disadvantage com­
pared to the unique opportunity of establishing a housing lab­
oratory in conjunction with the Agricultural Research Center. 
On April 5, Tugwell discussed the project again with the two 
men and gave his general approval for a "housing development" 
adjacent to Beltsville Center.2 
Preliminary reports were prepared on all major aspects of a 
proposed model town program which they called "rurban hous­
ing."3 The projects would, according to Lansill and Richards, 
combine work relief for the unemployed, low-cost housing for 
the slum dweller, long-term community planning, and subsist­
ence farming. Thus, even at this early date, most of the essen­
tial features of the greenbelt town program were laid out. There 
was no specific mention of garden cities; and while one of the 
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purposes of long-term community planning was to "establish a 
more satisfactory relationship for the worker between home, 
community and work," there was no suggestion of including fac­
tories within the project.4 
While Richards's reports were vague as to whether the towns 
were considered to be fullfledged communities along garden 
city lines, they were quite clear regarding housing. Richards 
quickly grasped the significance of low-income housing projects 
in the suburbs. The towns should demonstrate an attempt to 
make housing a "public utility" and remove necessary shelter 
from speculative fields.5 More importantly, Richards saw sub­
urban public housing as an alternative to the P.W.A. slum 
clearance program which was slow, worked too great a hardship 
on slum dwellers being cleared, and was expensive for tenants 
when completed. The chief problem for the P.W.A., as everyone 
from the president on down knew, was land. Assembling many 
small parcels of urban land into a large tract was so costly that 
no adequate low-rent housing could be built on it without a 
large subsidy. Richards concluded that "'rurban" housing pro­
jects should be built on inexpensive suburban land before any 
slums were cleared and rent for prices with which slum housing 
"would not be able to compete," thus correcting "a fundamental 
error in federal slum clearance."6 
While Lansill and Richards were deciding what kind of 
towns they wanted to build, Vinton's Research Section of the 
Suburban Division began to look for cities near which to build 
them. The most important criterion for selecting a city was its 
past and projected stability of employment. A study was made 
of over one hundred major cities to find those with the steadiest 
growth of population, employment, and payrolls from 1900 to 
1933. Primary consideration was given to a city that main­
tained, in addition to steady growth, enlightened labor policies, 
above average wage levels, a diversity of industry, and, finally, 
a suitable site on its fringe for the construction of an entire new 
suburb.7 The preliminary survey resulted the recommendation 
of nineteen metropolitan areas: New York, Boston, Pittsburgh, 
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Detroit, Philadelphia, Chicago, Providence-Fall River, Bridge­
port-New Haven, Youngstown, Worcester, Wheeling, St. Louis, 
Cincinnati, Buffalo, and Los Angeles. On a secondary list were 
Baltimore, San Francisco, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis-St. 
Paul.8 
Further consideration by Vinton led to a major revision in 
the original group of cities. Los Angeles and San Francisco 
were dropped because they were too far from the R.A.'s offices 
in Washington. The program was going to be closely supervised 
and coordinated—the planners doing most of their work in 
Washington. Detroit was eliminated because it was too depend­
ent on a single industry and was far from qualifying as a center 
of enlightened labor policies. A revised list was prepared in 
August. It proposed the construction of nine suburban towns. 
The cities of St. Louis, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and Chicago 
were retained. Three new cities were added—New Brunswick, 
New Jersey; Dayton, Ohio; and Chattanooga, Tennessee.9 
The three new cities were selected for reasons not altogether 
dependent on the original criteria. New Brunswick, New Jersey, 
was selected at the suggestion of Russell Black, a city planner 
from New Hope, Pennsylvania, just across the Delaware River 
from New Jersey. Vinton visited the New Brunswick area and 
found an excellent site midway between that city and the 
smaller industrial town of Bound Brook, New Jersey. He be­
lieved that the area would experience a rapid industrial expan­
sion out from New York—an assumption which proved to be 
correct. Also, he convinced the R.A. administrators that it was 
important to demonstrate their suburban program in the New 
York metropolitan area since it was the center of the communi­
cations media and had the largest concentration of architects 
and city planners. Chattanooga, Tennessee, was selected in 
part because the R.A. wanted to construct one of its towns in the 
area of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The selection of Dayton, 
Ohio, is less clear and Vinton does not recall why it was chosen.10 
The first subsistence homesteads project to receive federal 
funds was located outside Dayton, but there is no evidence 
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that this influenced the selection of that city for a suburban 
town.11 It is curious, however, that both Beltsville, Maryland, 
and Cincinnati, Ohio, were under consideration for subsistence 
homesteads when that program was shifted to the Resettlement 
Administration. They were two of sixty-four tentative subsist­
ence homestead projects transferred to the Suburban Division 
of the Resettlement Administration for further study.12 Greater 
Cincinnati Homesteads, as the one project was called, was 
never given serious consideration by the Suburban Division for 
subsistence homesteads. No site was ever selected nor any land 
optioned. Beltsville Homesteads, on the other hand, remained 
in the overall plans for Greenbelt until 1936, but it too was 
finally dropped.13 The only subsistence homestead project in 
which the Suburban Division played a major developmental 
role was Jersey Homesteads outside of Hightstown, New Jersey. 
This highly publicized project for Jewish garment industry 
workers was initiated in 1934; but due to a disagreement be­
tween the R.A., the project sponsors, and the garment unions, 
construction was in abeyance when the Suburban Division took 
charge of the half-completed site. The community became one 
of the nine towns to be financed with the Suburban Division 
appropriation, but was later separated from the division's pro­
gram and completed by the R.A.'s Construction Division.14 
Guessing the cost of the towns was very difficult. The R.A.'s 
estimate was much too low. The nine sites selected by the re­
search staff became the basis of Tugwell's first proposal for an 
allotment of funds from Roosevelt. The cost of each town was 
set at $7,550,000 which meant a total cost of $68,000,000 for the 
nine towns.15 The funds were to be allotted by the president 
from the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935; and 
therefore Tugwell had to compete for it with Harry Hopkins 
and Harold Ickes. 
The Relief Act of 1935 had been requested by Roosevelt in 
his Annual Message to Congress on January 4, 1935, and Con­
gress followed his guidelines for the manner in which the money 
was to be spent. Unfortunately, a number of these guidelines 
 41 JOSEPH L. ARNOLD
were very unsuitable to the greenbelt towns. The act was in­
tended to take all those still on relief rolls and put them to work 
on government projects. These projects would (1) be of per­
manent use to the nation, (2) provide an income to the worker 
greater than relief payments but below prevailing wages in pri­
vate business, (3) use large numbers of laborers, (4) be serf-
liquidating or reasonably close to it, (5) be as noncompetitive 
with private industry as possible, (6) be planned so that relief 
laborers could be quickly put to work and speedily dismissed 
when private employment increased, and (7) be located in 
areas of the most severe unemployment.16 
Guidelines four through seven were particularly difficult, if 
not impossible, to meet. The towns could be self-liquidating 
only if high rents were charged, but this would open them only 
to middle-class tenants and put the federal government into 
competition with private builders and landlords. If the towns 
were to demonstrate the best in American city planning and 
architecture, they could not be quickly thrown up to give peo­
ple immediate employment, nor could they be built efficiently 
by relief laborers, few of whom had the necessary skills. Also, 
the cities selected by the R.A. for the suburban towns were 
chosen because of their economic health, whereas the relief pro­
jects were to be located in areas with the most serious unemploy­
ment problems. 
The greenbelt towns shared much in common with Ickes's 
P.W.A. housing projects; but Ickes, suspicious of both Hopkins 
and Tugwell, was not initially pleased with R.A.'s suburban 
housing program. On August 27, 1935, Tugwell proposed that 
the president allocate the funds necessary for the suburban 
towns, but Ickes blocked it in the President's Advisory Com­
mittee on Allotments, noting in his diary, "It is extraordinary 
how duplicating agencies intending to do precisely the same 
thing keep bobbing up here like mushrooms after a rain."17 
Knowing Ickes's jealousy for rivals, the Suburban Division and 
the R.A. resolved to win him over. The opportunity presented 
itself most naturally in the Central Housing Committee rather 
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than the Advisory Allocations Committee. The Central Housing 
Committee was composed of representatives from all the fed­
eral agencies engaged in housing activities—the Resettlement 
Administration being represented by Tugwell, Lansill, and War­
ren J. Vinton.18 Ickes was told that the R.A.'s Suburban Divi­
sion wished only to build a limited number of demonstration 
projects. The interior secretary was convinced that these pro­
jects were not intended to challenge his position as the chief fed­
eral home builder, and he lent staff members and records freely 
to the Suburban Division.19 
Harry Hopkins, first with the Federal Emergency Relief Ad­
ministration and then in 1935 with the Works Progress Admin­
istration, placed special emphasis on getting people to work 
quickly on small, very flexible projects. Hopkins was not con­
cerned about the Resettlement Administration duplicating the 
housing function of Ickes's P.W.A., but he wanted as much of 
the E.R.A.A. money as possible to be quickly translated into 
jobs for the unemployed.20 A powerful ally of Hopkins was the 
secretary of the treasury, Henry Morgenthau. Morgenthau was 
never interested in Tugwell's greenbelt towns or any other re­
settlement projects. When Tugwell, as assistant secretary of 
agriculture, obtained a $67,000,000 allotment from the president 
for rural rehabilitation, Morgenthau succeeded in taking it 
away from him by telling Roosevelt that Tugwell had not even 
spent all of his previous allocations.21 Morgenthau believed 
that Hopkins's methods provided the best use for federal relief 
funds. 
The crucial decision for the greenbelt town funds came on 
September 12, 1935. Roosevelt called together all the chief 
administrators of the relief and public works programs to meet 
with him at Hyde Park and decide on the allocations for the 
balance of the $4,880,000,000 relief appropriations. The confer­
ence was attended by Morgenthau, Hopkins, Ickes, Tugwell, 
Lee Pressman (Tugwell's general counsel in the R.A.), Daniel 
Bell (the president's budget director), and several others.22 
There is no record of the conference, but it is clear that with ap­
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proximately 1,500,000 employable people still on relief rolls, 
Hopkins's quick-action projects were the obvious solution. Sec­
retary Morgenthau urged that most of the funds go to Hopkins, 
which is the policy Roosevelt followed.23 Tugwell received a 
total of $126,500,000 for the Resettlement Administration and 
$31,000,000 of this amount was allotted to the greenbelt towns, 
with the implication that another $37,500,000 might be forth­
coming at a later date. The president, that is, approved a con­
struction program totalling $68,500,000 but allocated only 
$31,000,000 in September:24 it was a typical Rooseveltian com­
promise. 
The failure of the Suburban Division to get the full 
$68,500,000 was a disappointment because there was no cer­
tainty that Congress would again appropriate relief money or 
allow the president to use it for model suburban towns—or, in­
deed, as turned out—that the president himself would be willing 
to sink any more into the program. Far more serious, however, 
were the stipulations which the president attached to the allo­
cation. First, the Suburban Division had to obtain permission 
from the Works Progress Administration to begin each town. 
The W.P.A. would ascertain whether the supply of relief labor 
in the area of each proposed project warranted the expenditure 
of relief funds. Second, the W.P.A. had to certify that each 
worker hired by the Suburban Division was on relief, unem­
ployed, or in need of a government job. Third, and most im­
probable, the land for the towns had to be purchased and con­
struction begun by December 15, 1935; and the towns had to be 
completed by the end of fiscal 1935 (June 30, 1936).25 These 
stipulations—made out of the justifiable desire to give immediate 
employment to people in desperate need of work—greatly com­
plicated, confused, and ultimately crippled the suburban town 
program. Tugwell phoned LansuTs office from Hyde Park to tell 
him and his staff the good—and the bad—news concerning the 
allocation. Lansill explained the strings attached to the money 
and turned to Tilford Dudley saying, "Well Ted, it's all up to 
you now.'' Dudley remembers that nobody in the room was 
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smiling. The task of assembling large tracts of land in ninety 
days seemed impossible. They didn't even begin to discuss how 
plans for the towns would be ready for construction crews by 
December 15.28 
The number of towns was cut from nine to five even though 
there still appeared some possibility of obtaining the full 
$68,500,000. Only those projects could be started at which some 
progress had been made in land optioning. The Beltsville site 
was already in the hands of the Resettlement Administration 
—the land having been purchased with unexpended funds from 
the old subsistence homesteads program.27 Likewise, the 
Hightstown site had been purchased by the Subsistence Home­
steads Division prior to its transfer to the Resettlement Admin­
istration.28 Tilford Dudley's Land Section—charged with the re­
sponsibility of obtaining the other suburban sites—had begun 
work at four other locations (Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Bound 
Brook, and St. Louis). It was clear that Dudley's task at these 
four sites was all he could handle; and therefore, the others were 
dropped. St. Louis was excluded at the end of October when the 
land could not be purchased by December 15.29 
While the Land Section furiously set to work collecting op­
tions at the project sites, the R.A. jostled and cajolled its way 
through the certifications and approvals necessary to obtain the 
funds. Any delay in the program could have resulted in the 
Suburban Division funds being transferred to a program that 
would employ people more quickly. On September 23 the presi­
dent officially requested the $31,000,000 by Allocation Memo 
No. 551. However, the allocation was appended by a memo 
from Budget Director Bell stating that he was advised by the 
W.P.A. that no supply of relief labor existed in the Beltsville, 
Maryland, area, the Bound Brook, New Jersey, area, or the Chat­
tanooga area and that it was doubtful if a sufficient supply ex­
isted at any of the other sites.30 Nevertheless, Corrington Gill, 
assistant administrator of the W.P.A., certified the Beltsville pro­
ject on September 30 and the remaining projects on October 
18.31 
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The first hurdle for the Suburban Division to surmount was 
a formidable one—Comptroller General McCarl. McCarl was 
the chief of the General Accounting Office which had been 
created by Congress in 1921 to oversee executive allocations. 
McCarl performed his duties diligently and was approached 
with great care by the R.A. for fear that he would not allow 
funds from the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act to be used 
for building greenbelt towns. Before any funds were transferred, 
the top R.A. and Suburban Division officials went personally 
to McCarl to explain the suburban projects to him, which flat­
tered the comptroller considerably.32 On October 9, Lee Press­
man and Wallace Richards officially requested approval of the 
fund transfer from Comptroller McCarl for the purpose of exe­
cuting suburban projects at nine locations. The comptroller gen­
eral said he would approve the funds under the authority of 
section 1, paragraph (b) of the Emergency Relief Appropriation 
Act of 1935. However, he questioned the large number of 
projects and whether they could be defined as "rural rehabilita­
tion." Tugwell answered that on the nine approved locations 
only three or four would be selected for actual use. Thus the R.A. 
could "prevent any group of speculators in any one place from 
attempting to hold up the Administration for exorbitant prices 
for the land." The projects would derive part of their income 
from "agricultural work performed within the community," 
thereby satisfying the rural rehabilitation requirement.33 Mc-
Carl approved the fund transfer on October 10. The next day, 
October 11, the suburban town program was to be announced 
to the press, and a few men were to begin clearing the site at 
Greenbelt. 
Late in the day on the 10th, Lansill received a call from 
District of Columbia Commissioner George Allen. Allen, as 
chief of the District W.P.A., was sending 800 transient laborers 
to Greenbelt the next day and another 700 the day after.34 The 
president himself had thought this was a good way to rid the 
capital city of 1500 unemployed and somewhat undesirable 
men—leftovers from the bonus marchers, unemployed men who 
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had drifted into the capital, and local unemployed, homeless 
men.35 Roosevelt issued an Executive Order transferring all the 
transients in the District of Columbia to the Resettlement Ad­
ministration by November 1. Allen was quoted as saying that 
this action solved "the greatest single relief problem which the 
District government faces."36 The local press regarded it as a 
coup for the District government and an important step in the 
national administration's program to move unemployed persons 
from relief rolls to useful work projects.37 One can only imagine 
the consternation of the Suburban Division officials. 
The construction at Greenbelt was begun on October 12; 
but the Greenbelt planners were not ready with blueprints, so 
the entire labor force was put to work creating a lake.38 The lake 
was of marginal utility to the plans for Greenbelt and began 
to devour large amounts of money before a single foundation 
was laid. The press release announcing the commencement of 
the Beltsville project and the suburban town program—issued 
on October 11—said that Beltsville would be built "with effi­
ciency, economy and speed"; but the emphasis was obviously on 
speed at the cost of both efficiency and economy.39 At Green­
belt the planners were at least well under way, but the other 
projects were still far from the drawing board stage as the Sub­
urban Division had not even completed hiring of planning di­
rectors or draftsmen.40 C. B. Baldwin later summarized his feel­
ings at the time: "I was scared to death."41 
The unexpected addition to the Beltsville labor force under­
scored the necessity for an acceleration of the program. A speed­
up in planning, however, appeared unlikely because a major 
conflict within the Suburban Division reached its climax at this 
same time. The planning staff, assembled in the summer of 
1935, divided its attention between the Beltsville and Hights­
town projects since the government already owned the land and 
could begin construction immediately.4- The chief of the Plan­
ning Section was Thomas Hibben, an engineer. He turned the 
planning of Hightstown and Beltsville over to his Engineering 
Section which was under the direction of another engineer, 
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Frank Schmitt. The houses and other buildings were planned 
by architects in an Architectural Section.43 Engineers were em­
ployed to plan the towns because Lansill, C. B. Baldwin, and 
even Tugwell did not have sufficient confidence in professional 
town planners, whom they regarded as impractical and Utop­
ian.44 This was a serious error. The engineers produced an undis­
tinguished plan for Hightstown and a plan for Beltsville that 
was expensive and clumsy. It called for sixty miles of streets laid 
out in a geometric pattern.45 
Fortunately, Lansill asked Tracy Augur, the chief town plan­
ner for the T.V.A., to give his advice on the plans being prepared 
by the engineers. Augur, a member of the Regional Planning 
Association of America in the 1920s, was dismayed with the 
work of the Engineering Section. The engineers were reluctant 
to show anyone their drawings; but in late July or early August, 
Augur and Warren Vinton were able to spirit a copy of the Belts­
ville plan out of the engineers' office and show it to Lansill, Bald­
win, and Tugwell. They urged the three administrators to turn 
the job over to professional planners. Augur brought Henry 
Wright, Clarence Stein, and Frederick Bigger to Washington 
to meet the R.A. officials and review the town plans.46 The great 
English town planner and architect of Hempstead Garden Sub­
urb, Sir Raymond Unwin, was also brought to the R.A. offices in 
August to discuss the program and added his approval of a 
change.47 The result of all this advice was to convince Tugwell 
and the other R.A. officials that a basic reorganization should 
be made. All the engineers should be replaced with town plan­
ners—a separate team for each town. The suburban town plan­
ning should also be completely separated from the subsistence 
homestead program. 
Thomas Hibben was transferred on August 16 to Tugwell's 
office as advisor on engineering problems for the entire Resettle­
ment Administration—thus removing him from the Suburban 
Division. Frank Schmitt, and his staff in the Suburban Division 
Engineering Section, were reorganized as a separate Construc­
tion Division and took no further part in the planning of the 
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suburban towns.48 The two architects who directed the Archi­
tectural Section were gradually eased out. During October and 
November almost every one of the original planning officials 
had either been transferred or fired.49 
Hibben's replacement was Frederick Bigger, the associate 
of Stein and Wright. He took over direction of the planning 
on October 4—one week before construction began at Green­
belt.50 In his capacity as chief of planning for the Suburban 
Division, Bigger became the key figure in the new planning pro­
gram. He wielded great authority because he was a senior ad­
ministrator with technical training in architecture and town 
planning. He was slight of build and quiet. Certainly he had 
none of Tugwell's dashing brilliance or Lansill's savoir faire. He 
did possess a detailed working knowledge of every aspect of 
architectural planning combined with a shrewd administrative 
ability and great patience. He and Lansill worked extremely 
well together and are the two men most responsible for execut­
ing the greenbelt town program. While Tugwell deserves the 
credit for originating the program, that remains his most signif­
icant contribution. Any discussion of the towns should mention 
all three names equally. Frederick Bigger was the one respon­
sible for all the key policy statements and basic decisions con­
cerning the planning of the towns. 
Bigger, along with John Nolan of the Harvard City Plan­
ning School, selected all the new planners and architects. Dur­
ing the 1920s, Nolan headed the nation's largest city planning 
firm and had been in close contact with British planners such as 
Ebenezer Howard and Raymond Unwin.61 The R.A. had the 
pick of the best planners and architects in America—this group 
was one of the hardest hit of all professions during the depres­
sion. Architectural work declined eighty-six percent between 
1928 and 1932, and construction had increased little by 1935.52 
A staff of twenty-six planning directors was quickly assembled: 
Greenbelt: Wallace Richards, project coordinator; Hale 
Walker, town planner; Reginald J. Wadsworth, principal archi­
tect; Douglas D. Ellington, principal architect; Harold Bursley, 
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engineering designer; Greenbrook: Isaac McBride, project co­
ordinator; Henry Wright, town planner; Allan F. Kamstra, 
town planner; Albert Mayer, principal architect; Henry S. 
Churchill, principal architect; Ralph Eberlin, engineering de­
signer; Greenhills: Albert L. Miller, project coordinator; Justin 
A. Hartzog, town planner; William A. Strong, town planner; 
Roland A. Wank, principal architect; G. Frank Cordner, princi­
pal architect; William G. Powell, engineering designer; Green­
dale: Fred L. Naumer, project coordinator; Jacob Crane, town 
planner; Elbert Peets, town planner; Harry H. Bentley, princi­
pal architect; Walter G. Thomas, principal architect; Charlton 
D. Putnam, engineering designer; Tracy Augur, Catherine 
Bauer, Russell Black, Earle Draper, J. Andre Fouilhoux, and 
Clarence Stein, general advisors.23 The directors were assisted 
by a staff of over four hundred people. The size of the staff was 
large because of the speed with which plans had to be prepared. 
This, of course, further increased the ultimate costs of the 
towns.54 
The planning staffs and supporting personnel moved into 
their offices at the end of July. They were housed in the fifty-
four-room Evelyn Walsh-McLean mansion at 2020 Massachu­
setts Avenue. Built by the copper king, Thomas Walsh, the 
house had been a center of Washington social life for over thirty 
years. The offices became a curiosity to visitors who joked about 
the clattering of typewriters in rococo bathrooms and archi­
tectural conferences in converted bedrooms. The main ballroom 
was crammed with drawing tables over which long-necked 
drawing lights bobbed like a fleet of sailboats on a sea of blue­
prints.56 Contemporary photos of shirt-sleeved engineers work­
ing under high baroque ceilings looked very much of the "realist 
school" of Soviet painters depicting the engineers of the new 
society at work in the former palaces of the czars. 
As a matter of fact, the planners of the greenbelt towns 
were hardly to be compared with either Soviet or American 
revolutionaries. While some American planners looked long­
ingly at the Soviet Union's engineered society,56 the same was 
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not true of the average American architect, who was generally 
a white, Anglo-Saxon conservative.57 The great majority of the 
architects and engineers who directed the greenbelt town pro­
gram were Republicans. Their enthusiasm was not solely phil­
anthropic; it was also sparked by the technical challenge of the 
program. Lansill remembers that several of the chief architects 
and town planners remarked to him that while they could make 
far more money in private practice when prosperity returned, 
they would remain in the Suburban Division forever if they 
could continue planning more greenbelt towns.58 They were in­
spired by a program which became the most significant Ameri­
can experiment with garden city building the nation had ever 
seen. Will Alexander says, "They were sure this Resettlement 
Administration was going to revolutionize things."59 Marquis 
Childs recalled the enthusiasm of the planners who kept the 
lights burning far into the night at the MacLean mansion— 
"They thought they were planning a new world."60 
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LAND ACQUISITION

In August, 1935, Warren Vinton wrote from the Black-
stone Hotel in Chicago: 
Ted [Tilford] Dudley and I have been moving through the 
country preparing to buy land in the grand manner. In Cin­
cinnati I laid out a tract of some 20,000 acres. We will 
stop back on Wednesday and narrow down the area. I'm de­
lighted with the good results we are getting, but I find a 
good deal of initial difficulty in getting cooperation. The 
country has been run to death with project planning fol­
lowed by nothing thereafter, and the people are sick of it.1 
The deadine stipulated by the president greatly increased the 
chance that the greenbelt town projects would become another 
New Deal plan that died aborning. While the Land Section had 
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begun operations at each of the five project sites, only at Belts­
ville, Maryland, had substantial progress been made. 
The Land Section of the Suburban Division played only a 
small role in the acquisition of land for Greenbelt, Maryland, 
because most of it had been optioned by the Land Utilization 
Division of the Federal Emergency Relief Administraton and 
the Subsistence Homesteads Division of the Interior Depart­
ment.2 The Suburban Division of the Resettlement Administra­
tion inherited the previously optioned land and added to these 
properties until a total of 12,189 acres had been purchased by 
September, 1935.3 Most of this land was ultimately transferred 
to the Agricultural Research Center. The Resettlement Admin­
istration retained 3,371 acres which were purchased at a cost of 
$556,632.15, or an average price of $165.00 per acre.4 The R.A. 
advertised a land cost figure of $91.00 per acre, and this has 
been accepted by scholars,5 who failed to note that the figure 
was an average of the entire 12,189 acres rather than the portion 
of this tract which the R.A. retained as the site for Greenbelt.6 
The prospects of purchasing enough land for the other four 
towns at a reasonable price appeared dim. The Land Section 
staff was very small considering the fact that it was responsible 
for the purchase of thousands of acres of land scattered across 
a thousand miles of the nation. Only seven full-time negotiators 
were available to cover the five sites. These men were aided by 
a small staff of clerical workers and professional land apprais­
ers.7 Tilford Dudley attempted to build a larger staff of nego­
tiators and appraisers by raiding the Farm Credit Administra­
tion; but the F.C.A. complained to Tugwell, and Dudley was 
forced to use only the few he had.8 This necessitated the use of 
private real estate firms to negotiate the options. While this had 
certain advantages, it placed a great responsibility on people 
whose only interest in the greenbelt town program was a finan­
cial reward. The government negotiators were compelled to act 
as a reserve force for these local firms. The Washington staff, 
aided by the use of a TVA airplane, attempted to be every­
where at once. Dudley in particular spent most of his nights 
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sleeping on railroad trains or in the airplane as he shuttled back 
and forth between Washington and the five project sites.9 
In St. Louis the reluctance of the local real estate agency to 
act promptly contributed to the failure of the entire project. 
Dudley believed that this firm—the largest in St. Louis at the 
time—was not in need of extra work and therefore gave honest 
but leisurely service. By November when the acquisition pro­
grams at the other sites were nearly completed, the St. Louis 
firm had hardly begun. Dudley decided to hire another firm 
and continued optioning through his own negotiators, but pre­
cious time was lost. A second agency was found late in Novem­
ber, but it was not until January that it completed the optioning 
program. By that time the R.A. officials decided that sufficient 
funds were not available for the St. Louis project anyway, and 
it was abandoned. The loss of this project was not a severe blow 
to the Suburban Program, for no work had been done on town 
planning and the $24,438.11 consumed in obtaining options and 
clearing the titles comprised only .08% of the Suburban Divi­
sion's allotment.10 
In Cincinnati the R.A. was extremely fortunate in securing 
the services of the Walter Schmidt Real Estate Company. It was 
the largest in Cincinnati, and Schmidt was a national figure 
in the real estate business as an officer and later president of the 
National Association of Real Estate Boards. Schmidt had pub­
licly opposed the federal housing program but was tactfully ap­
proached by Dudley and several other R.A. officials, who ex­
plained the entire concept of the greenbelt town project to him 
emphasizing its experimental and limited nature. Schmidt ac­
cepted the commission, and a week after the funds came 
through from Hyde Park, twelve of his negotiators were in the 
field collecting options.11 
Two smaller real estate firms were selected in Milwaukee; 
but what they lacked in size, they compensated for in diligence. 
The agents began work on August 29, but on September 18 
Tugwell informed Dudley that the project was about to be can­
celed. The R.A. had decided that Milwaukee's needs for low­
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rent housing were not as severe as those in most other cities, 
especially since the P.W.A. had begun a housing project 
there.12 Also, the R.A. did not wish to appear to be competing 
with Secretary Ickes's program. In the middle of October the de­
cision was reversed, and there was very little time left to gather 
the options. The local agents, aided by as many negotiators as 
the Washington office could spare, "worked with a white heat of 
intensity."13 The agents labored round the clock to take options, 
clear titles, and complete the many other steps in assembling 
land for the federal government. They worked from early morn­
ing until late evening in the field seven days a week, coming 
back to the office where another staff collated the material dur­
ing the night.14 The optioning was supposed to have been com­
pleted by November 20, but Dudley got a five-day extension. 
The last option was taken on the twenty-fifth, whereupon Dud­
ley gathered up all the options along with the appraisals, title 
records, and other information, and rushed by train to Wash­
ington where they were presented to Tugwell and Lansill, who 
gave approval the following day.15 
The land optioning, in all cases, had to be kept secret, for 
as Dudley and other federal land purchasers had found, "land 
owners take a special delight in holding their government up for 
high prices."18 The Housing Division of the P.W.A. was forced 
to give up major projects in St. Louis and Chicago during 1935 
because land prices skyrocketed when news of the plans reached 
the public.17 Nor could the Land Section force the sale of land. 
Condemnation proceedings would take too long and had not 
been sustained by the federal courts.18 
The real estate agents in Cincinnati were making rapid prog­
ress when the Cincinnati Enquirer came out on October 2 with 
a premature announcement of the Resettlement Administration 
project.19 The leak had occurred in Washington, and the Land 
Section was naturally furious; but the negotiators were told 
to discount the story and tell everyone that "it was simply an­
other rumor and that they did not know anything except 
that they were working for the Schmidt Company and under 
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orders from their superiors."20 The newspaper was not able to 
follow up with further information, and options continued to 
flow into the Schmidt offices. At the same time, R.A. officials 
began to inform key figures in the Cincinnati area to line up 
their support when the project would be officially announced. 
The site originally selected included land belonging to a 
number of stubborn German farmers and days went by before 
they were convinced to sell. The R.A. in Washington told the 
negotiators that if optioning could not be completed by October 
15, the project might have to be given up. One individual named 
Muehlenhard proved unshaking in his desire to keep his land. 
When Harold Gelnaw, the Land Section's "high pressure ace," 
was flown in from Milwaukee to convince Muehlenhard, he was 
chased from the property with a three foot corn knife. Finally, 
Dudley was able to induce the man to visit the Schmidt Com­
pany offices where the full story of the project was presented to 
him. He was first exhorted to help the children of the slums 
through which the R.A. had driven him on the way to the office. 
Later he was threatened with condemnation proceedings.21 Af­
ter five hours the exhausted man signed an option and handed 
it to an equally exhausted staff which quickly gathered this and 
the other options and caught a train for Washington. They were 
due to report the next morning, October 17, on the completion 
of the optioning program.22 
In Washington the entire plan was reviewed, and it was de­
cided to shift the tract slightly to the south: this entailed further 
optioning. By the time the agents were back in the field, news 
of the project was well known in the area. An attorney for the 
Cincinnati Building and Loan League had even been meeting 
with land owners urging them not to sell out to the federal 
government. This action simply raised the price of the proper­
ties remaining to be optioned. Tugwell thought these prices 
were too high and ordered the negotiators to begin taking op­
tions to the north, thus playing one group of property owners 
off against the other. By the time this game was finished, the 
R.A. had options on 11,860 acres, which stretched for several 
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miles along the edge of the Mill Creek Valley in Hamilton 
County.23 
On December 3, 1935, Tugwell, Lansill, Dudley, Vinton, 
and the chief planners for Greenhills met to decide where to 
locate the town. Vinton said that the southern-most site was 
the best because it was closer to the factories in the valley 
where many of the residents would be employed and closer as 
well to Cincinnati. The further away the town was, the higher 
the transportation cost would be. Tugwell overruled him, how­
ever, saying that the land was too expensive. The northern lo­
cation was chosen.24 Premature publicity and lack of local co­
operation, then, did not destroy the Cincinnati project, but did 
force the R.A. to build on a less advantageous site. 
In Milwaukee the R.A. had taken the extra precaution of 
keeping its identity hidden from the real estate agents during 
the early weeks of land optioning. Information was, however, 
again inadvertently leaked by the federal government. In early 
December a group of R.A. officials checked into a leading hotel 
in Milwaukee and "stupidly talked in the lobby and in the 
open rooms about the Milwaukee project."25 Optioning was al­
most completed, but the first reaction of the press and public 
was one of skepticism and suspicion. This reaction could have 
had serious consequences had the R.A. not previously estab­
lished a close relationship with the city and county officials. 
Immediately after the site had been selected, Vinton and Dud­
ley explained the entire program to Milwaukee's popular So­
cialist Mayor Daniel W. Hoan and several other local officials. 
They were pleased with the willingness of the Resettlement 
Administrators to seek their support. More importantly, they 
were enthusiastic about the project itself.20 Therefore, when the 
official announcement of the project was made on December 
15, 1935, Mayor Hoan, U.S. Congressman Raymond J. Cannon, 
and a host of other Milwaukee area officials gave it their ap­
proval.27 Harold Gelnaw, who headed the Milwuakee land ac­
quisition program, told reporters that the R.A. received better 
cooperation in Milwaukee than in any other city.28 He may 
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still have been thinking of his encounter with the knife-wielding 
Mr. Muehlenhard. 
Some apprehensions persisted, particularly among real es­
tate groups and building and loan companies, but an attempt 
was made to win even their support. Lansill, Vinton, Jacob 
Crane (one of the chief architects), and several others went to 
Milwaukee and explained the project to these two groups.26 
Not everyone was convinced. There were continual reports that 
some of the building and loan groups and other individuals 
were about to seek court action to block the project, but no case 
was ever presented. The building and loan people may have 
been restrained from their action by the continued "solemn 
backing" of the local political leaders and the pressure that 
these leaders may have exerted on them.30 
Rexford Tugwell was anxious to have the greenbelt towns 
demonstrate "the advantage of locating in suburban areas 
where land prices are lower."31 He also hoped that the public 
would compare the slum clearance projects—built on higher 
priced land—with the spacious greenbelt towns.32 He was, there­
fore, most anxious to buy land at the lowest possible price, and 
in this regard the land acquisition program was an unquestion­
able success. 
Land prices at the three towns bore a direct relation to the 
distance of the tract from the central city. The land at Green­
belt, located approximately twelve miles from downtown Wash­
ington, was $165.00 per acre.The land for Greenhills, Ohio 
(5,930 acres), lay approximately four and one-half miles from 
Cincinnati and was purchased for an average price of $268.58 
per acre.33 The 3,410 acre tract34 for Greendale, Wisconsin, was 
located only three miles southwest of Milwaukee and thus the 
most expensive-$372.50.36 At Greenhills and Greendale the 
purchase price was below the value estimated by independent 
appraisers who set the Greenhills land at $268.58 per acre and 
the Greendale land at $412.52.36 Most striking was the contrast 
between the land prices paid by the R.A. and the P.W.A. The 
P.W.A. at this time was paying an average of $.44 per square foot 
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for their slum real estate which amounts to a cost of $19,166.40 
37 per acre.
In contrast to the land acquisition programs at Greenbelt, 
Greenhills, and Greendale, the attempt to purchase land for 
Greenbrook, to be located outside of New Brunswick, New 
Jersey, ended in failure after a long bitter fight which almost de­
stroyed the entire greenbelt program. This was a tragic loss. 
The Greenbrook planning staff was the most distinguished 
team of architects assembled by the R.A., and the town most 
closely resembled the classic garden city. The story of Green-
brook reveals a small, but highly instructive, episode in the his­
tory of the New Deal and in the development of public atti­
tudes towards a host of political, social, and economic questions 
connected with the government's housing program. Therefore, 
it will be discussed in some detail. 
Little difficulty was experienced in initiating the program 
to purchase a site for the new town. On September 17, Dudley 
and Theodore Pellens, the project supervisor, arrived in Bound 
Brook, New Jersey, to select a real estate broker to collect land 
options for the R.A. The town was located about three miles 
from the proposed town site and was the home of several real 
estate brokers. The largest broker, a Mr. Fetterly, was currently 
the Republican candidate for mayor of Bound Brook. The sec­
ond broker was a prominent Democrat. The third, a Republi­
can, was Thomas D. Van Syckel, apparently the only broker 
giving his full attention to business. Van Syckel was checked 
for his honesty and general reputation in the community before 
being approached with the project plans.38 Van Syckel liked 
the idea and, as time went on, developed an intense interest 
in the greenbelt town concept. He argued the R.A.'s case with 
as much sincerity and fervor as any of the project planners. 
Although he and the R.A. occasionally disagreed, there was no 
one so despondent over the failure of the project. Possibly, he 
regretted the loss of an opportunity not only to make money 
but to play a major role in a great enterprise—to make a lasting 
contribution to his community and the nation.39 
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The negotiators hired by Van Syckel did not all share his 
zeal, but the money earned was sufficient to keep most of them 
active in the field late into each evening. The R.A. concealed the 
true purpose of the optioning, as was the practice at the other 
sites. This was more difficult at Bound Brook since the town­
ship of Franklin, in which the project was to be built, had no 
property map and the R.A. was forced to construct an owner­
ship map from the tax rolls. This raised the suspicion of the 
township tax assessor, C. I. Van Cleef, who began to inquire 
about the sharp increase of optioning. Van Cleef himself owned 
a large farm in the township and was approached in early Oc­
tober by Van Syckel and Pellens. It is not clear whether Van 
Cleef knew the reasons for the optioning, but he realized that 
whoever was buying land had a great deal of money. When ap­
proached again by Van Syckel and Dudley, he offered to sell 
for twice the value of his land saying that "his cooperation was 
worth much more than the difference in price and that he could 
give a great deal of valuable help to the buyer if won over to 
the proper side."40 When the R.A. refused to buy at Van Cleef's 
price, he began persuading fellow landowners not to sign op­
tions. 
A more serious problem was the purchase of five hundred 
acres on an estate belonging to John W. Mettler, president of 
the Interwoven Stocking Company. He was wealthy, politically 
powerful in the state of New Jersey, and a conservative Repub­
lican. Mettler was approached with caution by Dudley and 
Pellens, who interpreted their plans to him and solicited his land 
and his support. Dudley reported that Mettler "was coldly hos­
tile, suspicious, and noncommittal."41 He asked for time to have 
his land assessed and think over the proposal. 
The negotiators left the Mettler tract alone for the time and 
concentrated on the rest of the project site. They found that 
many small tracts were owned by recent immigrants who had 
built up a modest truck farming industry but who were sub­
sisting on low market prices. Many of them clung tenaciously 
to their little plots. The negotiators hired interpreters and spent 
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long hours explaining the advantages of selling the land. An­
other group which balked at selling its land included local citi­
zens whose families had owned the same land since colonial 
days and resented both the intrusion of the immigrants and the 
federal government.42 
Near the end of October the R.A. realized that Mettler was 
stealthily moving against them. The local office began receiving 
calls from a real estate firm connected with Mettler. Next, one 
of the most prominent negotiators, Mr. Van Voorhees, said he 
would have to cease collecting options until after the November 
election in which he was running for reelection to the Somer­
set County Board of Freeholders.43 On October 24, the Franklin 
Township Committee held an emergency meeting—its members 
having learned the whole story of the Resettlement Administra­
tion project. The New Brunswick Daily Home News broke the 
secret the following day, reporting also that the township com­
mittee planned a protest.44 R.A. negotiators were caught unpre­
pared and refused to make any statement. They deliberately 
brushed aside all the stories as mere rumors just as the Cincin­
nati group had done at the beginning of the month. This proved 
a poor policy as the rumors grew faster in the absence of spe­
cific information from the R.A. 
On October 28, Franklin Township Attorney Clarkson 
Cramner telephoned the R.A. office in Bound Brook to notify 
them that in the evening a public meeting would be held at a 
local school to consider the project and that he, as chairman, 
wanted a government spokesman there to answer questions. The 
local R.A. people were taken unawares. They called Washing­
ton, and Lansill promised to send Isaac McBride, one of the 
R.A.'s most effective representatives. Emotions ran high at the 
meeting; the tone of the audience was described as "running 
a rout so stormy as to be only a step removed from open dis­
order."45 Questions were asked about who was going to live in 
the new town, how it would pay taxes, and what the effect 
would be on local property values. One local resident, hearing 
that the project was for low-income families, shouted, "We 
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don't want the scum of the earth brought in here."46 State Rep­
resentative Charles A. Eaton told the audience, "The Federal 
Government has no more right to come into this township and 
cram this proposition down its throat than has the government 
of Germany."47 McBride answered questions as well as he could 
but was forced to hedge on the point of taxation. He tried to 
assure everyone that however the community was planned, the 
township and county would not be compelled to supply services 
without deriving an equal income. He summarized by saying, 
I simply am asking you as intelligent people to withhold 
your judgement and not proceed to condemn this project 
without knowing what you are condemning. Nobody is co­
ercing you. This is a free country. Not one of you has to sell 
his property unless he wants to sell it. . The government 
is not going to resort to condemnation.48 
The meeting voted to send a five man committee to talk with 
the R.A. in Washington. Later Cramner appointed five addi­
tional members—including Mettler—to what came to be called 
the Committee of Ten.49 
The meeting was followed by a barrage of newspaper edi­
torials on the project. The small Somerset Messenger Gazette 
asked its readers what the effect would be of erecting numerous 
"cheap houses" and filling them with "recent slum dwellers."50 
The New Brunswick Daily Home News, the largest local paper, 
criticized the secretiveness of the R.A. but reserved judgment 
on the project itself. The R.A. officials admitted that the Daily 
Home News presented the news "with complete fairness 
throughout the controversy."51 
On November 1, the Somerset County Board of Freeholders 
voted to condemn the project because the federal property it 
would withdraw from the tax rolls would decrease local rev­
enues and increase service costs sharply. In addition the board 
was "without definite information as to plans, purposes and 
scope of this project."52 Two days later the R.A. officials an­
nounced that the tax problem would be solved by the transferal 
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of the property to private hands as soon as the town was com­
pleted. This did not satisfy the Daily Home News or many of 
the local residents. The newspaper expressed the opinion of 
"'many substantial Republicans" who believed the whole project 
was "the product of a deep laid plot to turn this staunchly Re­
publican township and the equally staunchly Republican county 
of which it is a part, Democratic at the crucial 1936 election."53 
Bishop Alma White of the Somerset Pillar of Fire Church re­
ported that "divine inspiration" had called her back from Lon­
don, England, in time to fight the Resettlement Administra­
tion's attempt to buy land which her church held on the 
proposed project site.54 Dudley and the R.A. concluded that it 
was not God who was directing the attack on the project, but 
John W. Mettler. 
Mettler's position was published in a long interview for the 
November 17 issue of the New Brunswick Sunday Times (the 
Sunday edition of the Daily Home News). He said that the 
town would require more services than collectable taxes could 
support, that it was located too far from surrounding factories, 
and that it covered 6,000 to 8,000 acres while the entire city of 
New Brunswick covered only 2,500. His greatest objection,' 
however, was allegedly to the architectural style which he said 
"'will undoubtedly be used—the pre-fabricated cement-type 
box-shaped house or the multiple-family packing-box type 
house without cellars and with flat roofs." He thought it "hope­
less" to expect the "Colonial style house to be built in the pro­
ject which, of course, would make it a very different proposition. 
No person would object to the right kind of houses which would 
bring a more desirable class of people than can be expected to 
occupy the pre-fabricated, flat roof, slab-type house."55 There 
was no suggestion that his opposition stemmed from his politi­
cal views, but Mrs. Mettler remembers that the fundamental 
objection of her husband was that the project was sponsored by 
the New Deal. She also recalled that he was afraid the pro­
posed project would be similar to the one already under con­
struction in Hightstown, New Jersey.58 
For whatever reasons, Mettler remained an implacable foe 
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of the Suburban Division, and his position on the Committee of 
Ten was preeminent. The committee spent November 6 in 
Washington where they talked with Lansill, Vinton, and Big­
ger, who described the project and promised that future tax 
problems would be solved in a manner satisfactory to all. The 
R.A.'s efforts were in vain, for at a second meeting of 1,000 resi­
dents on November 13, 1935, the committee reported 8-2 
against the project.57 The R.A. campaigned to win local support 
while pressing the optioning. Albert Mayer, one of the Green-
brook architects wrote an article for the New York Times Maga­
zine describing the greenbelt town program with special em­
phasis on Greenbrook.58 Further contact with Mettler showed 
him willing to end his opposition if the town could be moved 
farther from his property—even offering the assistance of a real 
estate agent to secure the new options!59 Dudley conferred with 
Albert Mayer and Henry Wright, who agreed it could be 
shifted somewhat, but not as far as Mettler suggested. The next 
week was spent hounding the owners of the few remaining 
tracts needed and continuing the campaign for support.60 On 
November 21 the R.A. held a meeting of nearly one hundred 
"interested Franklin Township residents'' who voted 85-16 to 
support the R.A. after hearing a talk by Fred W. Ehrich, chair­
man of the New Jersey State Housing Authority. He affirmed 
that the new town would pay local taxes, be constructed in a 
"'conventional style of architecture," and pay union wages to all 
those employed to build it.61 
Ry November 27 the Land Section had optioned enough 
land to begin construction. On December 5, the Daily Home 
News was finally able to publish sketches of Greenbrook along 
with a detailed description of the development of the garden 
cities and the precise type of housing, streets, and other facil­
ities to be built.62 This was followed by an announcement that 
construction would soon begin. The Daily Home News now 
urged that Somerset County unemployed be given priority for 
the new jobs.63 Local businessmen approved as over one hun­
dred employees moved into the area to begin construction.64 
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Two days later the opposition asked the Federal District 
Court in Newark to issue an injunction restraining the R.A. from 
continuing their project. The action was undertaken on behalf 
of the Franklin Township Committee, the School Board, and 
four property owners, one of whom was C. I. Van Cleef. They 
were represented by Merritt Lane of Newark, who was a promi­
nent Republican and one of the organizers of the Liberty 
League.65 The Bill of Complaints charged that the Emergency 
Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 was unconstitutional, that 
the Executive Order creating the R.A. was also unconstitutional, 
and the entire action was an unlawful invasion of state's rights.66 
This added a new and dangerous dimension to the struggle. 
The R.A. might win overwhelming local support only to be 
defeated in the courts. The fact that the project had just been 
endorsed by the Building Trades Councils of Somerset, Middle­
sex, and Union Counties was overshadowed by the news from 
Newark. On December 12, the Franklin Township Committee 
was petitioned to withdraw from the case.67 On December 17, 
the Bound Brook Town Council endorsed the project after 
learning that the R.A. intended to build a new grade school and 
possibly a high school.68 Other local residents applied for homes 
in Greenbrook.69 
Dudley took over as director of the Bound Brook project in 
order to exert more pressure on Mettler, the local Republican 
machine, and opponents of the project. Mass meetings were 
held. A former option collector, Van Voorhees, became a lead­
ing heckler at these meetings. Dudley accused Freeholder Voor­
hees of being "evasive, weaseling and squirming'' and of making 
"statements which reveal a gross ignorance of the facts."70 
On December 22 Attorney Merritt Lane presented the case 
of the Franklin Township Committee before District Judge 
Clark in Newark. He noted that an R.A. pamphlet, printed up­
side down, was proof of an error "typical of the government,'' 
which caused Judge Clark to remark that Lane showed "a cer­
tain lack of patriotism.'' Lane heartily agreed. Judge Clark de­
cided that the plaintiffs were in the wrong court and should take 
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the case to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia where 
the injunction would be filed against the officers of the R.A. 
instead of the local officials in Bound Brook.71 This was done, 
and the case was taken over from Lane by none other than Dean 
Acheson, who sought to enjoin Lansill, Tugwell, Secretary of 
the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Comptroller General 
J. R. McCarl.72 The struggle was now not only a local political 
fight but also a national legal contest with strong political under­
tones. The District of Columbia Supreme Court dismissed the 
injunction on January 3. Acheson appealed and was granted a 
temporary injunction, which was not even modified to allow 
the R.A. to accept land options which were expiring.73 The case 
was argued on February 12 and the decision rendered on May 
18. Lansill recalls the "superb" case presented by Acheson and 
the poor case presented by Lee Pressman's lawyers, Ralph S. 
Boyd and Allan Jones (Pressman did not even attend the trial). 
Lansill surmised that the government would be permanently 
enjoined.74 
Meanwhile the local conflict moved into high gear with the 
R.A. launching "an intensified program of education" in the 
county with speeches, posters, articles, and pictures describing 
the project and its benefits to the local communities.75 The R.A. 
stressed the many additions to the facilities of Franklin Town­
ship: the schools, roads, parks, and, of course, the houses—"A 
Garden Home You Can Call Your Own," as the title of an R.A. 
pamphlet announced. To the surrounding residents, the R.A. 
held out the promise of immediate "rush business" for the local 
construction firms and thousands of jobs for the unemployed. 
The town itself would bring a long-term increase in trade with 
the future residents of Greenbrook.76 
The Somerset County Board of Freeholders remained op­
posed to the project with two Republicans consistently outvot­
ing Frank J. Schubert, the lone Democrat.77 A poll of Franklin 
Township tax payers was suggested, and Mettler at first agreed. 
The questionnaires were printed. Then, at the last moment, 
he backed down saying the poll would have no 'legal stand­
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ing."78 The R.A. took its own poll which showed seventy-five 
percent favoring the project, fifteen percent opposed, and ten 
percent having no opinion.79 Slowly, local support emerged. On 
January 20, the mayor and Town Council of Plainfield endorsed 
the project.80 On February 17, the Franklin Township School 
Board withdrew as a plaintiff from the court case.81 On the 25th 
a petition with 700 signatures was presented to the Franklin 
Township Committee asking that it withdraw from the suit and 
endorse the project.82 
The day after the petition was presented to them, the three 
members of the committee were scheduled to meet with R.A. 
officials in Washington. Frederick Bascom, the chairman, re­
fused to go, but the other two, Conrad Icke and John Amsler, 
went, accompanied by Clarkson Cramner, the township's at­
torney. They spent the afternoon with Lansill, Clarence I. Blau, 
the acting general counsel for the R.A., and Major John O. 
Walker, chief of the Management Section. Lansill reassured 
them that the R.A. was currently drawing up papers to divest 
itself of ownership as soon as the town was completed. Blau 
added that this had already been done for Greenbelt. When 
questioned about the bill introduced by Senator Bankhead pro­
viding the payment-in-lieu-of-taxes by the R.A. projects, Blau 
replied that this would only apply to the R.A. projects in At­
lanta. Apparently, the committee members feared the Bound 
Brook project would become tied up and lay uncompleted as 
seemed to be the case in Hightstown. They wanted a written 
statement that Greenbrook would be completed by the R.A. 
Lansill replied that they would gladly sign such a statement, 
saying, "I'll give almost anything to get this through."83 Tugwell 
also wrote a letter to the committee assuring them that the proj­
ect would not only be completed, but that upon completion, 
"the Federal Government will divest itself of ownership so that 
the property embraced within the project will be subject to the 
same burden of taxation as all the other property within the 
state of New Jersey."84 
The R.A. convinced the committee members that the tax 
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question was settled, but this failed to end the suit. The five 
property owners who were also plaintiffs announced they would 
continue the suit. The Franklin Township Committee withdrew 
from the case as a result of the conversations in Washington but 
was enjoined from doing so by a New Jersey Supreme Court 
judge. The injunction came after Merritt Lane presented an 
affidavit by C. I. Van Cleef stating that Mr. Amsler, one of the 
committeemen, had voted in favor of the project because he 
had been offered a seventy-five-dollar-a-week job on it.85 
While bribery charges were being debated in Trenton, New 
Jersey, Senator W. Warren Barbour introduced in the Senate 
a resolution to investigate the entire program of the Resettle­
ment Administration. It would authorize the establishment of 
a special committee, financed with a $25,000 budget and em­
powered to subpoena witnesses. A resulting report would indi­
cate 
1) the nature and extent of all expenditures made or pro­
posed to be made by such Administration, 2) the nature and 
extent of projects undertaken by it, and the advisability of 
undertaking future projects, 3) the effect of each such pro­
ject in State and local taxation and on local real estate values, 
4) the extent to which such projects have benefited and will 
benefit labor, and 5) the circumstances relating to the secur­
ing of persons as tenants or purchasers in connection with 
such projects, and the effect on such persons of becoming 
such tenants or purchasers.86 
In a statement to the press Barbour said the general purpose of 
the investigation would be to determine if the R.A. was doing 
a good job and should be supported, or if it was "heading for a 
dead-end smash-up and should be stopped before the wreck 
occurs.'" He also urged immediate investigation of the bribery 
charge leveled against the R.A.87 The resolution failed but was 
reintroduced without the investigative machinery, making it 
merely a Senate request for information. While discussing his 
second resolution, Barbour specifically attacked the two R.A. 
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projects in New Jersey. He characterized the Hightstown proj­
ect as "'a chaotic mudhole with a few tin houses to glorify the 
money that has been spent." Concerning Greenbrook he con­
ceded that the R.A. "paints a fine picture of the future devel­
opment," but considering "the failure of the other project at 
Hightstown,' he had little confidence in the success of Green-
brook.88 He also quoted from the series of articles in the Wash­
ington Post by Felix Bruner which were highly critical of the 
Resettlement Administration and the community projects.89 
Comparison of Greenbrook to the Hightstown project was 
damaging not only because of the real errors made at Hights­
town, but because its particular character subjected it to vi­
cious attacks in the press. The Philadelphia Inquirer, for exam­
ple, published an article on the project entitled, "Tugwell 
Hands Out $1,800,000 for N.J. Commune." The community was 
described as a "'model of a Russian Soviet Commune for 
the immigration of two hundred Jewish needleworkers 
headed by a Russian-born little Stalin who will be running their 
'co-operative' full blast not fifty miles from the birthplace of 
American Democracy."90 On May 8, the day after this article 
appeared, the Senate approved Barbour's resolution by a voice 
vote.91 
Ten days later, on May 18, the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the District of Columbia handed down a sweeping 
decision which not only forbade the Bound Brook project, but 
assailed the very foundation of the New Deal. Acheson's bill of 
complaint accused the project on two major counts: first, that 
it was unnecessary as opportunities for employment in the town­
ship were sufficient, and second, that it was detrimental to the 
local community by introducing "industrial workers of low in­
come from the congested areas" into an area where "the bulk 
of the population is . rural in character.1' Further, the 
township would lose one-fourth of its taxable land while the 
new town would increase public service costs but not contribute 
sufficiently to defray them. Local autonomy would be affected, 
and "since 1735 the Township has protected and fostered the 
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interests of its inhabitants in the security of its lands, property 
and persons and in the development and character of the com­
munity." The R.A.'s town would cause this protection and con­
trol to be "virtually destroyed," and "the whole character of the 
community may and will be changed contrary to the wishes of 
the inhabitants and solely in accordance with the wishes of the 
officers of the United States." The complaint stated that one of 
the five property owners who rented a house on her land would 
suffer a depression of rental value. Finally, the complaint said 
the project was illegal because it was financed with funds from 
the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 and admin­
istered by an agency financed with funds from this act. The act, 
it continues, "is an effort to delegate to the President legislative 
power in contravention of Article I, Sec. 9, Clause 7; and Article 
II, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the United States." These arti­
cles outline the powers granted to the Congress and to the pres­
ident. The contention of the five Franklin Township Appellants 
was that the E.R.A.A. of 1935 granted legislative powers to the 
President which he in turn granted, through a series of execu­
tive orders, to the Resettlement Administration and other agen­
cies receiving funds from it.92 
The three-to-two decision of the court was delivered by As­
sociate Justice Van Orsdel. First, the court made it clear that if 
the state of New Jersey undertook the Bound Brook project, 
the township government could not maintain its suit in the 
courts, but that the five property owners could do so even if the 
state government were financing and administrating the proj­
ect. Since the U.S. government was the agent, however, both 
the property owners and the township government had a right 
to bring suit. Second, turning to the Emergency Relief Appro­
priation Act of 1935, the court declared that in this case it was 
"a clearly unconstitutional delegation of legislative power" to 
the president and the R.A. The court found nothing in the 
terms of the act which would give the president guidelines for 
legal uses of the funds. It left him, in fact, "virtually unfettered" 
as to how the money should be spent and was an example of 
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what Supreme Court Justice Cardozo had recently called "dele­
gation running riot."98 The court was fearful of such powers in 
the hands of the president and his agents as were granted by 
the E.R.A.A. "without path or program'' to circumscribe his ac­
tions. 
Obviously, if the President were so disposed, he could use 
the entire sum appropriated in building houses exclusively 
for our colored population, or on the other hand, he could 
just as well exclude that portion of the population from any 
benefits whatever. The houses for which this vast sum 
of money is to be spent may be rented or sold, at a profit or 
at a loss. They may be constructed in cities where there is 
no demand, or in the country to create and build a new city 
in its entirety. Indeed, they may be built and left unoccu­
pied; and while, as a practical matter, this may be said to be 
a mere fancy, the principle is none the less involved, for that 
principle demands that in the appropriation of the public 
moneys the congressional mandate shall include a reasona­
ble limitation on the discretion of the executive in their 
use. . The fundamental question involved is the total 
lack of constitutional power on the part of Congress to put 
into operation through legislation a project such as is here 
contemplated; and this can be ascertained, not from any pos­
sible determination of fact, but from the very terms of the 
statute itself.94 
The two dissenting justices, Groner and Stephens, agreed that a 
permanent injunction should be granted to halt the Bound 
Brook project but thought that the decision concerning the 
unconstitutionality of the entire Emergency Relief Appropria­
tion Act of 1935 was unnecessary and should not have been at­
tempted until the facts of the case were more fully presented. 
Thus the entire court shared the opinion that a permanent in­
junction should be issued and the dissenters were notflatly rul­
ing out future concurrence with the majority concerning the 
E.R.A.A.85 
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Reaction from federal officials was confused. Tilford Dudley 
in Bound Brook confidently predicted that the government 
would appeal to the Supreme Court "right away," while in 
Washington Attorney General Homer S. Cummings issued a 
statement that in his opinion the decision affected only the sin­
gle project in New Jersey. He did not mention an appeal to the 
Supreme Court.88 President Roosevelt told his press conference 
that same day that, while he had not read the decision, he agreed 
that it applied to Bound Brook only. He too remained silent on 
the question of an appeal.87 The next day both Tugwell and 
Solicitor General Stanley Reed issued statements saying they 
agreed with Cummings and that, while there were no immedi­
ate plans to appeal, no final decision had been made.98 
Resettlement officials, on the advice of Cummings, decided 
not to appeal the case fearing that further litigation might 
halt all the projects, which, they believed, could be completed 
without going to court.99 Since the object of the Relief Appro­
priation was to employ workers as quickly as possible, the Re­
settlement officials were forced to announce "the suspension, 
if not the abandonment of further efforts'" at Bound Brook.100 
The offices were closed, the employees dismissed, and the op­
tions allowed to lapse. "The project was dead," commented Til-
ford Dudley in June.101 Tragedy was added to the heartbreak 
of the project planners when Henry Wright, chief architect and 
planner of Greenbrook, died suddenly on July 9, knowing that 
his most ambitious attempt to house the underpriviledged in a 
beautiful community had been destroyed. 
Opponents of the Bound Brook project and the New Deal 
were naturally pleased with the court decision and the aban­
donment of Greenbrook. Frederick Bascom, one of the five 
plaintiffs, commented on how fortunate those residents were 
who gave options to the government because "the next few years 
will certainly bring increased values for land in Franklin Town­
ship," and added that "this is the logical way for the township 
to develop."102 
The Milwaukee Journal believed the decision was a blow to 
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the constitutionality of any federal housing program and asked 
its readers if they really wanted a "sweeping and largely arbi­
trary authority over the housing of people."103 The Washington 
Post believed the decision "a powerful indictment of the sloppy 
legislative habits into which Congress has fallen" which allows 
the executive branch to engage in such "vast experimental proj­
ects."104 Similar views were expressed by the St. Louis Star-
Times and the Baltimore Sun.105 The St. Louis Globe-Demo­
crat and the New York Times thought the entire question should 
be taken to the Supreme Court.106 The Albany Evening Press 
questioned the narrow application of the decision which can­
celed only one R.A. project and left the agency and its appro­
priation untouched. "If the government does not respect the 
spirit of the law, how can it expect its citizens to do so?"107 The 
National Association of Real Estate Boards was pleased with 
the court action because "it sets a precedent which will bring a 
flock of similar suits'' on all public housing projects, including 
those of the P.W.A. It was concerned, however, that such de­
cisions might lead to passage of a broad housing bill which 
would not be to the advantage of real estate agencies.108 The 
Harvard Law Review disagreed with the decision. Not only 
would the project be a legal delegation of congressional power, 
but the greenbelt towns would be an enormous aid to the well­
being of the nation and could only be financed by the federal 
government.109 
In Milwaukee a group of building and loan firms announced 
plans to file suit in the Federal District Court to halt both the 
P.W.A. and the R.A. housing projects in Milwaukee County. 
Fortunately for the R.A., the land was already in its possession 
and therefore, by the terms of the Bound Brook decision, was 
immune to injunctions on any count save the constitutional 
one.110 The Milwaukee group actually filed a suit in late August, 
1936, but the case was never argued.111 
During the summer and fall of that election year, anti-New 
Deal papers pointed to the Bound Brook episode as an example 
of the sinister, bungling New Deal housing efforts. The New 
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York Sun believed the project had been impractical and (failing 
to note the court decision) declared that Greenbrook had "col­
lapsed of its own weight." Again, on October 2, The Sun decried 
the secret efforts of the federal government to ruin "a high 
class productive fanning area" with a "low cost housing slum 
clearance project," and championed local residents who formed 
a "militant opposition" which ultimately destroyed the plan.112 
The real story shows how a small group of local political 
officeholders, real estate dealers, and residents in combination 
with a wealthy and politically powerful landowner were able 
to prevent a project, which by the spring of 1936 was favored 
by a majority of the local citizens. On May 18, the day of the 
court decision, Tilford Dudley published the results of a survey 
conducted by the R.A. which showed 75 percent of the 2,390 
people polled approved of the project.113 This poll is corrobo­
rated by the 200 vote majority President Roosevelt received in 
Franklin Township in November, 1936.114 
The judicial attack on the R.A.'s suburban town program had 
far-reaching ramifications for the future federal housing pro­
gram. The P.W.A. housing projects were experiencing similar 
troubles with local residents and hostile courts. Two months be­
fore the Greenbrook decision, the federal government acqui­
esced to a lower court decision which prohibited a P.W.A. hous­
ing project in Louisville, Kentucky. In addition, the attorney 
general refused to take it to the Supreme Court for fear of losing 
all authority to spend money for housing projects.115 At this 
same time the New York State Supreme Court upheld the right 
of the New York City Housing Authority, a local rather than a 
federal agency, to obtain land through condemnation and build 
a public housing project.116 This impelled the federal govern­
ment to seek a program which would be locally controlled and 
federally financed. This was enthusiastically endorsed by many 
housing reformers and written into the Wagner Housing Act of 
1937 and repeated in the Housing Act of 1949. Even though the 
courts later upheld direct federal construction of housing proj­
ects, local housing authorities have remained rather naturally 
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reluctant to give control back to the federal government. The 
result has been that suburban areas have effectively blocked low-
income housing projects by refusing to establish housing au­
thorities or constituting them with directors opposed to low-
income housing.117 
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PLANNING OF THE GREENBELT TOWNS

The decision of the Resettlement Administration to 
build complete garden suburbs rather than housing projects 
greatly complicated the task of the Suburban Division. In the 
face of many limitations—early deadlines, reduced funds, relief 
labor, and federal red tape—the division could have met its 
primary responsibility by merely constructing a large number 
of simple dwellings. However, the enthusiasm of the staff cen­
tered around the challenge of planning complete suburban com­
munities containing a full range of the same physical facilities 
found in the typical American town. Since the R.A. had obtained 
land at a very low price, the planners hoped the savings gained 
thereby could be matched by those accruing from the planning 
techniques and together fulfill their own prophesies about su­
perior communities created at a lower cost through large scale 
preplanning.1 
83 
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Under the direction of Thomas Hibben, a report was drawn 
up on August 1, 1935, cataloging a long list of facilities which 
were to be constructed and administered as "'public utilities.' 
All streets, sidewalks, bridges, and underpasses were to be 
planned with the aim of segregating pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic. Comprehensive water, gas, and electrical systems were 
suggested including water reservoirs, gas storage tanks, and 
electrical power plants. Housing units were to vary in size and 
design. A wide variety of nonresidential buildings was suggested, 
including schools, administration buildings, offices, warehouses, 
markets, hospitals, fire and police stations, auditoriums, fair­
grounds, stores, and "industrial buildings" for "production' and 
for "processing and handling of agricultural and other com­
modities."2 Other facilities could be parks, playgrounds, swim­
ming pools, fish ponds, game conservation areas, airports, gar­
dens, forest preserves, and farms. While not stated in the policy 
paper, it seems clear that these lists were only to serve as indi­
cators of the possibilities open to the planning staff rather than 
actual specifications. The chief contributions of Frederick Big­
ger and his new staff of architects were to establish more clearly 
the objectives of the towns and to improve the quality of site 
planning. Shortly after he became planning head, Frederick 
Bigger described the purposes of the greenbelt town program. 
The principal objective of this Division of Suburban Reset­
tlement, so far it concerns the four major projects now being 
planned, is as follows: 
(a) To secure a large tract of land, and thus avoid the 
complications ordinarily due to diverse ownerships; in this 
tract to create a community, protected by an encircling 
green belt; the community to be designed for families of 
predominantly modest income, and arranged and adminis­
tered (managed) so as to encourage that kind of family and 
community life which will be better than they now enjoy, 
but which will not involve subjecting them to coercion or 
theoretical and untested discipline; the dwellings and the 
land upon which they are located to be held in one owner­
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ship, preferably a corporate entity to which the Federal Gov­
ernment will transfer title, and which entity or corporation 
will rent or lease the dwellings but will not sell them; a mu­
nicipal government to be set up in character with such gov­
ernments now existing or possible in that region; coordina­
tion to be established, in relation to the local and state 
governments, so that there may be provided those public 
services of educational and other character which the com­
munity will require; and, finally, to accomplish these pur­
poses in such a way that the community may be a tax paying 
participant in the region, that extravagant outlays from the 
individual family income will not be a necessity, and that 
the rents will be suitable to families of modest income. 
(b) To develop a land use plan for the entire tract; to 
devise, under the direction of the Administrator, a system of 
rural economy coordinated with the land use plan for the 
rural portions of the tract surrounding the Suburban com­
munity; and to integrate both the physical plans and the 
economies of the rural area and the Suburban community.3 
The freedom given the greenbelt town planners is almost 
unique in the history of public housing in America. In the 1950s 
Clarence S. Stein contrasted this freedom with the restrictions 
placed on subsequent public housing architects. He concluded 
that drab plans are bound to result when "the essential abilities 
of architects—imagination, invention and ingenuity—are dried 
up and negated."4 However, numerous unsolicited suggestions 
were offered the greenbelt planners on how they should proceed. 
Frank Lloyd Wright presented John Lansill with his model 
of Broadacre City and suggested that the Resettlement Admin­
istration scrap its plans, add $70,000,000 to its $30,000,000 allo­
cation and allow Wright to construct "the finest city in the 
world."6 The great architect further stipulated that there must 
be no interference with his direction of the project. Lansill does 
not believe Wright was serious about the suggestion since the 
conditions he demanded were obviously beyond reason. Had 
Wright been willing to work within the liberal guidelines im­
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posed on the rest of the planning teams, the R.A. would have 
considered Broadacre City. As it was, he reacted to Lansill's 
rejection with a denunciation of all public and private housing 
in America and never again communicated with the Suburban 
Division.6 
A more obscure architect, Edgar Chambless, suggested his 
plan for urban America. He called it "Voadtown." The idea came 
to him in 1893 as he sat penniless on a hill overlooking Los 
Angeles trying to understand why his savings, invested in rail­
road stocks, had disappeared in the crash. He envisioned an 
extension of the row house idea—stretching for hundreds of 
miles through the countryside with three levels of subways 
linking the homes, factories, and stores. Roadtown, said Chamb­
less, "will be a line of city through the country. . It will 
give the suburbanite all that he seeks in the country and all that 
he regrets to leave in town."7 Chambless sent letters and tele­
grams to Roosevelt, Wallace, Tugwell, and many other New 
Deal officials.8 He even received some support from the Na­
tional Grange.9 In late 1935 or early 1936 he explained his idea 
to Lawrence Hewes, one of Tugwell's special assistants. Hewes 
looked at the drawings but never considered the project seri­
ously.10 Chambless was equally unsuccessful in his attempt to 
interest the New York World's Fair Committee. In the last 
week of June, 1936, he committed suicide in his small furnished 
room on East Forty-ninth Street in New York.11 
President and Mrs. Roosevelt were also deeply interested 
in the towns, but did not follow the planning closely or suggest 
major changes. The president reviewed the plans for Greenbelt, 
Maryland, on April 30, 1936, but no changes were made by 
him.12 Mrs. Roosevelt visited Greenbelt, Maryland, several 
times with Mrs. Henry Morgenthau.13 She hoped to convince 
the secretary of the treasury, through his wife, that the greenbelt 
towns were not as bad as he thought they were.14 Morgen­
thau, after all, had "broad control over the financing of the proj­
ects."15 Mrs. Roosevelt also visited Greendale, Wisconsin, in 
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November, 1936, and criticized the residential architects for 
locating the basement laundry next to the coal bin.16 Lansill 
was diligent in keeping R.A. officials away from the planning 
offices and project sites where they would occasionally arrive 
and begin issuing orders.17 Tugwell was too busy to give seri­
ous attention to the physical planning of the towns, although he 
kept informed on their progress.18 
Beyond the guidelines established in October, 1935, Fred­
erick Bigger imposed none of his own ideas on the planning staff. 
This was commendable. As the only senior administrator with 
technical competence in architecture and city planning, he 
could easily have dictated the town plans. Albert Mayer, an ad­
visor to the Suburban Division in 1935-36 and one of the archi­
tects of Greenbrook, New Jersey, said that Bigger chose to 
serve primarily as an advisor and coordinator.19 A separate 
staff was assigned to each town and worked independently of 
the other town planning staffs. This was necessary since each 
town site was different in topography, population, economy, 
and legal structure. Each planning staff had three departments: 
town planning, architecture, and engineering. Subsections were 
established to plan electrical and heating facilities, utilities, and 
landscaping. Special sections rendered drawings and scale 
models, made detailed records, and conducted field research. 
The planning staff was headed by one or two men designated 
as chief town planner, chief architect, or chief engineer; but 
the group was collectively responsible for the whole project. 
All four staffs had a regional coordinator whose responsibility 
was to keep the planning staffs and the R.A. administrators in­
formed.20 
A number of people involved in the planning remarked on 
the high degree of dedication and cooperation among the plan­
ners, most of whom had never worked on a project calling for 
daily teamwork and compromise.21 Hale Walker, the town 
planner of Greenbelt, said he had never seen a more coopera­
tive group of people: "Everyone seemed to recognize that the 
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problem was town building. Interdepartmental criticism was 
freely given and taken in good spirit."22 For example, if the 
heating section decided to use coal for fuel instead of oil, it 
would necessitate changes in the house plans to allow for a coal 
bin and a change in the site plan and street plan to allow coal 
trucks to deliver directly into the coal bin. The planning staffs 
worked with almost every department of the government. In 
his annual report, Lansill expressed gratitude to twenty-eight 
federal agencies, technical associations, corporations, and foun­
dations for their cooperation.23 There is no evidence to support 
a claim of rivalry between the four staffs as reported in the New 
York Sun.2i Conflicts which might have arisen over pay scales 
were minimized by C. B. Baldwin, who asked John A. Overholt 
of the Civil Service Commission to draw up classifications and 
pay scales for all jobs in the R.A. The Resettlement Administra­
tion was not under Civil Service, but Baldwin found it more 
desirable and equitable to follow Overholt's recommendations 
than to involve himself and other R.A. officers in salary dis­
putes.25 
The most serious design problems resulted from a lack of 
experience in the construction of low-cost towns. Few architects 
had designed low-cost homes. Few members of the American 
Institute of Planners were trained in town planning. Most were 
engineers or landscape architects.26 "Some of the early studies," 
commented Clarence Stein, "looked as though they were meant 
for the Westchester villas of young bankers."27 
Information about the needs, desires, and financial limita­
tions of low-income groups was badly needed to determine 
proper distribution of funds among the four towns.28 Initially 
it was assumed that a total of 5,000 housing units would be con­
structed with the $31,000,000 allocation.29 By February, 1936, 
when the four planning teams met with Lansill, Bigger, and 
Budget Director Diggs to decide on a "definite'' allocation for 
each town, the total number of housing units was reduced to 
3,500 as follows:30 
 89 JOSEPH L. ARNOLD
Towns Units Cost 
Greenbelt, Md. 1,000 $6,950,000 
Greenhills, Ohio 1,000 8,750,000 
Greendale, Wise. 750 7,050,000 
Greenbrook, N.J. 750 7,150,000 
Most of the planners felt this was not enough money. Roland 
Wank said they had a chance of reaching their goal "if nothing 
unforseen arises, but I must say that it would be an unforeseen 
circumstance if nothing unforseen occurs."31 
It was decided to proceed with the intention of constructing 
the highest quality facilities consistent with a "reasonable first 
cost." The alternative would have been to construct inexpensive 
facilities of inferior quality.32 As Tugwell explained to the Re­
gional Planning Commission of Hamilton County, Ohio, in 1936, 
It is our belief that the highest standards of construction are 
essential to genuinely low-cost building. . We are ask­
ing ourselves most searchingly not "what is the first cost?" 
but rather; "what do the forty-year costs add up to?"33 
The planners hoped the towns would provide a yardstick 
against which architects and builders could measure similar 
projects. For this reason detailed technical and cost reports were 
filed in the Suburban Division Library. They represented the 
most comprehensive record of planning techniques ever made 
in America.34 
Fortunately, the Suburban Division had acquired large 
enough tracts of land to allow the planners great latitude in 
blocking out the towns. The tracts were well beyond built-up 
urban areas so few roads or structures hindered the develop­
ment of comprehensive town plans. The only preexisting physi­
cal factor in planning the town layouts was the topography of 
each tract. At Greenbelt, Hale Walker laid out a sweeping, 
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crescent-shaped town along a beautifully wooded ridge with 
the open end of the crescent facing prevailing summer breezes. 
Greenhills was built along the crest of a number of small ridges 
cut by ravines and resulted in a somewhat irregular town pat­
tern.35 It is situated high above the "grimy but busy" Mill Creek 
valley affording its residents a spectacular view of the country­
side.36 Justin Hartzog, the chief planner, said one emerged from 
the smog in the valley "to burst suddenly out into sunlight and 
take a deep breath from the upper strata."37 Greendale is laid 
out on very gently rolling land, but the tract is cut by Dale 
Creek, which runs through its very center and empties into the 
Root River which flows along the western edge. The two courses 
meet at the southern end of the town. Instead of using Dale 
Creek as a convenient drainage ditch, it was incorporated into 
the town plan as a lovely park.38 Greenbrook was to have been 
built on almost flat terrain. The chief problem in planning the 
town would have been a branch line of the Pennsylvania Rail­
road which ran through the southern edge of the tract and was 
to have been the center of an industrial park.39 
The planners had to determine the ultimate size of each 
town. The basic question was how large a community must be 
to support adequate public and commercial facilities, amortize 
the mortgage, and still retain a sense of "community." Clarence 
Stein was asked to prepare several studies one of which ex­
plored the financial aspects of this question. He said that if the 
average resident had an annual income of $1,250, the towns 
would each require a minimum population of 4,000 to pay for 
maintenance and administration alone, excluding amortization 
of the mortgage. Each of the 4,000 residents would cost the town 
$79.09 per year or $316.36 for a family of four. If the bread­
winner's income was $1,250 he would have to pay twenty-five 
percent of it in rent to cover this cost. Stein believed twenty-
five percent was too high for families in this income group. How­
ever, if the population was increased the maintenance cost per 
person would decline so that a town of 7,000 would require 
$72.02 per person.40 The dilemma presented by Stein's report 
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was serious. Unless each of the four towns had slightly over 
1000 housing units (research at Greenhills indicated the average 
family size of potential residents to be approximately 3.7 per­
sons), the towns could not afford to maintain services; but 4,000 
units were more than the Suburban Division could afford. The 
solution was to build as many units as possible and plan for 
the construction of the remaining number of units in the future. 
In the spring of 1936 the Suburban Division reported that all 
four towns were planned for populations of between 4,000 and 
6,000 families.41 With continued cutbacks in the number of 
units, the whole question of the ultimate size became somewhat 
academic and no clear plans were made for the projected devel­
opment of the towns with the exception of Greendale. Hartzog 
spoke of a town of 7,000 people at Greenhills, while the planners 
of Greenbrook envisioned a total population of 15,000 to 20,000 
residents. Greendale's staff set its final number at 12,000. No 
definite proposal was made for the ultimate size of Greenbelt 
although Hale Walker mentioned a population of 30,000.42 
Low residential density was considered desirable for all the 
towns. In the residential area of Greendale there were approxi­
mately five families per acre. At Greenhills there were 8.5 fam­
ilies per acre and at Greenbelt four families per acre.43 There 
is no comparison between the population densities of the Green­
belt towns and any urban housing projects undertaken by the 
federal government. The P.W.A. projects, built on land costing 
anywhere from $50,000 to $350,000 per acre, included as many 
as eighty-two housing units per acre as in the Harlem River 
Houses of New York.44 
The unique planning feature of the greenbelt towns was, of 
course, the greenbelt. Its purpose was to separate the town from 
surrounding built-up areas, to provide a land reserve for ex­
pansion of the community to its predetermined limit, and to 
provide a rural environment for the townspeople. The rural 
use of the greenbelt was given more attention in Resettlement 
Administration publications and reports than by the planning 
staffs who generally looked on the greenbelt as an open space 
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buffer area and land reserve. It may be that its possibilities for 
agricultural use were publicized to satisfy the comptroller that 
the towns were in part a rural rehabilitation project and en­
titled to funds from the Emergency Relief Appropriation.45 The 
land at Greenbelt was unsuitable for profitable farming, and the 
planners of Greenhills and Greenbrook gave little attention to 
agricultural uses of the greenbelt.46 At Greendale, however, 
Elbert Peets and Jacob Crane made a detailed recommen­
dation for the creation of what was actually a collective farm on 
the greenbelt with all the farmers employed on a salary basis 
with a share in the profits.47 Both Bigger and Lansill liked the 
idea, but it was not executed. The planners remodeled some 
existing farms on the greenbelt and leased them to tenants. All 
of the towns did make use of an idea advocated by perspec­
tive residents—to plan individual flower and vegetable gardens 
on the greenbelt. An overwhelming majority of families ques­
tioned indicated such a desire.48 Allotment gardens were planned 
which could be rented for a small annual fee. The gardens be­
came particularly important during World War II when fresh 
vegetables were difficult to obtain. 
The question of the most suitable width for the greenbelt 
was given careful attention by Tracy Augur. He thought it 
ought to be at least half a mile wide except where some other 
physical barrier such as a ravine would make crossing the green­
belt equally difficult. This would direct "the daily contacts of 
its citizens inward toward the center rather than outward into 
nearby developments."49 Augur expanded his ideas: 
The width of the protective belt should be such that persons 
living at the edge of the community will not be tempted to 
walk across it to shopping facilities which may spring up in 
the surrounding territory, but will instead find it more con­
venient to go to their own shopping centers within the com­
munity. It should be wide enough and open enough in 
character that persons crossing it by automobile will dis­
tinctly realize that they have left one community and en­
tered another. It should be so wide that private subdivides 
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of adjoining land can not make a plausible demand that their 
tracts be connected with the water and sewer lines and 
streets of the community. It should be so wide that it would 
from a natural boundary between school districts so that 
there would be no temptation to place part of the new com­
munity in the same school district with unorganized areas 
outside.50 
It is unfortunate that none of the greenbelt towns will be able 
to test the idea. All of them have lost most of their greenbelts. 
Initially both Greenbrook and Greendale were to have in­
dustrial sites for private businesses. Greenbrook was an obvious 
choice for a major industrial park. This had been one of the 
reasons for selecting the site and the subsequent growth of in­
dustry in the Bound Brook-New Brunswick area indicates the 
accuracy of that judgment.51 After the Greenbrook project was 
abandoned, the possibility of establishing a ten-acre industrial 
park at Greendale was investigated and rejected. First, no 
money was available to assist the industries in moving to Green­
dale and they would not relocate without help. Second, in most 
of the local factories, half the employees were earning less than 
the proposed minimum income ($1200) needed for residence in 
Greendale. However, an area was reserved for future light in­
dustry.52 In 1962 a small (fifty-two acres) industrial park was ini­
tiated and another one hundred acres have since been proposed 
for industrial use.53 The inclusion of industry in the original 
towns might have solved the commuting problem and broad­
ened the town tax base. 
The streets and pedestrian walks were laid out to provide 
safety, convenience, and a physical setting for social contacts. 
At Greenbrook and Greenbelt the curvilinear streets were de­
signed to form superblocks intended to form a physical basis 
for the development of neighborhoods—as had been done at 
Radburn and several other towns.54 The superblocks at Green­
belt are fourteen to eighteen acres. They would have varied 
from nine to slightly over thirty acres at Greenbrook.55 The 
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homes face the center of the block in which a large common 
play area is provided. The streets at Greenhills, running along 
the crests of the ridges, form a kind of natural superblock. The 
homes again face inward. The superblock also lowered con­
struction costs. At Greenbelt it was calculated to have reduced 
by thirty percent the cost of streets, sidewalks, and utility lines 
which would have been built for an equal number of homes 
laid out in the traditional gridiron block pattern.56 
Greendale planners rejected the superblock as well as curvi­
linear streets. Elbert Peets, the town planner, was attracted to 
traditional architectural styles, particularly that of colonial Wil­
liamsburg which had opened shortly before he was hired by the 
Suburban Division. Peets said it "was not quite an accident that 
in its skeleton organization the plan of Greendale is much like 
the plan of Williamsburg."57 
Careful attention was given to traffic safety in planning the 
streets and walkways. In each town the street system was con­
structed so that traffic would not be able to use residential 
streets for passing through the community, but would travel 
around it on a peripheral highway. A major arterial highway 
was planned to cut through the center of Greenhills, but the 
R.A. convinced the Hamilton County Regional Planning Com­
mission to relocate it outside the town.58 At Greendale most 
residential streets ended in cul-de-sacs. Traffic circulation 
streets were kept at a minimum and intersections were designed 
to give drivers wide vision of approaching vehicles and pedes­
trians. All residents could reach the town center by crossing only 
one traffic circulation street. Everyone could reach a park or 
playground without crossing a single street.59 Pedestrian un­
derpasses were planned where walkways crossed major traffic 
streets. The Greenbelt planners designed many of them; but 
the expense was too great, and only a small number were con­
structed.60 The other town plans, perhaps because of the cost at 
Greenbelt, did not include underpasses. 
The focal point of each community is the town center. It was 
agreed that the center should be "more than the usual commer­
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cial store center—rather a gathering place and part of the cul­
tural life of the town."61 Questionnaires sent to local residents 
helped determine the facilities included in each center. Fam­
ilies in the Washington, D.C., area expressed strong preferences 
for a library, a swimming pool, and a community hall. In the 
Milwaukee area (where in 1936 there was a tavern for every 
300 persons) citizens wanted a tavern along with the library and 
community hall.62 Standard shops and stores such as groceries, 
drug stores, variety shops, beauty parlors, and gasoline stations 
were planned in every town. Greenbelt and Greendale each had 
a theater. Greenbelt was to have had a small inn to house guests 
of the town or the Agricultural Research Center. It would have 
contained a tap room and a 150-seat dining room overlooking 
the lake for community group dinners.63 Naturally local fire, 
police, and administration offices were located in the town cen­
ter. One main building was used for the school by day, a meet­
ing place in the evening, and a church on Sunday. All the town 
plans had areas set aside for independent church structures 
though none were built until the 1950s.64 
The schools were planned on the basis of studies made of 
local systems and costs. The Suburban Division considered it 
unwise to ask local county school districts in the project areas 
to provide educational facilities for the sudden influx of chil­
dren. Therefore, each town was planned to provide twelve 
grades of instruction for its children. At Greenbelt planners ar­
ranged with Prince George's County officials to construct the 
high school independent from the grade school-community 
center. It would become a regional consolidated high school. 
Greenhills high school consolidated five small rural districts 
and undoubtedly improved the level of secondary education 
for the area. Greendale's school was intended to be used for 
all twelve grades, but it was too small; the high school students 
attended school outside the town.65 
The Suburban Division hoped to demonstrate the economy 
of installing all utilities at the same time. On the other hand, 
local utility companies hoped to charge high rates for their 
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services thus offsetting the original savings. The town of Green-
hills, for example, began negotiations in May, 1936, with the 
city of Cincinnati for the purchase of water, but the city wanted 
twenty-four cents per thousand cubic feet. The Greenhills 
planners considered this far too expensive, noting that water 
was sold within the city for only sixteen cents. The R.A. began 
negotiating with Hamilton County for the right to drill wells 
in the Mill Creek Valley. Options were taken on well sites, and 
test wells were drilled. At the last minute, however, the Board 
of County Commissioners refused to issue the permits appar­
ently due to fears of industries in the valley and neighboring 
towns that the wells would lower the water table—a possibility 
the planners denied. In May, 1937, a tripartite agreement be­
tween the city of Cincinnati, Hamilton County, and the R.A. 
allowed water to be supplied through a federally financed 
water main, but the cost in time and money was great.68 Fewer 
utilities would have been purchased from local companies if 
the Suburban Division had been able to afford independent 
services. In the spring of 1936 the Suburban Division planners 
discussed building an electrical generating plant at Greenbelt 
thereby creating an "'all electric" community with rates com­
parable to the TVA rates, but the Potomac Electric Power Com­
pany provided electricity at a good wholesale rate. The fact 
that the three towns were all electric (lighting, cooking, and 
hot water) was coincidental as a separate consideration was 
made for each town. Greenhills would have used gas had it not 
been offered a lower rate on electricity. Had Greenbrook been 
built, it would have used gas.67 
The continued reduction in the number of homes to be 
constructed at each of the towns obviously complicated the task 
of planning utilities. The result was that utilities were laid for 
many more housing units than were actually constructed. At 
Greendale all the streets, walks, water, and sewer lines were 
laid for a town of 1,200 families; but the final construction bud­
get allowed only 572 homes to be completed. Utilities at Green-
hills were built to serve 1,000 units of housing while only 676 
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were built. Greenbelt built utilities for 2,000 homes and con­
structed only 890. Some of the major trunk sewer and water 
lines were built with a capacity to handle even larger popula­
tions.68 
Heating systems for each town caused much debate be­
tween planners and engineers. Essentially, the question was 
whether to install individual heating systems or build central 
systems making it a public utility. Studies of the installation 
and operating costs of five different heating systems indicated 
that central systems were less costly. Other factors, however, 
complicated the issue. The proponents of individual heating 
systems argued that (1) the tenant would have more independ­
ence and could save money by using less heat, (2) the tenant 
could burn lower grades of coal or even wood (in a coal-fueled 
system), (3) operation of the individual system would cost 
only time to the tenant but a management would have to employ 
operators which would raise rents, and (4) the cost of laying 
heating pipes to a large number of small units or to units spread 
out for a great distance from the heat source would be too ex­
pensive. Advocates of central heating answered that (1) under-
heating of one unit of a multifamily dwelling would rob neigh­
boring units of heat through the walls; (2) the use of low-grade 
coal or wood would ruin the equipment, whereas professional 
maintenance of central equipment would result in fewer repairs 
and greater savings to the tenants in the long run; (3) central 
heating would allow the use of oil furnaces, which could be­
come a cheaper fuel as was already seen in Washington, D.C., 
and Bound Brook, New Jersey; (4) paternalism would be no 
more threatening than in centrally-heated private apartment 
buildings and is a problem created by management not the 
physical plant; and (5) in coal-fueled housing central heating 
would eliminate the extra cost of ash collection and free the site 
planner from the limitations imposed by individual coal deliv­
ery. Each planning staff made its own decision on the heating 
system, and only Greendale provided individual coal furnaces 
for the tenants.69 
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The most important feature of any community is its homes: 
they usually represent the most valuable physical property in 
the town (overwhelmingly so in residential suburbs) and are 
the buildings in which most of the family living is done. The 
planning of the homes for the greenbelt towns reveals the only 
fundamental divergence among the planning teams. An attempt 
was made to formulate a general policy for home planning in 
October, 1935, when the three staffs from the Greenbelt, Green-
hills, and Greenbrook projects (no staff for Greendale had been 
selected at this time) met with the Suburban Division directors 
and special advisors Henry Wright, Clarence Stein, and Cath­
erine Bauer. It was decided to go on the assumption that "they 
were planning a long term investment for a perpetual entre­
preneur" which would justify "increased capital investment if 
it produces lowered maintenance and operation costs."70 They 
also agreed that while one or two types of dwellings might ap­
pear to be superior, each community should have a variety of 
plans and the architects should be allowed "to indulge some­
what (but not too much) in experiments as to type plan."71 
Finally, every effort should be made to determine what type of 
housing was preferred by potential residents. 
Each staff sent questionnaires to potential residents concern­
ing their living accommodations at the time—what facilities, 
rooms, home arrangements (i.e., detached, row, or apartment 
homes) they would prefer.72 At least two staffs sent field 
researchers out to gain more detailed knowledge which was sup­
plemented by census information on family size and composi­
tion prepared by the Research Section.78 Results of the ques­
tionnaires revealed striking differences in housing preferences 
of would-be residents. In the Washington area only thirty-two 
percent desired a detached house while sixty-eight percent in 
the Cincinnati area and seventy-four percent in the Milwaukee 
area indicated that desire. Only in Washington did more fam­
ilies (forty-five percent) choose a row house over a detached 
house. Also in Washington, twenty-two percent wanted apart­
ments while almost no one did in either Cincinnati or Mil­
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waukee.74 Field research at Cincinnati indicated a close rela­
tionship between income and housing preference. The poorer 
families assumed that a detached house was out of the question 
for them even in a government project built for moderate and 
low incomes. They generally picked row houses which were 
certainly better than the overcrowded apartments in which they 
lived.75 
Most planners agreed that row houses were the only type 
of dwellings economically feasible for moderate incomes. Henry 
Churchill's statement that the average American's desire for a 
detached house "is a sentimental idea without much to recom­
mend it" reflects more than a pure cost analysis, and it also 
represents the thinking of the Greenbrook, Greenhills, and 
Greenbelt staffs.76 At Greendale, however, Elbert Peets disa­
greed. He felt that a detached house was far superior to a row 
house which had been accepted by "'sophisticated planners, 
largely on the English precedent."77 He thought each house 
should stand apart with its own fenced yard around it. It was 
hoped a useful cost comparison could be made between the 
detached houses at Greendale and the row house units at the 
other projects, but the task became impossible and only a rough 
estimate can be made of per unit costs. Greendale's detached 
houses at $10,814 per unit compare favorably with Greenhill's 
row houses at $10,872 per unit and were not a great deal more 
than Greenbelt's row houses and apartments at $9,909 per unit.78 
Ultimately the Greendale staff had to be content with only 274 
detached houses and 298 multifamily units completed the town. 
Greendale remains the only public housing program which 
built the detached houses most Americans apparently prefer. 
One of Clarence Stein's studies for the Suburban Division 
indicated that seventy percent of the tenants would have auto­
mobiles. A similar study by the Research Section for Greenhills 
showed that ninety percent would have them. Some planners 
thought both figures were much too high.79 Naturally, all three 
greenbelt towns today suffer from the large number and in­
creased size of automobiles; though less so than most other 
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American towns built before the Second World War. Only 
Greendale and Greenbrook attempted to plan for a sizable 
number of individual garages. At Greendale, Peets designed 
the house, driveway, and garage so the resident has complete 
privacy going between his car and home. In this respect, he 
consciously tied the home and the outer world together with 
the automobile and most accurately anticipated the home build­
ing trend of the future.80 
The homes in each town were designed in a wide variety 
of floor plans.81 The number of rooms planned for each of the 
living units was determined by the Research Section's analysis 
of family size and composition in each project locality. As 
originally planned the majority of units in each project were to 
have two or three bedrooms.82 Only Greenbelt with thirty-five 
percent of its units containing one bedroom planned to accom­
modate as many single persons and older couples as corre­
sponded to their population in the local area. Greenbrook, 
Greenhills, and Greendale planned a small number of four bed­
room units approximating the number of families in the locality 
needing such rooms.83 The house designs, therefore, prescribed 
that the greenbelt towns would be populated primarily by 
young families with one or two children. 
Experiments were made in combining the dining and living 
rooms as well as in planning the living room for use as a bed­
room at night. At Greenbrook field researchers found that local 
residents treated the living room as a "parlor,'' using it only on 
special occasions. One house plan placed the stairway to the 
second floor in the living room in an attempt to force more use 
of this room. Windows were situated to give maximum light 
and air circulation.84 In this last respect the relationship of one 
building to another was as important as proper placing of win­
dows. Scale models of each project enabled the architects to see 
more accurately the relationship of each building and each room 
and each window to its surroundings. The use of scale models 
was still new and the use of the "helidon"—a light positioned 
to show the shadow pattern for any time of the day over a con­
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tour model of the site with its trees and buildings—was just 
being tested by Henry Wright at Columbia University.85 
The Special Skills Division of the Resettlement Administra­
tion, under the direction of Adrian Dormbush, employed artists 
to design furniture for the tenants and sculptured pieces for 
each of the town centers. The furniture was produced under 
contract by private companies. It could be purchased at cost by 
any tenant of the greenbelt towns through the Treasury De­
partment.86 It was made of oak and an entire house could be 
furnished for $300 to $400.87 Like the housing at Greenbelt and 
Greenhills, it was functional and very sturdy. The furniture was 
well received in both trade and popular journals. The home 
furnishing edition of Retailing praised the R.A. for its high qual­
ity, inexpensive designs and also for allowing private firms to 
manufacture it.88 House Beautiful was even more enthusiastic 
in a short paragraph lauding the designs as splendid examples 
of the functional theory of art: 
There is a welcome absence of "gingerbread" so often found 
on inexpensive furniture and used primarily to cover up struc­
tural defects. The beauty of the Resettlement furniture is not 
the self-conscious "arty" type, but functional and therefore 
living and real. Its freshness and simplicity have grown out 
of the very limitations imposed upon the designers.89 
The statuary designed for the three town centers is indica­
tive of the Resettlement Administration's desire to create towns 
in the pattern of the traditional small town, for there is hardly a 
community in the nation without at least one statue. The pieces 
were designed by the Special Skills Division and executed by 
artists obtained through the W.P.A. The results range from an 
attractive group of figures cut by Alonzo Hauser for Greendale 
to a ponderous statute of a mother and child by Lenore Thomas 
in Greenbelt's central plaza.90 Greenhills never received its 
statues. The W.P.A. sculptor, Seth Velsey, began cutting four 
figures out of twenty tons of rock in the yard of a Dayton, Ohio, 
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stone company and had completed two of the figures by May, 
1942, when the W.P.A. fired him. In April, 1948, the stone 
company wrote the Greenhills town manager asking for six 
years of storage fees on the stones. The request was sent to the 
comptroller's office in Washington, but nothing was done about 
it.91 Greenhills has not yet received its statuary. 
With all the thought and debate that went into the green­
belt towns, the exterior design of the buildings is generally dis­
appointing. Henry Churchill, an advisor to the Suburban Divi­
sion and vigorous supporter of the program admitted that the 
exteriors were "competent and undistinguished."92 At Green­
belt one of the architects said, "There was no conscious effort 
to follow any set precedent in the design of the buildings"; 
and if one had to label the style, it could be called "functional" 
or "contemporary."93 Greenbelt's row houses and apartments 
look like solidly-built boxes pierced with windows; their appear­
ance is redeemed only by their placement in the landscape. The 
units at Greenhills are similar except for an unsuccessful 
attempt to hide the box-like skeletons with several types of exte­
rior trim. One explanation for the cinder block, flat-roofed build­
ings at Greenbelt was that more complex structures would re­
quire more skilled labor than could be drawn from the relief 
rolls.94 Greenbelt's architecture is an example of what the de­
signers of the 1930s regarded as the "New Tradition" (now 
called the International Style) in architecture—a reaction 
against the ornamentation and sentimental traditionalism of 
Victorian styles which held their own in the United States 
through the 1920s. In Europe the Bauhaus architects created 
"functional" buildings of which the Greenbelt and Greenhills 
structures are but poor reflections.95 The harsh conclusion of two 
eminent architectural historians is that the level of all the New 
Deal architecture "was almost as low as the level of its painting 
and considerably less amusing."96 
That conclusion is certainly not true of Greendale, which, 
from an aesthetic point of view, is the most interesting greenbelt 
town. Elbert Peets was the only planner to unashamedly con­
cern himself with "civic art." In 1922 Peets had collaborated 
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with architectural historian Werner Hegemann on The Ameri­
can Vitruvius: An Architect's Handbook of Civic Art. They 
hoped to emphasize the "'art" side of architecture and city plan­
ning because they felt the profession was "drifting too strongly 
in the directions of engineering and applied sociology."97 
American colonial traditions provided the inspiration for Green­
dale's architecture. Peets seemed to take literally the injunctions 
of men like Stein, Churchill, and Mayer to re-create the close­
ness of the colonial village. Greendale's houses are set in the 
American colonial and European village pattern—close to the 
street with small fenced yards on the side and rear. While all 
the towns are green and spacious, only Greendale has charm 
and atmosphere. As the towns grow older, the homes at Green­
belt and Greenhills will require more modern facing materials, 
whereas the houses at Greendale will look more authentic with 
each new coat of paint. Greenbelt and Greenhills are recogniz­
able as institutional type structures while Greendale, even with 
row houses, looks like a collection of individual homes which 
happened to grow together into a lovely village. 
No description of the towns can equal a short stroll through 
them. While better materials, more efficient shopping centers, 
and better house plans have since been developed, community 
planning—the integration of all these elements—was not seri­
ously attempted again in America until the 1960s. The planners 
of the greenbelt towns showed remarkable imagination and 
thoroughness in the face of great pressures. Tugwell, Lansill, 
and Bigger had the courage to act on Daniel Burnham's direc­
tive to "make no little plans."98 Possibly the best tribute to the 
greenbelt town planners came from the National Association of 
Real Estate Board's Confidential Weekly Letter which, between 
its denunciation of all government housing programs, praised 
the three towns for their "excellent design."99 
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# UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF:

CONSTRUCTION OF THE TOWNS

Construction began even before the creation of the 
Construction Division, which was organized on December 1, 
1935. It had previously been under the direct control of the Sub­
urban Division.1 The commencement of work at Greenbelt 
started "'a spectacular race between the architects and the con­
struction engineers. Plans were rushed to the blueprinters 
almost before the last lines were drawn—in order to keep ahead 
of the surveyors and steam shovels."2 Since the entire greenbelt 
program was geared to the employment of relief workers, the 
hiring schedule set the pace for the entire program—if drawings 
or materials failed to arrive when the hiring schedule called for 
the employment of several hundred workers, the men were 
given make-work projects absorbing thousands of dollars each 
day.3 
George E. Allen, the District of Columbia W.P.A. adminis­
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trator, turned the first spade of dirt at Greenbelt on October 
12, 1935, and told reporters that the project solved "the greatest 
single relief problem which the District Government faces."4 
The problem was indeed great. The District housed approxi­
mately 1500 transient men at five locations. The men were un­
skilled, diseased, and hopeless. There was constant "fighting, 
drinking, gambling, and dope peddling in the transient lodges."5 
Conditions were worse for the several hundred Negroes who 
were housed and fed separately in a warehouse at 12th and N 
Streets.6 
The Suburban Division took over the transient lodges and 
began to move the able-bodied men out to Greenbelt. A number 
were suffering from venereal diseases and were shipped to Fort 
Eustis, Virginia, for treatment. Over six hundred of the men 
were unable to perform manual labor, but there is no record of 
whether the Suburban Division continued to house them or sent 
them back to another relief agency.7 To pay for lodging and 
meals the other nine hundred were employed 136 hours per 
month instead of the usual eighty-eight hours. However, the 
cost of room and board was considerably more than the extra 
48 hours of labor. A remarkable improvement was observed in 
the morale of the transients. Most of the violence and disorgan­
ization in the lodges disappeared. The Negro lodge underwent 
a renaissance. The men formed their own policing system and 
lodge council. They organized sports teams, purchased equip­
ment for the lodge, and even put on a vaudeville show. It was 
estimated that the transients were at least seventy-five percent 
as efficient as regular wage workers—far more than the Subur­
ban Division expected. Some of the men worked only until their 
first paycheck and then disappeared, but most stayed with the 
project until its completion.8 At Greenbelt the transients began 
work two weeks before road and street plans were available. 
They were first used to clear trees and excavate the site for a 
man-made lake. They continued to be used primarly for pick and 
shovel work. This may have been why a proposal for a C.C.C. 
camp at Greenbelt was dismissed.9 
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While there was no group comparable to the D.C. transients 
in the Cincinnati or Milwaukee areas, there were substantial 
numbers of unemployed men who were hired before they were 
needed. Greenhills and Greendale were begun in December. 
The Greenhills planners did not even receive the topographical 
survey of the site until December 30 and thus were not able to 
submit any road plans until the end of January. The plans were 
further revised after a field study at the site, and construction 
on the first streets and residential units did not begin until 
March, 1936. From the inception of construction on December 
15 until early March, between one and two hundred laborers 
were employed each day, but there was very little useful work 
for them to perform.10 At Greendale between eighty and one 
hundred men were employed through the winter, but little 
could be accomplished because the original topographical sur­
vey (made through tenfoot snow drifts) proved to be inaccu­
rate and streets could not be redrawn and staked out until late 
April.11 
Once blueprints reached the field, the R.A. substantially in­
creased the number of employees. From March, 1936, to No­
vember, 1938, the payrolls for the three projects never fell below 
3,000. During the six peak months of 1936-37 over 8,000 were 
employed. A total of over 13,000 people worked at Greenbelt 
making it one of the largest single projects built during the New 
Deal.12 
Employment policies of the Suburban Division were deter­
mined primarily by C. B. Baldwin, who was an assistant admin­
istrator of the R.A. However, he was required by the president's 
original allocation letter to obtain written approval from the 
Works Progress Administration affirming that there was a suf­
ficient number of unemployed laborers on relief to warrant fund­
ing of the project from the emergency relief appropriations. 
The W.P.A. also had to consent, in each instance, to the hiring 
of laborers from outside the relief group.13 Approval to begin 
the projects was quickly obtained, but the hiring of nonrelief 
labor caused some conflict between the R.A. and the W.P.A. 
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Harry Hopkins was interested in employing as many relief work­
ers as possible, so efficient use of labor was of little interest to 
him. The R.A. hoped that ninety percent of its laborers could 
be taken from the relief group, but this proved to be impos­
sible. Therefore, whenever the R.A. found it necessary to hire 
skilled labor from outside the relief group, the W.P.A. would 
approve only on the condition that a larger number of unskilled 
relief workers be hired at the same time. The unemployed men 
were willingly taken on, but R.A. officials regretted that there 
was often little productive work for them to do, particularly in 
the latter stages of construction.14 
As construction progressed, more skilled labor was needed, 
and the Suburban Division was forced to seek it from local 
labor markets. At Greenbelt, for example, only forty-five of the 
one thousand laborers were nonrelief workers in November, 
1935. In May, 1936, the R.A. hired 650 skilled workers from 
the nonrelief group.15 By February, 1937, forty percent of the 
two thousand laborers were drawn from outside the relief rolls; 
this figure rose to sixty percent by June, 1937. While detailed 
figures are not as complete for the other two towns, the same 
approximate ratio had been reached by the summer of 1937.16 
The R.A. was forced to undermine its preferential policy for re­
lief laborers for two reasons. First, the R.A. refused to use un­
skilled men to do skilled union jobs and rapidly absorbed all 
the local union construction workers on relief, leaving no alter­
native but to seek nonrelief union men. Second, training un­
skilled workers to perform complex jobs would have increased 
costs and risked the building of inferior facilities. The priority 
goal was to reduce future maintenance and replacement costs 
by building high quality structures in the beginning. For these 
reasons, the Greenhills community building and most of the 
utilities were built under competitive private contracts. In the 
case of the community building, the contractor substantially un­
derbid the R.A.'s own Construction Division.17 The community 
building at Greendale was also built under private contract, but 
the installation of utilities was done by R.A. laborers.18 The con­
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struction of the Greenbelt water system was accomplished by 
the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission under a spe­
cial contract.19 
Local labor practices regarding job classifications were 
adopted.20 All hourly wage rates followed prevailing local pay 
scales for each trade. Wage rates varied considerably at the 
three projects. At Greenbelt skilled laborers earned as much as 
$1.75 per hour while at Greenhills the maximum was $1.37. Un­
skilled workers classified as "common laborers'' received sixty-
nine cents per hour at Greendale, and at Greenbelt they re­
ceived fifty-one cents (which later rose to fifty-seven cents).21 
The R.A.'s work rules and wage policy were heartily endorsed 
by organized labor.22 The unions had failed to obtain a manda­
tory prevailing wage policy for federal relief projects.23 In sharp 
contrast, the Federal Housing Administration did not require 
union work rules or prevailing wages on F.H.A.financed con­
struction, and W.P.A. projects in Prince George's County paid 
far below the rate at Greenbelt.24 The W.P.A.'s "'security wage'' 
was below the R.A.'s wage at every level of skill. Unskilled 
laborers at Greenbelt made $44.88 per month compared to 
$35.00 a month for the W.P.A. unskilled laborer. Also, all R.A. 
laborers worked only 88 hours per month for their wages while 
W.P.A. laborer worked 130 hours. R.A. skilled laborers who 
drew the highest hourly rate ($1.75) made $154.00 per month 
compared to $52.00 for the skilled W.P.A. laborer.25 
In spite of the R.A.'s beneficient policies, the wages for un­
skilled laborers were low considering that the men were only 
allowed to work eighty-eight hours per month so that more 
individuals could be employed.26 If the Resettlement project 
was the only source of income for the laborers and they were 
only able to work eighty-eight hours per month, only those 
who earned $1.15 per hour could meet the $1200 minimum in­
come requirement for residency in the very towns which the 
government labeled "low income" housing. There is evidence 
to indicate that some of the laborers secretly took outside work 
to supplement their $700-$800 annual income. The average an­
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nual income of skilled laborers working on the greenbelt towns 
was estimated by an R.A. labor relations official to be almost 
$l,900.27 
Naturally, local politicians were eager to obtain what they 
considered for their fair share of the jobs for their unemployed 
constituents. Senator Tydings protested to Tugwell that not 
enough Maryland laborers were being used at Greenbelt.28 A 
rumor that the Greenhills, Ohio, project might be abandoned 
brought immediate and strong response from a host of Cincin­
nati and Hamilton County officials.29 There was also the danger 
with so large a program that unscrupulous R.A. officials would 
use their positions to political or private advantage. Only one 
case of political pressure was discovered. The assistant superin­
tendent of the Greenhills Construction Division was soliciting 
funds and forcing employees to attend local Democratic Party 
meetings. The individual was immediately dismissed.30 At 
Greenbelt a truck driver was fired for "loan sharking," and, in 
a more serious case, the supervisor of Labor Management at 
Greenbelt withheld paychecks from five hundred employees un­
til they paid personal debts to him or to several stores in Wash­
ington which allegedly hired him to collect bills. Both individ­
uals were investigated by the Justice Department.31 These ap­
pear to be the only cases of graft connected with the greenbelt 
towns. No other charges appear in the existing government 
records or in the local press. 
To give more men jobs, hand labor was often preferred over 
machines. When relief laborers at Greenbelt were forced to use 
shovels instead of bulldozers, Tugwell reportedly infuriated 
Roosevelt by suggesting the president might like them to use 
spoons.32 Even horsedrawn wagons were used for hauling at 
the Greendale site.33 R.A. officials, and particularly the planners, 
felt some frustration watching their funds drain away. John 
Lansill, however, accepted it philosophically, noting that the 
funds were, after all, allocated primarily to make jobs.34 
Provision of transportation for the worker put a further 
strain on the budget. Men working at Greenbelt were bussed 
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from Washington and Baltimore. But when their numbers in­
creased, special trains took them to Branchville, Maryland, 
where trucks picked them up for the last two miles of the jour­
ney. The cost of the trains was sixty cents per man per day.35 
At Greenhills the Cincinnati Street Railway Company lodged 
a formal protest to the Ohio Public Utilities Commission com­
plaining that the R.A. was transporting people from Cincinnati 
without a license and illegally competing with the C.S.R.36 At 
Greendale a spur rail line was built into the project site over 
which men and materials arrived from Milwaukee.37 Again, in 
contrast to the R.A., the W.P.A. did not provide for the trans­
portation of its employees to its projects.38 
Impending deadlines necessitated the purchase of materials 
before planning was completed. It was impossible to estimate 
correct quantities accurately but to wait for blueprints would 
have left hundreds of laborers without work. The engineering 
section's unfamiliarity with procedures resulted in delivery of 
some items that were wrong in size and quantity. Orders were 
processed for through a "ponderous" federal purchasing system 
designed for longer-term projects.39 The Procurement Division 
of the Treasury Department had to advertise for bids on each 
item—a process that usually took four weeks. Often separate 
bids on component parts of the same item were accepted and 
the parts were found to be slightly unmatched.40 Some com­
panies bid so low as to be unable to deliver the goods. Other 
firms found that government building contracts were not as 
profitable as private ones in 1936-37 when the price of construc­
tion materials was rising.41 Notwithstanding, the quality of ma­
terials was "the best money could buy."42 No experimentation 
was done with materials, but the concrete and cinder block 
structures in the three towns will last a century or two.43 
In the winter and spring of 1935-36 even the weather con­
spired against the construction of the towns. Progress was 
slowed at Greenbelt by ''one of the worst winters in Washing­
ton's history."44 In January and February frost penetrated to a 
depth of fourteen inches delaying the digging of foundations 
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and the pouring of cement. Nevertheless, the R.A. kept all its 
1,122 workers on the payroll. Several hundred men were em­
ployed at Greenhills, Ohio, clearing the site; but deep snow 
and below-zero weather greatly reduced their efficiency.45 Dur­
ing several weeks in February no work at all could be done in 
surveying and clearing the site at Greendale, Wisconsin, because 
the snow stood eight to ten feet deep. It took several days to 
clear even a single road into the project. No workers were laid 
off during the stoppage. In March the winter broke at Greenbelt. 
The ice turned to water and heavy rain fell. The roads to the 
project became impassable, and 250 men were put to work try­
ing to improve them.46 During the summer Greenbelt made 
great progress, and after a year of work, 838 dwelling units were 
underway and over half were under roofs. At Greendale and 
Greenhills work was proceeding rapidly, but no units had been 
roofed. The winter of 1936-37 was not particularly cold, but 
very heavy rains fell. At Greenbelt the rain delayed delivery of 
materials though interior work continued. All work stopped at 
Greenhills in mid-January, 1937, while the 2,000 workers and 
their equipment help clean up the city of Cincinnati after the 
disastrous flood in the Ohio and Miami River valleys. The proj­
ect site, located on high ground, was not inundated by the 
flood; but there was no electric power, water, or adequate trans­
portation.47 The towns were finally completed—Greenbelt in 
the fall of 1937, Greenhills and Greendale in June, 1938-three 
years after the organization of the Resettlement Administra­
tion.48 
The relief function of the greenbelt town program ended in 
June, 1938; altogether it had provided jobs for 20,000-30,000 
men.49 However, the cost to the R.A. was high. At Greenbelt 
(for which the only detailed figures are available), labor costs 
comprised 67.8 percent of land development and construction 
compared to the average thirty to forty-five percent in private 
industry.50 In February, 1936, the total costs were estimated at 
$29,900,000, but that figure was subject to drastic revision. Pre­
diction of labor costs was hampered by the force account system 
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of hiring which required direct hiring of day laborers instead of 
letting contracts for the job to be done.51 During the spring of 
1936 when construction began on a large scale, planners were 
able for the first time to project fairly accurate total-cost figures. 
They were compelled to reduce the total number of dwellings 
for each town. Consequently, by June, 1936, Greenbelt was to 
have 1,300 units; Greenhills, 1,000 units; and Greendale and 
Greenbrook, 750 apiece.52 The number of units was further de­
creased until the final figures were substantially lower than 
planned: Greenbelt contained 885 units plus five farm houses 
(547 row houses in two-story units, 306 units in four-story 
apartment buildings, and five prefabricated, detached houses); 
Greendale contained 572 units plus sixty-five farm houses (274 
detached houses, ninety semidetached houses, and 208 units in 
two-story row houses); Greenhills contained 676 units plus fifty-
six farm houses (152 apartments, 500 units in two-story row 
houses, and twenty-four detached houses).53 The sad fact for 
planners and architects was that only forty percent of the dwell­
ing units envisioned in the fall of 1935 were actually constructed. 
Not only had many hours of planning been wasted, but all 
original calculations for stores, schools, and other facilities 
were undone by a severely decreased population. The cost of 
operating schools and commercial establishments would be ex­
tremely high if the standards set for the larger towns were re­
tained. Even with the elimination of Greenbrook and 1,400 
units from the other three towns, the total development cost 
was over $36,000,000. 
Since much of the criticism leveled at the greenbelt towns 
was based on the high costs, an explanation of how these figures 
were calculated is helpful. The federal government published 
confusing and, at times, conflicting cost figures. For example, at 
Greenbelt the most detailed cost figures are listed in the Farm 
Security Administration's Final Report of Project Costs: Green­
belt, Maryland and set the total cost of the project at 
$14,016,270.61. However, that figure includes two items out­
side the cost of the town itself—"Farm Improvements'' which 
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amounted to $30,172.04 and was not computed in the R.A.'s 
per-unit cost of the Greenbelt dwellings, and $122,309.33 for 
household furniture which was sold to the residents. Deducting 
those two items lowers the total cost of Greenbelt to 
$13,863,789.24.54 In 1940 the Farm Security Administration 
listed Greenbelt's total development cost at $13,394,406.00.55 
Yet again, in 1943 during the Cooley Committee hearings on the 
R.A. and F.S.A., the cost was cited as $13,701,817.00.56 As for 
cost per unit, the F.S.A. Final Report adds the cost of house 
construction ($7,361,269.35) to overhead ($624,476.68) for a 
total of $7,985,746.03 or $8,972.00 per unit.57 The F.S.A. pam­
phlet of 1940 and the figures given to the Cooley Committee in 
1943 cite $8,819,732.66 as the total cost of Greenbelt housing 
which is $9,909.00 per unit.58 This last is the figure Tugwell 
accepted as the cost per unit at Greenbelt.59 
Another way of computing the unit cost would be to divide 
the total project cost (houses, roads, community buildings, 
schools, rural lands, etc.) by the 890 units constructed—a per-
unit cost of approximately $15,000 if the $13,701,817.00 total 
cost is used. Figures on the other two towns, based on the 
Cooley Committee hearings, are $11,860,627.00 total for Green-
hills ($8,012,917.00 for housing or $10,872.00 per unit) and 
$10,638,465.00 total for Greendale ($6,601,376.00 for housing or 
$10,314.00 per unit).60 The cost of the three greenbelt towns 
together amounted to $36,200,909.00. The number of housing 
units of the three towns combined is only one-seventh of the 
total number built by the R.A. and F.S.A. However, the total 
cost of the three towns comprised slightly over one-third of the 
$104,895,624.00 expended by the two agencies on all 193 of their 
communities.81 
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* THE DECISION TO RETAIN 
FEDERAL OWNERSHIP 
Contrary to its original intention, the Resettlement 
Administration retained ownership of the greenbelt towns. 
This arrangement greatly encumbered the towns' political, eco­
nomic, and social institutions, and ultimately jeopardized the 
entire program. The R.A. stated that it did not intend the green­
belt communities to be "federal islands," but rather "'normal 
American communities in which every person has his full share 
of both duties and privileges."1 From Tugwell to officials under 
him, it was firmly stated that the federal government would 
divest itself of ownership after the towns were complete. 
When the construction of each demonstration is completed, 
the entire property will be conveyed by the Federal Govern­
ment to a nonprofit corporation or local housing authority. 
Thereafter, the only function of the Federal Government 
124 
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will be to see that restrictions to preserve the original char­
acter of the development are carried out. . Each com­
munity will be a tax paying participant in the region.2 
But preservation of the original character of the towns seemed 
difficult to insure once they were transferred to private owner­
ship and local political control. In part, R.A. officials decided by 
default to keep the towns under federal ownership. They pro­
crastinated and debated on this and many other matters until 
it was too late to do anything else. 
Will Alexander states that there was considerable disagree­
ment on the question of turning the towns over to a private 
housing corporation. He suspected that a group of people sur­
rounding Lee Pressman, the general counsel, had little faith 
in the system of private ownership and was able to postpone 
the question and keep the R.A. from making any clear-cut dis­
position plan. "Our difficulty," says Alexander, was that we just 
couldn't make up our mind. It was generally assumed that 
sometime we would, but we never got it done."3 This, Alexander 
later said, was a serious error, because even though he, Tug-
well, and C. B. Baldwin believed the greenbelt towns would 
be better maintained with the land in public hands—"the belief 
in the desirability of land ownership as a sound policy is so 
deeply engraved in our people that when you go against it, 
you can't maintain any such policy as that in Congress."4 Alex­
ander was correct in his suspicion. Both Pressman and Baldwin 
opposed the transfer of the greenbelt towns to private owner­
ship, and these two men were closer to Tugwell and to the 
Suburban Division than was Alexander. However, they could 
not seriously advocate federal retention of the towns until a 
legal device was found by which the residents could be taxed 
and operate a government within the state structures while the 
town remained federally owned.5 
On October 20, 1935, Lee Pressman recommended that the 
Greenbelt, Maryland, project "should be entrusted to local 
controls. The forms of community organization should be 
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adapted to the normal conditions present in like communities 
in the vicinity."6 To maintain the garden city concept of single 
ownership, the land and structures should be deeded to "some 
corporate entity created under the laws of Maryland."7 If the 
project remained under direct federal ownership, not only 
would the state and local governments be unable to tax it, but 
Greenbelt citizens would "'not be entitled to the ordinary rights 
and privileges of state citizenship."8 
In view of the charges then being made by local citizens in 
Prince George's County, Maryland (Greenbelt), and Somerset 
County, New Jersey (Greenbrook), that the Resettlement towns 
would destroy the tax base, some action had to be taken. The 
R.A.'s early press releases and other publications indicated the 
towns would become normal, tax-paying communities. In De­
cember, 1935, Tugwell decided to transfer ownership of the 
towns to the people living in them. Residents would be citizens 
of the state, pay all state and local taxes, and retire their mort­
gage with the R.A. from rent payments to their own privately 
controlled housing authority.9 It was contemplated that the 
housing authority would sign a contract whereby the R.A. 
would administer the projects "for a term of years."10 
However, further analysis showed this plan to be financially 
unfeasible. Stein's report on operation-maintenance costs was 
based on a projected income level averaging $1,250 and indi­
cated that the towns would have to have at least 1,000 units 
simply to pay maintenance costs. Mortgage payments were not 
included in this study. Another report on operating expenses 
submitted in February by Wallace Richards was also based on 
a town of 1,000 units. It projected operating costs at $353,663, 
which was very close to the actual expense at Greenbelt during 
its early years. Added to this amount, however, was an annual 
charge of $105,000 towards amortization of the mortgage. The 
mortgage was for $7,000,000 (the estimated total cost of 
Greenbelt) to be payed over sixty-seven years at one and a half 
percent interest.11 Simply to meet operating costs, the average 
income of the tenants would have to be above $1,250 unless 
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they paid more than twenty percent of their income for housing. 
As the total cost of Greenbelt rose, the planners tried to increase 
the number of units. In July, 1936, Greenbelt was raised from 
1,000 to 1,300 units, but this was cut back the next month to 
l,250.12 During the fall it was reduced again to the 885 units 
then under construction. This put Greenbelt below Stein's fig­
ure for minimum pay-as-you-go services, not to speak of Green-
hills with only 672 units and Greendale with 572. 
The R.A. was caught in a dilemma. If the towns were trans­
ferred to a private housing corporation, rents would have to ex­
ceed the amount low- or moderate-income families could afford. 
This would not only contradict all the announced intentions 
of the Resettlement Administration but also might be an illegal 
use of the project funds under the executive order directing the 
R.A. to resettle "destitute or low income families."13 On the 
other hand if the R.A. were to sell the towns at a price the resi­
dents could afford, the result would amount to a gigantic sub­
sidy for a very small number of people. The third alternative 
was for the R.A. to retain ownership of the towns. 
The Bankhead-Black Act (49 Stat. 2035, 40 U.S.C. 431) of 
June 29, 1936, made federal retention of the towns practicable. 
The act held that federal ownership of resettlement project 
property did not "deprive any State of political subdivision 
thereof of its civil and criminal jurisdiction in and over such 
property, or impair the civil rights under the local law of 
the tenants or inhabitants on such property." The Resettlement 
Administration was additionally authorized to negotiate with 
local taxing units "for the payment by the United States of 
sums in lieu of taxes . based upon the cost of the public or 
municipal services to be supplied." Payments were to be taken 
from receipts derived from operation of the projects.14 
Although the hearings were primarily concerned with the 
rural property held by the R.A., the greenbelt towns were men­
tioned briefly in regard to selling them when completed. Deputy 
Administrator W. W. Alexander affirmed that this was the plan.16 
The issue became confused when Representative Carl Vinson, 
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appearing on behalf of William Bankhead, said the bill was in­
tended to cover only those projects which were "strictly farm­
ing" and suggested a separate bill be introduced for the towns. 
Fortunately, R.A. officials had solicited the aid of Representa­
tive John McCormack, chairman of the committee, who ignored 
Vinson's suggestion.16 McCormack made clear, however, that 
the act would only provide a temporary solution for the towns 
until the whole matter is given further consideration."17 
Pressman agreed. McCormack then asked for a further defini­
tion of the taxation problem, and Pressman replied, 
With respect to the housing problem, particularly in subur­
ban resettlement projects, if we do not make some arrange­
ment with respect to our taxing problem we are undoubt­
edly going to be combatted by every single local taxing unit 
through lawsuits, local comment and local prejudice, and 
what not; and it is very difficult to estimate just what kind 
of a situation we are going to have if we do not satisfy the 
local governmental units and the people in those local com­
munities. [At Greenhills] they have asked us what ar­
rangements we are going to make before the year is over. 
Our answer has been that we simply cannot tell. We 
have no way of arranging it. The indication is that 
probably they will start a lawsuit to enjoin us from going on 
with our project. That is the situation in every one of the 
other communities where we are acquiring land.18 
Although the R.A.'s First Annual Report, submitted over four 
months after the passage of the Bankhead-Black Act, reiterated 
the intention of transferring ownership of the towns, the admin­
istrators were not fully committed.19 
In January, 1937, Lansill inquired what legal problems 
would be involved "if Greenbelt is operated eventually by the 
Federal Government instead of being leased to a local corpo­
ration."20 Neither possibility—leasing or directly operating the 
towns—had been mentioned to the congressional committee or 
otherwise publicized. Nevertheless, the solicitor of the Depart­
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ment of Agriculture replied to Lansill that the Bankhead-Black 
Act would allow the Resettlement Administration to become 
landlord of Greenbelt.21 Such action would still enable the 
community to be incorporated and have a regular town govern­
ment.22 
LansilTs inquiries regarding Greenbelt were very likely oc­
casioned by the difficulties encountered in arranging the trans­
fer of Greenbelt to a private housing authority. The major legal 
problem was the necessity of obtaining enabling legislation in 
the Maryland Assembly for the establishment of a Greenbelt 
Housing Authority and a municipal charter. Prince George's 
County political leaders headed by State Senator Lansdale 
Sasscer at first opposed the entire town. They were concerned 
about the taxes the town would pay, about the color of the res­
idents, and whether they would become a burden on the county 
relief rolls.23 After meeting with R.A. officials in October, 1935, 
however, Sasscer gave the town his endorsement.24 Meeting 
again in March, 1936, R.A. officials and leaders from Prince 
George's County agreed on a municipal charter, but could not 
agree on a housing authority.25 It was decided to wait on both 
issues until the next session of the Maryland Legislature in 
1937 when "these matters could be given more thought."26 
In April, 1937, the Prince George's County legislators intro­
duced bills in the Maryland Assembly to incorporate Greenbelt 
and establish a housing authority. The charter of incorporation 
(House Bill No. 395) was passed by the assembly. It had been 
jointly agreed upon by Prince George's County leaders and the 
R.A.'s legal division. The charter provided for the first town 
manager in Maryland history.27 In establishing a housing au­
thority, the Maryland Senate, under the leadership of Sasscer, 
refused to cooperate with the R.A. On April 3, 1937, the Senate 
passed a general housing authority enabling bill for Maryland 
municipalities but specifically excluded Greenbelt from estab­
lishing an authority under the act.28 Two days later the Senate 
passed the Greenbelt Charter but amended it at the suggestion 
of Sasscer to allow the establishment of "'no other housing au­
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thority than the one allowed in House Bill No. 155."29 House 
Bill No. 155 regulated fireworks in Prince George's County, but 
attached to it was a rider establishing the Greenbelt Housing 
Authority. The housing authority was given sweeping powers. 
It could lease and determine the rents on all housing, repair the 
structures, and construct new ones. It could not only acquire 
new property, but "sell, lease, exchange, transfer, assign, mort­
gage, pledge or otherwise dispose of such real or personal prop­
erty or any interest therein."30 It would run all public services 
"without the necessity for any franchise from the Town of 
Greenbelt."31 In sum, the housing authority controlled Green­
belt. 
The foregoing power would be exercised by a board of 
governors composed of the chairman of the Prince George's 
County Board of Commissioners, the chairman of the Washing­
ton Suburban Sanitary Commission, the chairman of the Na­
tional Capital Park and Planning Commission, the member of 
the National Capital Park and Planning Commission from 
Prince George's County, the president of the University of Mary­
land, the mayor of the town of Greenbelt, one resident of 
Prince George's County to be selected by the County Board of 
Commissioners, one resident of Greenbelt to be elected by the 
other residents, and one person to be appointed by the federal 
agency administering the interest of the federal government at 
Greenbelt. The unsatisfactory nature of the board is obvious. 
First, the residents of Greenbelt were allowed only two of the 
nine votes and even with the allowance of a quorum of four, 
the residents could never comprise a majority. The interest of 
the federal government was hardly protected with only one 
vote on the board. Who would control Greenbelt? It is difficult 
to believe that all the members would be able to regularly 
attend board meetings. The largest bloc of votes would be in 
the hands of the Prince George's County Board of Commission­
ers, which was itself represented by its chairman and which ap­
pointed two other members. The fireworks bill with its amend­
ment passed the Maryland Senate unanimously on the evening 
of April 5, 1937-the last day of the session.32 
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As late as March 30, 1937, Monroe Oppenheimer told the 
solicitor of the Department of Agriculture that legislation was 
pending in the Maryland Assembly to incorporate the town of 
Greenbelt and "to establish a Greenbelt Housing Authority to 
which the project could be conveyed or leased or to which vari­
ous phases of the administration of the project could be en­
trusted on a cooperative basis."33 The day after the fireworks bill 
passed, Oppenheimer wrote to Solicitor White saying that the 
version passed by the general assembly "was never agreed to 
by the Resettlement Administration" and was passed "despite 
the opposition of the Resettlement Administration."34 Unfor­
tunately, there is no record of the R.A.'s proposal for the Green­
belt Housing Authority, but Oppenheimer closed his letter say­
ing that the R.A. officials "feel that the constitution of the 
Authority is so obnoxious to them that they will probably never 
avail themselves of this legislation."33 Faced with the opening 
of Greenbelt to residents in the fall, the R.A. gave up further at­
tempts to transfer the towns to private ownership. The final 
arrangement at Greenbelt set the policy for the other two towns. 
The planners of Greendale believed the town was too small 
to be self-sustaining and should not, therefore, be incorporated 
as an independent community. It should be merged, along with 
the other Milwaukee suburbs, into "one metropolitan city."36 
The Legal Division of the R.A. thought it best to leave the 
choice of independence or annexation up to the future residents 
of Greendale.37 The Research Section of the Suburban Division 
never considered the possibility of annexation and recom­
mended only that Greendale be incorporated as a separate vil­
lage and not come under the jurisdiction of the neighboring 
town of Greenfield because local officials feared they would "be 
dominated by new electors added as a result of the development 
of the Milwaukee project."38 By October, 1936, the R.A. had 
definitely decided to incorporate Greendale as an independent 
municipality with a village council-manager government.39 
The establishment of a Greendale Housing Authority to 
which the federal government could transfer title was recom­
mended by the Legal Division in December, 1935. Wisconsin 
132 T H E
 NEW DEAL IN THE SUBURBS

housing corporation laws already in existence allowed this ac­
tion, but the R.A. took no further movements in that direction.40 
Soon after the residents of Greendale moved into the town in 
1938, the Farm Security Administration petitioned the State Cir­
cuit Court of Milwaukee for a charter of incorporation. It was 
submitted to a referendum and passed 312-142. The charter was 
filed with the Office of the Registrar of Deeds in Milwaukee 
on November 1, 1938, and on that day the project became an 
independent municipality known as the village of Greendale.41 
The incorporation of the Greenhills, Ohio, project was no 
problem for the Resettlement Administration because Ohio law 
provided for municipalities with extremely broad powers. The 
Legal Division of the R.A. examined the possibility of deeding 
the project to a housing authority in Cincinnati, but there is no 
evidence that such a plan was ever given detailed considera­
tion.42 Greenhills was incorporated in the fall of 1939 with the 
same mayor-council-manager type of municipal government in­
stituted at Greenbelt, Maryland.43 
The three communities did have municipal charters, and the 
tenants could establish their own governments. All the R.A. 
administrators agreed that these should be chartered independ­
ently of the federal government. However, they would be nec­
essarily subordinate to the landlord—the Resettlement Admin­
istration—which would maintain its own staff of administrators 
in each community. 
The decision to retain the towns under federal ownership 
had a number of advantages. It kept alive the possibility of 
completing the towns if Congress appropriated funds at a later 
date. It prevented the extensive undeveloped lands from fall­
ing into the hands of private interests which might develop 
them without regard to the general town plans. It allowed the 
possibility of resettling increasingly lower income families in 
the towns after they became established in their localities as 
wholesome communities. The towns could, if Congress wished, 
become unique laboratories for experiments in housing, town 
planning, and community organization. Congress, of course, 
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never gave any serious thought to this possibility during the 
decade and a half in which the towns existed as half-forgotten 
federal suburbs. 
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TENANT SELECTION

Every community is judged not only by its buildings 
and landscape, but by its residents—individually and as a so­
ciety. Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the social and political 
planning of the greenbelt towns was the selection of the people 
who would live in them. The planners were certain they had 
created an outstanding physical environment, but none could 
accurately predict what would happen when hundreds of fam­
ilies were thrown together in the new communities. Would the 
residents Like the town? Would they get along with each other, 
with the residents in neighboring towns, and with the federal 
government? 
The Resettlement Administration took very few risks in se­
lecting the families to live in the towns. Each new resident was 
carefully screened. There is no evidence that the R.A. consid­
ered housing a true cross section of moderate- or low-income 
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families or that the need for better living conditions constituted 
the sole basis for selection. The choice of tenants was made 
from a very large number of applicants. Over 5,700 families 
applied for the 885 homes in Greenbelt, 2,700 for the 676 homes 
in Greenhills, and over 3,000 for the 572 homes in Greendale.1 
Frank H. Osterlinder, the R.A.'s regional attorney in the Mil­
waukee area, wrote, "It is interesting and pitiful to see the large 
number of applications of citizens who are desirous of becom­
ing occupants of these government homes."2 Reports on living 
conditions of several of the families admitted to Greendale give 
an indication of the need for better housing and neighborhoods: 
Young couple, one child: Present housing one room, serves 
as living room, bedroom and dining room. Poorly heated. 
Entrance on alley. Landlord will not allow the child to play 
in yard. 
Couple, one child: Now pay 43 per cent of $1,650 income for 
rent. Will pay 25 per cent at Greendale. 
Childless couple: Now live in one furnished room and make­
shift kitchen partitioned off in attic. Kerosene stove. En­
trance through landlord's living room. Share bathroom with 
two other families. 
Couple, three children: Present house small and over­
crowded. Kitchen in attic. Bathroom only source of water. 
The letters of application also reveal the plight of those fam­
ilies seeking entrance to the greenbelt towns as evidenced in 
the following: 
We are a young married couple with no children, as yet, but 
are looking forward to Greenbelt to solve that privilege, as 
we have not, heretofore, felt that the high rent here in Wash­
ington gave us the right to have a child on our modest in­
come. 
The expenses for my little girl's last two operations have 
handicapped me so that it is next to impossible to make ends 
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meet and I simply must have a decent, clean and healthy 
place for these youngsters which I cannot find in or around 
Washington for the amount of money I can afford to pay. 
My need is desparate from the financial standpoint and 
also for my children's health sake. My salary being only 
$1,440 out of which I have $21 a month to pay for old hos­
pital and doctor's bill This you can readily see leaves 
me a very limited income to cover the little girl's care, rent, 
food, transportation and clothes. 
I have looked for a place that we can afford until I am about 
on my last legs, and my husband told me something that 
scared me last night, too,—he said they told him when he 
filled out the questionnaire for Greenbelt that they didn't 
want "'movers." Now, we don't want to be movers; it isn't in 
our blood to be. My husband was reared in the home his 
grandfather homesteaded in Kansas and I lived all my life 
in the same home in Tuscaloosa County in Alabama. My 
mother was reared in the same home her grandmother was 
and my grandfather's people were all home owners too. I'd 
almost think I was in heaven to live in a place like Greenbelt 
where my little boy could get in the sunshine in safety.3 
It was initially announced that only families of "low income'' 
would be selected as residents of the greenbelt towns.4 This was 
defined by the government as $l,000-$l,999 income per year. 
Those who earned $2,000-$2,500 were defined as the "'middle 
income" group, while those earning below $1,000 were labeled 
the "relief group."5 Greenbrook, New Jersey, was planned with 
a goal to house families of 4.4 persons with an average annual 
income of $1,200, but included units for families with incomes 
as low as $1,000. Yet no way was found of cutting the physical 
facilities and maintenance costs to the point where families of 
4.4 persons with $1,000 incomes could be housed. They would 
have had to pay more than twenty-two and one-half percent 
of their budget for rent (the percentage judged to be maximum 
for housing excluding utility costs), or the government would 
have had to subsidize their rent.6 Clarence Stein's studies for the 
R.A. were based on an average family size of 4 persons with an 
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average annual income of $1,250.7 By the fall of 1936 the R.A. 
had to change the income range of prospective families to 
$1,200-$2,000 and began to call the future tenants "moderate 
income" families.8 Actually the income and rental schedules 
were sliding ones depending on family size: 
Number of Persons Income 
One $ 800-$1,600 
Two $ 900-$l,650 
Three $l,000-$l,800 
Four $1,100-$2,000 
Five $1,200-$2,100 
Six $1,300-$2,2009 
As of June 30, 1938, the average annual income for families in 
the three towns was: Greenbelt, $1,560; Greenhills, $1,771; and 
Greendale, $1,624.10 The rent schedule was based on the as­
sumption by the R.A. that each family should pay twenty-five 
percent of its income for rent and utilities charges (heat, water 
and electricity or gas).11 Therefore the actual shelter rent on a 
one and a half room apartment was $18.00, but with the added 
charges for utilities the monthly rent was $21.00.12 Because of 
this there appeared conflicting reports of the rent schedules in 
various publications. The original rent schedule, including the 
utility costs was: 
Number of Rooms Cost 
1% ( a p a r t m e n t ) $21.00 
2M 27.00 
3 29.00 
4 (row house) 31.00 
5 34.50 
5M 37.00 
6 39.00 
6% 41.00 
4% (single house) 45.0013 
140 THE NEW DEAL IN THE SUBURBS 
Almost as many families were probably too poor to enter 
the greenbelt towns as were too wealthy. Tugwell himself said 
that the majority of American city dwellers in 1936 earned less 
than $1,200 per year.14 On the other hand rents at Greenbelt 
averaged $31.23 for all units while the District of Columbia Pub­
lic Utilities Commission stated that there were "few houses fit 
for human habitation" in the District for under $35.00.15 Rents 
in the greenbelt towns were approximately the same as P.W.A 
housing project rents. The average rent (including utilities) in 
the P.W.A. projects was $7.50 per room.18 At Greenbelt the 
four and five room row houses (which are the most common) 
averaged $7.32 per room." Rents at the other towns were 
slightly different. At Greenhills rents ranged from $18.00 to 
$42.00 and averaged $27.62. The range at Greendale was from 
$19.00 to $36.00 since it contained no six room units as did the 
other two towns.18 Average rent at Greendale was $29.16 until 
1939 when the Farm Security Administration lowered it to 
$27.95 to compensate for a drop in wages and employment in 
the Milwaukee area.19 
More elusive than the income criteria were the standards de­
signed to preclude families which might detract from the devel­
opment of a wholesome, solid, and stable community. The first 
week after the announcement of the greenbelt town program, 
the R.A. reassured the doubting Senator Sasscer concerning the 
future residents. It was confirmed that they would be "chosen 
not from the relief rolls, but from among the low income workers 
in the Washington and Prince George's County area whose rec­
ord proves them to be citizens of character and reliability."20 
Again in March, 1936, Wallace Richards was asked by a re­
porter about the fears of Prince George's County residents that 
Greenbelt would be populated with undesirable slum dwellers. 
"Prince George's County needn't worry,1 said Richards, "about 
a disreputable community. The Resettlement Administration 
will take no chances on the experiment failing because of being 
peopled by shiftless people."21 John O. Walker, chief of the 
R.A.'s management division, stated in the Interim Report that, 
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in the interest of low-cost maintenance, families would be se­
lected to insure long-term occupancy. The families would need 
not only "economic security, but a reasonable, though adequate, 
educational and social development."22 Walker stated else­
where that families were excluded which posed "any excep­
tional social problems."23 In short, the policy of the Family 
Selection Section of the Management Division was "to make 
sure, before any family is accepted, that it will fit into the pro­
posed community with benefit both to itself and to the commu­
nity."24 
Each family filed an application form giving family size, 
income, present housing facilities, and other information which 
allowed the Family Selection Section to screen out those not 
meeting general requirements. Unfortunately, no copies of the 
form have survived to provide us with the bases on which 3,400 
to 5,700 applicants to Greenbelt were eliminated.25 Many ap­
plicants were rejected because their income was over the maxi­
mum allowable. One Greenbelt official said that "quite a few" 
had incomes over $5,000.28 Families accepted for investigation 
were subsequently interviewed by a five-man family selection 
committee. Following this a social worker visited each family 
in its home and filled out a "'rating sheet." Families were rated 
on the conditions of their present housing and also on personal 
habits and attitudes. Social workers were to determine whether 
a family in debt was trying to pay it off or was unconcerned, 
whether they were "neat and clean" or 'Very tidy," whether they 
were members of a socially acceptable organization" or one 
"likely to conflict with project objectives," and whether they 
possessed "questionable family life and social attitudes" or were 
a "'well integrated family group—normal, home loving, self-re­
specting."27 A credit check was made and references from two 
landlords were reviewed. Finally, a physical examination was 
required for each family. 
If the need of the applying family was desperate, its finan­
cial stability might not count so high on the application. Some 
of these families and others were favored because of their atti­
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tudes towards community life in general and towards the green­
belt town in particular. At Greenbelt, in fact, some whose credit 
was on the borderline were admitted because of their interest in 
the greenbelt experiment and because of the inadequacy of 
their other housing facilities.28 Of all the community participa­
tion" requirements, the one eliminating the most applicants pro­
hibited wives of employed husbands to work. In the Washington 
area one-third of all families were ineligible for consideration 
because of this rule. Undoubtedly a number of these families 
would have dropped below the $1,000 annual income require­
ment if the wife stopped working. This regulation later caused 
some conflict between the greenbelt town residents and the 
government. 
Some effort was made to reflect the diversity of the metro­
politan population within the income limitations, of course. 
Greenbelt, in the first years, attempted to retain a religious ratio 
of 30 percent Roman Catholic, 7 percent Jewish and 63 percent 
Protestant, the same as the District of Columbia in the 1930 
census. It was considered desirable to have one-third of the 
families employed outside the federal government.29 Selec­
tion was made without regard to political affiliations or views. 
There were no charges that politics influenced the choice of res­
idents. All three towns embraced citizens with political philos­
ophies from socialism to laissez faire capitalism.30 Each of the 
towns soon had both Republican and Democratic Clubs, al­
though the latter outnumbered the former in the early years. 
This may reflect the previous local party affiliations of families 
in the moderate income strata. The selectivity of the R.A. may 
overshadow this effort to assimilate diverse elements in the 
towns, but Carlton F. Sharpe later recalled that the residents 
of Greenhills were "a pretty good cross section of the moderate 
income group despite the screening process."31 
The most inflexible rule excluded Negro applicants. In June, 
1936, during the early planning stages of Greenbelt, Maryland 
(while it was still under the direction of the Subsistence Home­
steads Division), the plan called for "a separate development 
area, the Rossville Rural Development, which will be for Negro 
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families." It was to have included 800 acres—almost one-third of 
the entire Greenbelt tract which was then planned for 2,796 
acres.32 However, when the Greenbelt, Maryland, project was 
officially announced in October, 1935, eight months before the 
Rossville Development was planned, Will Alexander admitted 
"that there is little likelihood that any of the houses will be 
rented to colored tenants."33 Actually, several Negro families 
lived on Greenbelt's farms, but they numbered only fourteen 
and played no part in the life of the community.34 Cedric Lar­
son, who studied the tenant selection policies and interviewed 
its directors, explained in 1938 that "Negroes were not admitted 
as residents, since they have their own low cost housing project 
in Northeast Washington called Langston Terrace."35 
This discrimination on the part of the Suburban Division is 
nowhere explained in the existing records of the Resettlement 
Administration, but it probably deferred to the local commu­
nities adjacent to the towns and to the prevailing views of Con­
gress on integrated public housing. Local residents as well as 
the powerful State Senator Sasscer, it will be recalled, had 
strongly objected to the possible inclusion of Negro residents at 
Greenbelt.36 There was no mandatory policy for federal housing 
projects to separate the races. In fact, Langston Terrace in Wash­
ington, built by the P.W.A., had a few white residents; and the 
P.W.A. project in Milwaukee, Parklawn, had both white and 
Negro residents in 1938. Still, these two were among only ten 
of the forty-nine P.W.A. housing projects that were racially in­
tegrated by 1938.37 The inequity of this racial policy is immea­
surable. In the opinion of Edith Elmer Wood, in an Interior 
Department study, the worst slums of Washington, Baltimore, 
Cincinnati, and Milwaukee were Negro slums.38 It is not known 
how many applied and were rejected by the Suburban Divi­
sion, but there was interest on the part of the Negro community 
in the suburban town program. A group in Toledo, Ohio, asked 
the R.A. about having a suburban community built outside 
Toledo; yet there is no record of any motion in that direction 
by the Planning Section.39 
The racial exclusiveness of the greenbelt towns stands in 
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contrast to other R.A. (later F.S.A.) programs in which Negroes 
were discriminated against, but were at least allowed entrance.40 
Tugwell, for example, told the R.A.'s regional director in Illinois 
and Missouri to see that Negroes were given an equal oppor­
tunity to receive aid from the R.A.41 Will Alexander's long ca­
reer on behalf of Negro advancement speaks for itself, but ap­
parently neither man intervened in this program. C. B. Baldwin 
later regretted the segregation in the towns but added that at 
the time there was no support for integration and they were 
involved in controversy enough. Neither the N.A.A.C.P. nor 
any other Negro group protested the segregation.42 The R.A.'s 
statement in its report to the Senate that the employees con­
structing the greenbelt towns "are prospective occupants," must 
have rung with familiar hollowness to the many Negroes who 
helped build those towns.43 
The Resettlement Administration sought to insure the gen­
eral success of the greenbelt towns, both as social and physical 
experiments, by rigorously excluding those whose backgrounds 
might create problems and inevitable bad publicity. This was 
undoubtedly a policy dictated by practitioners of realpolitik. It 
was unfortunately proven wrong by subsequent events. Even 
with conservative tenent policies practically guarantying a so­
cial success, the greenbelt towns failed to influence either pri­
vate developers or public housing policies. The towns would 
have provided a much more useful social experiment had they 
been opened to very low income groups to test the effect of com­
munity housing projects on a mixture of moderate- and low-
income families. Later public housing projects, containing none 
of the physical features of the greenbelt towns and none of the 
local autonomy, did admit low-income families and the result, 
as is well known, was only the most negligible improvement of 
the social structure. Perhaps the greenbelt towns would have 
had little effect on the social structure of a true cross section of 
the nation's poor, but that will never be known. 
A true cross section of the poor, of course, would have in­
cluded a sizable group of Negroes. The exclusion of this entire 
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group from the only suburban public housing projects ever 
built in this nation is tragically in line with the long history 
Negro exclusion from suburban areas. The boldness of the R.A.'s 
physical planning is hardly matched by the boldness or even 
the basic equity of the social planning. 
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FEDERAL MANAGEMENT

The management of the towns was part of a complex 
intergovernmental arrangement which functioned surprisingly 
well. The key figure in the administrative machinery was the 
federally appointed community manager in each town. In each 
case this individual also happened to be elected by the town 
councils to the local office of town manager.1 His salary was 
paid by the federal government except in his capacity as town 
manager, for which he was paid a token salary of $1.00 per 
year by his respective town.2 The R.A. was very fortunate to 
select three men who share equally the distinction of being 
directly responsible for creating the greenbelt communities. 
Roy S. Braden was the oldest and most experienced of the three. 
In 1940, during his tenure at Greenbelt, he was elected presi­
dent of the International City Manager's Association. Sherwood 
Reeder, manager at Greendale, and Carlton Sharpe, manager 
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at Greenhills, were both graduates of the Syracuse University 
School of Public Administration and the National Institute of 
Public Administration in New York City. Reeder had been as­
sistant manager of Cleveland and Sharpe had been assistant 
manager of St. Petersburg, Florida. All three men left their 
positions with towns during the Second World War. Braden 
left to take another city manager position; Reeder and Sharpe 
both left to work on defense housing. Sharpe went on to a dis­
tinguished career as the city manager of Hartford, Connecticut, 
and Kansas City, Missouri. In spite of the short tenure of the 
three men, they provided able and experienced leadership to 
these new towns where few, if any, of the citizens knew any 
thing about running a local government. 
In addition to the community/town manager, the town 
treasurer, the solicitor, the town clerk, and the director of adult 
education in each town, were paid directly by the federal gov­
ernment.3 The balance of local employee salaries was paid by 
the towns with funds received annually from the federal govern­
ment. The dual status of the community/town manager and 
other officials caused no serious problems in the early years be­
cause there was little friction between the locally elected town 
councils and the federal government. More complicated dif­
ficulties were encountered after 1945 under the stress of nego­
tiations between the residents and the federal government over 
the dispossession of the towns. 
Power over the local officials of the towns came from the 
Resettlement Administration—Colonel John O. Walker, chief of 
the Management Division, Administrator Will Alexander, and 
succeeding him, C. B. Baldwin. By the time the first residents 
moved into Greenbelt, of course, the Resettlement Administra­
tion had been absorbed by the Department of Agriculture. 
This was the first transfer of the greenbelt towns. By the end 
of 1947, they had been administered by five different agencies: 
Resettlement Administration (1935-37), Farm Security Ad­
ministration (1937-42),4 National Housing Agency (1942), Fed­
eral Public Housing Administration (1942-47), and the Public 
150 THE NEW DEAL IN THE SUBURBS

Housing Administration (1947-54). Fortunately the towns had 
good friends in the Farm Security Administration. John 0. 
Walker maintained close and friendly relations with the local 
town officials—particularly the community / town managers.5 
Will Alexander, C. B. Baldwin, and other F.S.A. officials were 
deeply interested in helping the residents develop their com­
munities.8 However, as Alexander himself later stated, the en­
tire R.A. program was regarded with suspicion by the conserva­
tive element in the Department of Agriculture. Many members 
had opposed the merger of the two departments.7 
The peculiar nature of the towns tended to blur jurisdic­
tional rights. In 1937 and 1938 there was constant correspond­
ence between the town solicitors and the F.S.A. regarding the 
legal power of the towns to perform such acts as insuring prop­
erty or prohibiting hunting on the greenbelt. At Greendale, 
Sherwood Reeder asked permission to fumigate the tenants' 
furniture before it was moved into the new homes.8 In these, as 
in most cases, the Department of Agriculture responded that 
the Bankhead-Black Act permitted such actions.9 However, such 
a minor request as one to obtain land in the towns for new roads 
required the signed approval of the president under the same 
act.10 A most ingenious arrangement was made to cut the grass 
at Greenbelt—a Kafkaesque example of intergovernmental ac­
commodation. The town cut the grass next to the streets, and 
the F.S.A. cut it to everywhere else except for areas adjacent 
to the apartments where individual residents cut it.11 
Some examples of the regulations imposed on the residents 
illustrate common concern for the success of the towns. At 
Greenbelt, Manager Roy S. Braden requested the people to keep 
off newly-seeded lawns, report contagious diseases, keep chil­
dren from speeding through underpasses and roller skating near 
the houses after dark, refrain from making undue noise in the 
evening, and see that cars were parked in the spaces provided.12 
Rules governing the homes were the usual ones found in most 
private rental units. Repairs were to be made by the maintenance 
staff and interior alterations such as painting could be made 
with managerial permission.13 Some rules made by the F.SA. 
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and the town councils indicate an exaggerated regard for the 
physical appearance of the towns. Because of the "most unat­
tractive appearance" of clothes hanging on the lines in Green­
belt, outside drying of clothes was prohibited after four P.M. 
on weekdays and all day Sunday.14 In December of 1937 some 
residents of Greenbelt wanted the ban on owning dogs lifted so 
they could give their children puppies for Christmas. The F.S.A. 
refused; and, as in most other cases, the residents voted to up­
hold the decision by three to one.15 In Greenhills the same is­
sue was raised, and a referendum in 1940 indicated the majority 
of residents wanted dogs so the rule was changed.16 Apparently 
the only rule which Greenbelt's people refused to obey was one 
dictated by their own town council. On June 26, 1939, an ordi­
nance was passed prohibiting the wearing of bathing suits and 
shorts in the town center. It was ridiculed by the Cooperator, 
scorned by the Washington papers, and ignored by Greenbelt's 
sweltering citizens. After a few futile efforts the Greenbelt police 
also ignored it.17 Generally, the record seems to show that the 
people of the towns were satisfied with the local administration 
of their communities in the early years of existence.18 
Many problems were similar to those in any private housing 
project, except that the F.S.A. was more solicitous of the tenants. 
The tenants, in turn, were less prone to complain and generally 
obeyed regulations with good humor. The regulations were con­
sidered so complicated that it was difficult to understand them 
at Greendale, but no substantial grievances emerged.19 There 
is some evidence that a few of Greenbelt's residents feared evic­
tion if they complained, but this never occurred.20 If it had, 
the town newspapers would have protested vigorously, and the 
national press would have used it as an example of the rigidity 
of regimentation. The only study made of residents who left 
the towns concerned the sixty-five families who left Greendale 
between 1938 and 1942. It was found that in no case did man­
agement pressure force them to leave. They were either incom­
patible with, and rejected by, the other residents, or they were 
unhappy living under the stigma of public housing.21 
Two unique problems arose at Greenbelt. Due to the high 
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number of government employees there, the town government 
suffered from a lack of qualified people to serve. Government 
employees were covered by the Hatch Act of August 2, 1939, 
which, according to the Federal Civil Service, barred them from 
running for local offices or participating in local political affairs. 
In February, 1940, the Greenbelt Cooperator complained that 
the act "cheated the local governments of the best material."22 
In October of the same year the commissioner of Civil Service 
allowed government employees to hold elective offices in Green­
belt provided they remained nonpartisan and were not associ­
ated with any local, state, or national partisan organizations.23 
The other problem involved relations with Prince George's 
County and the state of Maryland. At first, the residents of 
Greenbelt were not allowed to vote in any state or local elec­
tions or to participate in any of the state or county health ser­
vices. Yet they were required to purchase Maryland driver's 
licenses and pay a state personal property tax.24 In August, 
1938, the Maryland attorney general ruled that Greenbelt was 
a part of the state of Maryland and therefore its residents were 
citizens of the state with all rights and responsibilities thus ac­
cruing.25 Not until January, 1940, however, did the Maryland 
State Health Department agree to include Greenbelt in the 
Prince George's County health programs—even the vaccination 
plan.26 
The initial suspicion and prejudice in the county was grad­
ually overcome as the advantages of Greenbelt's high school, 
recreational facilities, hospital-clinic, and cooperative stores 
were recognized.27 Moreover, payments-in-lieu-of-taxes for 
Greenbelt were always far above any tax rate for any other 
Maryland community.28 The local Democratic leadership was 
not changed by the influx of new voters, in spite of the fact 
that Greenbelt immediately became the second largest commu­
nity in the county and moved to first place in 1941.29 Greenbelt 
citizens took an active interest in local affairs during the pre­
war years, but during the war the turnover was so high that few 
residents voted in the county elections. In 1943 only 200 out 
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of 1500 eligible voters in Greenbelt registered for the local elec­
tion.30 Only after the sale of the town did residents resume an 
interest in local politics. Greendale and Greenhills experienced 
little or no difficulty assimilating with the local political struc­
ture. 
Neither town planners nor government administrators made 
adequate provisions for commuting. When Greenbelt opened, 
there was no direct transportation to Washington, which was a 
distance of thirteen miles. Residents without automobiles had 
to find a way to Branchville, Maryland, several miles away, 
where a trolley would take them to Mount Rainier, and then 
another trolley would take them to the city. In November, 1937, 
the Greenbelt Citizens' Association formed a committee to 
study the problem. The F.S.A. agreed to finance bus service 
to Washington by contract with the Capital Transit Company 
of Washington. Lack of patronage caused a deficit of $10,000 
during the first twelve months of service.31 There seemed to be 
no profitable way to serve so small and distant a suburb, even 
at a weekly cost of $1.75 per person. In early March, 1939, the 
F.S.A. decided not to subsidize C.T.C. losses any longer. The 
company then announced that after April 7, direct bus service 
to Washington would end and service to the Mount Rainier 
trolley line would commence—at an increased cost of $2.00 per 
week. An overflow crowd at the next Citizens' Association meet­
ing voted to protest to the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
The Capital Transit Company was accused of "inadequate ser­
vice, questionable bookkeeping, and a general dictatorial at­
titude."32 The direct bus service ended on schedule, the I.C.C. 
took no action, and Greenbelt residents bought twenty-six 
used cars in the first two weeks after the service ended.83 
By the end of 1939 sixty-five percent of the Greenbelt fam­
ilies owned automobiles—a considerable financial sacrifice judg­
ing from the fact that only thrity-three percent even had tele­
phones.34 There was a short-lived attempt to operate shuttle 
station wagons to Washington, but most people either drove in 
car pools or spent an hour or two on busses and street cars. 
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Transportation was a continuing problem.35 With the war came 
gasoline rationing and increased difficulty in using an automo­
bile. The Capital Transit Company cited the war as a reason 
for terminating bus service to Mount Rainier in September, 
1943, forcing residents to drive or ride to Branchville to get a 
trolley to Mount Rainier. The Greenbelters appealed to the 
Maryland Public Service Commission, the Federal Public Hous­
ing Administration, and the Federal Office of Defense Trans­
portation. This time they won, and the Mount Rainier service 
was restored.36 After the war the C.T.C. succeeded in cutting 
service back to Branchville and by 1949 raised the cost to $3.80 
per week. In 1951, after the completion of the Baltimore-Wash­
ington Parkway reduced driving time from forty-five to thirty 
minutes, the C.T.C. ended all service to Greenbelt.37 In 1965, 
with the opening of the Washington Beltway which runs 
through the center of the town, Greenbelt finally had a highway 
system linking it with the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan 
area. 
At Greendale, the Greendale Review admitted in 1940 that 
its transportation problem was not as severe as that at Green­
belt. This gave little comfort to the commuters who sometimes 
spent over an hour traveling to work and another hour back 
home.38 The needs of Greendale were complicated by the fact 
that, although Greendale was closer to the center of Milwaukee, 
many men worked at factories scattered throughout the area. 
When the Wisconsin Public Service Commission was 
approached for service in September, 1938, several different 
groups petitioned for different bus routes.39 Bus service began 
in January, 1939, on a six month trial basis. At the end of the 
period the Midland Coach Lines reported losses due to low 
patronage, and service was ended with the approval of the Pub­
lic Service Commission. A new company, the Milwaukee Elec­
tric Railway Company, furnished transportation to the end of 
the Milwaukee Transit System—and charged the same rate the 
first company had charged to go to the center of the city.40 
Service remained poor until the 1950s when Loomis Road, the 
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main route between Greendale and Milwaukee, was widened 
into a limited access highway.41 
Greenhills was located halfway between Cincinnati and 
Hamilton, Ohio, and residents worked in both places as well 
as in towns in between along the Mill Creek Valley. The Cin­
cinnati Street Railway Company refused an R.A. request for 
service to Greenhills unless it could depend on a government 
subsidy.42 During the first months there was no transportation 
for the public from Greenhills. Those traveling to Cincinnati 
drove to the end of the city bus line at North College Hill, ap­
proximately six miles.43 A private bus company, the Greenhills 
Transportation Company, was formed in early 1939 its single 
antique bus made several trips per day into Cincinnati—when 
it was not overheating. The same year another bus company 
began service to Hamilton.44 Obviously most residents relied on 
automobiles for transportation. 
Attracting industry to the towns might have improved the 
commuting problem. At Greenbelt, however, little initial inter­
est in that possibility was shown on the part of citizens or the 
government. Louis Bessemer, Greenbelt's first mayor, intro­
duced a resolution in the town council in November, 1938, to 
ask the F.S.A. for $10,000 to survey the industrial potential of 
the town, but it was tabled. One council member said such a 
survey was not the responsibility of the Town Council, and 
another questioned the value of industrial development in 
Greenbelt. The following issue of the Cooperator stated that 
while a survey was a good idea, development of local agricul­
ture and the processing of agricultural products would be "in 
keeping with the preconceived nature of Greenbelt."45 At that 
time the majority of residents were long-term civil service em­
ployees and may not have had interest in industrial employ­
ment. But by the beginning of 1944 the situation had changed 
drastically. Although over eighty percent of the residents were 
government employees, many were in temporary wartime po­
sitions which would terminate at the end of the war. In January, 
1944, the Citizens' Association invited Arthur S. Fleming to dis­
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cuss postwar employment prospects for Greenbelt's federal em­
ployees.*6 The following month the town council unanimously 
passed a resolution to ask the Federal Public Housing Admin­
istration to allow the town to offer industrial sites along the 
Baltimore and Ohio tracks in the northwest corner of the town 
limits.47 The Federal Public Housing Administration took no 
action and development of an industrial area waited until the 
1960s.*8 Greendale did not develop an industrial area, which 
was called for in the original plans, until it was transferred to 
private control. Greenhills, built on rolling hills, is not suitable 
for the construction of industrial plants. 
Income limitations on the residents led to continual reevalu­
ation of their rights. Again, Greenbelt serves as the most de­
tailed example of the problem. Families with incomes exceed­
ing the maximum set figure were to be evicted from the town. 
This penalized those who were presumably rewarded by their 
employers and threatened to rob the town of some of its most 
educated and talented leaders. Further, it reinforced the belief 
of many residents that they were only temporary guests who 
would eventually be expected to move out and find a home of 
their own in a more permanent community. In 1939 the F.S.A. 
raised all income maximums by twenty-five percent but by the 
end of the year a number of families had exceeded the new 
maximum and faced eviction.49 
A Special Committee on Community Life, which included 
George F. Warner, soon-to-be mayor of Greenbelt, Reverend 
Robert Kincheloe, pastor of the Community Church, and Walter 
Volkhausen, president of Greenbelt Consumer Services, was 
created. The committee requested an end to income limitations 
and a raise in rent for families with incomes exceeding the max­
imums. It noted that many government employees received 
raises which put them first at $2,300 and then to $2,600 push-
them just $100 over the maximum for a family of four ($2,000 
plus the twenty-five percent increase placed the maximum at 
$2,500). 
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You will not discover one family in Greenbelt which has a 
feeling of security of tenure which is the essence of home life 
and of community life because of the fear that some 
day the family will get a raise and have to move. 
This is the bed of sand on which we are attempting to 
build a more integrated community life. . This is the in­
secure foothold from which we are trying to better our rela­
tions with surrounding communities and establish our right 
to recognition by our county and our state.50 
In mid-January, 1940, Alexander and John Walker agreed 
to allow families with incomes in excess of the revised maxi­
mum to pay more rent rather than be evicted.51 This decision 
was reversed on November 1, 1941, and 300 families were told 
they would have to leave by March 31, 1942.52 Again the F.S.A. 
changed the policy, and all families were allowed to stay at 
Greenbelt regardless of income.53 At Greendale income limita­
tion was not as severe a problem in the prewar years because a 
local recession in the Milwaukee area kept incomes generally 
lower than in other parts of the nation.54 
A partial solution to the question of what to do with higher-
income families residing in the towns was hoped for in some 
form of private home ownership. Respecting the desire of many 
families to own homes, the F.S.A. attempted to lease land to 
potential builders and to allow tenants to purchase the homes 
they inhabited.55 These attempts were part of the basis on 
which cooperative homeowners' groups were formed.56 How­
ever, all efforts towards private ownership in the towns were 
either tabled or aborted by the increasing demands of the war 
and the transfer of the towns to the Federal Public Housing 
Administration.57 Most members of the homeowners' coopera­
tives built homes outside the towns.58 Residents in Greendale 
had hoped the government might sell the entire town to a resi­
dent co-op, but as months passed without any action, they be­
came exasperated and began leaving the town as soon as they 
saved enough money to purchase a house.59 
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The awkward position of the greenbelt towns, halfway be­
tween independent communities and government housing proj­
ects, created serious community problems. While stopping short 
of regimentation, federal management policies were intrusive 
enough to remind all residents that they remained in their new 
homes at the sufferance of a remote bureaucracy. This naturally 
lead to frustration and a feeling of impermanence. The failure 
of the Farm Security Administration to find a quick and simple 
method to allow the towns' residents to purchase their own 
dwellings or to build their own homes in the towns was a serious 
error. It was, unfortunately, only part of the general lethargy 
of F.S.A. in coming to grips with the fundamental purposes of 
the greenbelt town program. Engaged in far-flung and very 
controversial agricultural and rural development programs, it is 
not strange that the F.S.A. failed to respond to the original 
promise of its suburban stepchildren. 
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m BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC AND 
COOPERATIVE COMMUNITY 
The creators of the greenbelt towns intended that the 
planned harmony of physical elements be paralleled by the de­
velopment of political, social, and economic cooperation among 
the residents. Through face-to-face democracy residents 
would build a society in which there would be both individual 
freedom and mutual aid through cooperative institutions. The 
program was a mixture of the old New England town meeting, 
the mutual aid of the frontier towns, and the economic coopera­
tives of twentieth-century farmers—transformed to a suburban 
setting for white-collar and blue-collar consumers rather than 
agriculturalists. As a demonstration for the rest of the nation to 
follow, the greenbelt cooperative program was clearly more rad­
ical than the physical planning. The physical town could be im­
itated by the construction industry without major restructuring; 
but the spread of economic cooperation to a majority of con­
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sumers, not to mention manufacturers, would force a funda­
mental change in the American economic system. An editorial 
appearing when Greenbelt, Maryland, opened remarks that 
while the physical town was too costly to be of much value as a 
demonstration, the community of residents "will be the scene 
of a cooperative enterprise which the American people will 
watch with interest."1 
The towns required a grass roots democratic structure not 
only to direct socioeconomic cooperation, but also to provide 
the normal services of an independent municipality. The fed­
eral government held all the land, but the residents held the 
keys to local political power through the charters of incorpo­
ration. Had these residents moved into a typical public housing 
project they would have noticed few changes beyond improved 
sanitation and prompt repairs. In terms of their socioeconomic 
existence, they would simply have traded one landlord, who 
was squeezing a profit, to another landlord who was not. By 
moving into one of the greenbelt towns, with all the physical, 
economic, and legal accouterments of an independent town, 
each resident achieved legal rights, political powers, and a com­
mon identity with fellow citizens that was quite impossible in 
a housing project. The further fact that the towns were without 
established patterns and institutions and were located several 
miles from the nearest community forced the first generation of 
residents to establish their own new society—a task which, for 
several years, transformed their lives. 
The original residents took to heart Will Alexander's address 
to the first group entering Greenbelt, Maryland, in which he 
called them "pioneers on a new frontier."2 The pioneer 
motif stuck with the three towns in the prewar years. The Mil­
waukee News-Sentinel described the line of automobiles and 
trailers moving out of the city as a caravan of "uncovered wa­
gons that bumped out to Greendale' taking the first families to 
the new town.3 The Cincinnati Post compared the first residents 
moving into Greenhills with the city's founding fathers "trudg­
ing wearily into old Cincinnati."4 The first issue of the Greenbelt 
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Cooperator carried an editorial entitled "We Pioneers."5 The 
first issue of the Greenhills News-Bulletin included an editorial 
by Edwin B. Cunningham which read: 
We, the residents of Greenhills, are pioneers in the fullest 
sense of the word. . . While we are not engaged in the 
conquest of a physical frontier, nevertheless, on our shoul­
ders rests the solution of a problem most vital in our day 
the art of getting along with each other. . It is as pio­
neers in this field that we can blaze paths of greater hap­
piness.6 
Greenbelt's residents were particularly self-conscious under 
the watchful observation of a generally hostile press. Residents 
wrote many letters to their own newspaper and to the city 
papers complaining about the unfair stories and the "'ugly ru­
mors" about the town.7 One man urged his fellow citizens to do 
their complaining within the community rather than in the lo­
cal papers which "under pressure of strong real estate inter­
ests are endeavoring to ridicule our town. Our complaints 
are excellent fodder for their slander."8 
The following month, commenting on an article in the 
Washington Star, the Cooperator wrote that most residents 
were learning to "take with a grain of salt all 'news' of the news­
papers when they hear warped reports of their community."9 
One Greenbelt resident was stopped in his government office 
by his supervisor and asked, "What do you really think of Green­
belt wives not being permitted to have babies unless the Admin­
istration gives its official okay?" An article was produced as the 
source of the absurd allegation.10 So numerous were the re­
ports of regimentation and sinister activities at Greenbelt that 
George F. Carnes, an early columnist for the Cooperator, wrote 
in the following vein: 
Something should be done for the sightseers who come out 
Greenbelt way over the weekends. It makes me feel bad to 
see the hurt look on their faces after they have spent the 
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whole afternoon vainly searching for signs of regimentation, 
liberty-throttling rules and restrictions and barefoot women 
who use their frigidaires for china closets. 
Why not a little entertainment for them? Say for instance 
some of us could put on the oldest, ragged clothes we have, 
pull a rickety chair out on the lawn facing the street and prop 
our bare feet up in the sunshine. That would give the visitors 
a chance to see how the underprivileged spends his Sundays, 
and then too, maybe some newspaper man would happen 
along and we would get our picture in the paper under a 
caption something like this: BAREFOOT GREENBELTER CAN'T 
TELL FRONT FROM BACKYARD.

Portable signs, something light which we could remove after 
the rubbernecks had gone back home, with large illustra­
tions indicating the dire punishment which would befall 
anyone who was caught stepping on the grass, hanging out 
wash after four o'clock, or buying groceries outside of Green­
belt, would serve the purpose of convincing the trekkers that 
the trip wasn't in vain; that they had so much to be thankful 
for in the personal liberty and exercise of free will granted 
them by their own city government. 
Then last, but not least, we could erect a small booth in 
which we could place a uniformed guard with instructions 
to salute any and everyone as they left our city limits.11 
At the close of 1938, George A. Warner, town councilor and later 
mayor of Greenbelt, reminded his neighbors more seriously of 
"The Challenge of Nineteen Thirty-nine": 
We in Greenbelt have a contribution to make to his­
tory. It is for us to prove that more can be accom­
plished cooperatively than selfishly. . . . Let us make our 
town a model of good fellowship, neighborliness, tolerance, 
and practical democracy.12 
While Greenbelt attracted the most national publicity, the 
other two towns came in for a fair share of uncomfortable ob­
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servation. At times the eyes of the world seemed to be, quite 
literally, on the residents. During the early weeks at Green-
hills and Greendale, residents were often startled to see a group 
of visitors standing on their porches watching them eat dinner. 
For a time the F.S.A. was forced to limit tourists in the towns to 
weekends only.13 On these occasions the entire town popula­
tion became Sunday afternoon tour guides. The first "Guest 
Day'' at Greendale attracted over 4,000 people.14 In addition 
there were continual visits by professional groups, who were 
guided by young men employed by the National Youth Ad­
ministration. A delegation from the Soviet Union preceded by 
a few months a group of Americans from a convention of the 
National Association of Real Estate Boards. The Greendale 
Review proudly told its readers that both the Communists 
and the real estate people were surprised and impressed by the 
community.15 Visitors from hostile newspapers were regarded 
with suspicion and treated coldly. The Greendale Review cas­
tigated the press for "hitting below the belt" by publishing er­
roneous information about Greendale—particularly the allega­
tion that its homes cost $16,400 each.16 
The residents exercised strict discipline over any tendency 
to dependency on the F.S.A. An editorial in the Greenbelt Co­
operator criticized those who would turn to the government for 
funds and equipment as supportive of criticism that people 
would only demand more if anything was given to them. "After 
all, this is not a slum clearance project, and we surely do not 
want either relief or charity. Let's stand on our own feet."17 In 
August, 1938, when the possibility of building a recreation cen­
ter was being discussed, the Cooperator asked that citizens 
either pay for it themselves or forget the idea and certainly not 
ask, "Won't the F.S.A. dish out another helping?"18 The Green­
dale Citizens' Association, discussing a proposal to build a com­
munity center separate from the school, likewise decided not 
to seek government money. The majority of residents believed 
the F.S.A. had done enough for them and that they should fi­
nance their own building. Even during the local recession in 
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1939, while Greendale residents eagerly sought federal aid for 
unemployment relief, they established their own Labor Rela­
tions Committee to find jobs for Greendale's unemployed and 
set up an Exchange of Skills Office where a register of available 
jobs and a list of those with particular skills were kept. The 
citizens complained bitterly about W.P.A. labor from Mil­
waukee completing the groundwork at Greendale when Green­
dale men were jobless. So serious was the unemployment that 
a special fund was established by the Citizens' Association in 
early 1940 to help the needy of Greendale.19 Greenbelt citizens 
also sought government help to relieve unemployment there 
but to no avail. The situation continued through 1939 until 
May, 1940, during which time the wage earners of more than 
forty Greenbelt families were out of work.20 
There is no question that the towns relied on federal of­
ficials—particularly the community / town manager—for initial 
direction and continuing advice. But the local societies and 
institutions grew primarily through the enthusiastic efforts of 
almost every citizen. During the first year at Greenbelt approxi­
mately thirty-five organizations were founded in addition to a 
large number of temporary committees. Meeting rooms had to 
be booked weeks in advance.21 Almost every adult belonged to 
at least one organization or committee. The rivalry for positions 
was intense.22 A political scientist from the University of Mary­
land studied Greenbelt in the winter of 1938-39 and concluded 
that the citizens were ''over-stimulated" and organized more 
groups and activities than the community could possibly have 
time or money for.23 The Greenbelt movie theater was losing 
money because people were too busy with meetings to attend 
films.24 In December, 1938, the people decided to call an end 
to all meetings or other functions during the week between 
Christmas and New Year's Day. The Washington Star consid­
ered the move evidence of a revolt against "experiments in reg­
imentation" and concluded that even in the federal showcase of 
Greenbelt residents "prefer staying at home minding their 
own business to organizing details of their own and their neigh­
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bor's lives."25 Walter Volckhausen answered the Star that, aside 
from providing a respite during the holidays, the residents real­
ized they were moving too quickly in too many directions. In 
attempting to do everything necessary to start a new commu­
nity, the average citizen had been moving "at top speed . 
not because he has been 'regimented,' but because he has been 
set free."28 He concluded by saying, 
If Washington newspapers would endeavor to see the sig­
nificance of this town, and not use it as a political football, 
they would find that they have been scoring a development 
which holds more for the future of democracy than all the 
impassioned utterances that will ever decorate their paper. 
Democracy will grow not from your saying things, but from 
people doing things.27 
One explanation for the frenetic activity of the townspeople 
derives from their backgrounds. They were selected, in part, 
for their interest in community affairs. Because of the experi­
mental nature of the towns, a commitment to their success was 
keenly felt. One writer posited that Greenbelt's residents sensed 
"the first real chance they ever had to express themselves, and 
overdid it a bit."28 Most came from poor sections of Washing­
ton where they had had few opportunities for social organiza­
tion and no city government to which they could contribute-
as one might expect they were culturally and politically starved. 
Their general educational backgrounds were unusually high. In 
1940 the median school year completed by Greenbelt residents 
over twenty-five years of age was 12.5. Approximately sixty-
five percent had completed high school, thirty-four percent had 
some college education, and only three percent had less than 
an eighth grade education.29 The national median educational 
level in 1940 for whites over twenty-five was 8.75 years of 
school.30 In 1960, to compare, the national median was still only 
10.6 years.31 The high educational level of Greenbelt may be 
explained by the fact that 72.6 percent of these original residents 
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were white-collar workers—almost all employed by the govern­
ment.32 Greendale and Greenhills included many more resi­
dents from blue-collar factory employees. Forty-two percent of 
Greendale students were high school graduates and fourteen 
percent had some college education. Nevertheless, Greendale's 
median educational level was eleven years—considerably above 
the national average. Another contrast between Greenbelt and 
the other two towns was the age of the residents.33 If young 
people can be characterized as idealists, Greenbelt must have 
been a most idealistic town in 1938. The median age of its adults 
in that year was twenty-nine while in the other two towns it 
was thirty-three—hardly a middle-aged group either.34 
Another contributing factor to the process of rapid commu­
nity acclimation was the small number of homes initially oc­
cupied. It took almost a full year for the 885 homes in Greenbelt 
to be completed and occupied. Only fourteen people—ten 
adults and four children—moved into Greenbelt on opening 
day. In two weeks forty-five families had arrived. The Green­
belt Citizens' Association, the first and most important organi­
zation established in the early months, was founded on Novem­
ber 8, 1937, with approximately 100 families in residence. The 
first town council was elected on November 23, 1937, with less 
than 150 families in the town. By April, 1938, the town had 483 
families and by September, 1938, all 885 units werefilled.35 The 
100 to 150 families who started organizing during October 
and November, 1937, naturally obtained leadership and main­
tained an esprit de corps based on close contact during the 
early weeks. By the end of November organizations, in addi­
tion to the Citizens' Association and the town council, were the 
Greenbelt Cooperator, Greenbelt Woman's Club, Greenbelt 
American Legion, the community church, the Roman Catholic 
church, the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Greenbelt Federal Credit 
Union, the Greenbelt P.T.A., and the Greenbelt Players Theater 
Club. Temporary committees were formed to solve the trans­
portation problem and establish institutions such as kinder­
garten, the Greenbelt Consumer Services, and the Greenbelt 
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Health Association. Town newcomers in December and Janu­
ary complained that the "early settlers'' of the town "have taken 
over all the authority where it is possible to do so and 
are running the town to suit themselves."86 Fortunately, such 
accusations soon disappeared from the pages of the Cooperator, 
and the high level of participation in all town organizations 
throughout 1938 indicates they were baseless. 
If attendance at meetings of the Greenbelt Citizens' Associa­
tion is any guage of activity, 1939 reflected a turning point from 
hyperactivity to what Philip Brown called a "second and some­
what more efficient stage—one of struggling with routine man­
agement problems and spreading responsibility."37 Weekly 
meetings of the association in the beginning of 1939 were rarely 
attended by less than two hundred people, but by October 
the Cooperator lamented the decrease in attendance implying 
the association was "on its last legs."38 A similar trend appeared 
in the other two towns. Most of the temporary committees in 
Greenhills had achieved the specific goals for which they were 
created—to select a dentist, investigate methods of municipal 
incorporation, or devise a policy towards door-to-door salesmen. 
Other committees, such as the Transportation Committee, the 
committee to establish church services, and the committee to 
print a newspaper, became permanent but required fewer meet­
ings.39 Greendale had acquired over fifty organizations in the 
first two years—"For everything you could think of," said one 
resident.40 During the first year there were so many meetings 
that a number of people resigned in the new year to spend more 
time at home.41 Regular attendance at meetings of most groups 
decreased to about thirty-five percent of the memberships.42 
The Greendale Citizens' Association, founded in January, 1939, 
with large turnouts of residents, floundered after two years.43 
Despite the natural lessening of interest in active participation, 
the process of creating community institutions, ranging from 
car pools to complex consumer cooperatives, was most significant 
to the cooperative and democratic nature of the communities. 
This phenomenon is not unique with the greenbelt towns. It has 
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been marked by observers of newly born communities in the 
United States as early as De Tocqueville and as recently as the 
1950s by sociologist Robert K. Merton. The process of commu­
nity formations has led two American historians to isolate it as 
the most significant factor in Frederick Jackson Turner's fron­
tier democracy.44 
A brief analysis of Greenbelt's major institutions reflects the 
growth and subsequent disintegration of cooperation in the 
town. The two major political institutions were the town council 
and the citizens' association. The council was established in the 
town charter as the official representative body of the citizens. 
On November 23,1937, five councilors were elected from a field 
of twelve after a short nonpartisan campaign. Almost every voter 
went to the polls.45 Neither of the two conservative candidates 
was elected.46 The councilors selected Louis Bessemer as 
chairman—thus he became the first mayor. Bessemer was an em­
ployee of the U.S. Public Health Service and a long-time mem­
ber of the District of Columbia Cooperative League. The coun­
cil also elected Roy Braden to the post of town manager. Braden 
worked closely and amicably with the council—never becoming 
involved in local political disputes.47 Local politics remained 
nonpartisan; but interest in national parties was high. A Green­
belt Democratic Club was founded in the summer of 1939, and 
the Democratic Party was the overwhelming preference of 
Greenbelt's voters.48 
The alter ego of the town council was the Greenbelt Citizens' 
Association founded two weeks before the first council was 
elected. The association immediately leaped into action—its 
many committees investigating literally hundreds of problems 
and establishing dozens of new organizations. During peri­
ods of controversy the Citizens' Association operated as a town 
meeting and provided an instant channel of communication be­
tween the residents and the town council or the federal govern­
ment. 
The day following the election of the town council, 
Greenbelt's residents saw the first edition of the Greenbelt Co­
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operator. Founded by the new Journalism Club, the paper re­
mains to this day a nonprofit enterprise staffed by unpaid vol­
unteers. This is the only one of the three greenbelt town papers 
which has survived as an independent local newspaper. It is an 
invaluable record of Greenbelt's development. The first issue 
advised readers that "We Pioneers'' had a responsibility to 
create a self-governing democratic community and "develop a 
Greenbelt philosophy of life."49 An article "In the Public Eye'' 
urged citizens to "help make the facts clear" when writers and 
photographers came to Greenbelt.50 The fame of the paper was 
itself the subject of controversy. One person thought it sounded 
too "preachy" and had a "tendency to associate Greenbelt with 
regimentation and paternalism." He suggested the name Green­
belt Town Crier.61 Another citizen retorted that town crier 
conjured up images of "powdered wigs and knee britches—out­
moded symbols of an outmoded age. Greenbelt has been pro­
nounced the town of the future."52 The Cooperator espoused a 
liberal view, selecting such books for review as Eleanor Roose­
velt's This Is My Story, Upton Sinclair's Co-op, and G. J. Holy-
oak's History of the Rochdale Pioneers, a history of an early 
cooperative movement.53 The paper attacked the "horrors" of 
Japan's army in China in January, 1938. In March, it discussed 
the fall of Austria and Roosevelt's rearmament proposals, scor­
ing "misguided and deluded pacificists' who believe that "gang­
sterism can be stopped by protests."54 However, it defended 
the right of pacifists and Jehovah's Witnesses to dissent, warn­
ing against "Super-patriots" such as members of the D.A.R. and 
the Dies Committee.55 The consumer cooperative movement 
was supported against the charge by J. B. Matthews, research 
director for the House Un-American Activities Committee 
(Dies Committee), that "communists were working through 
consumer organizations to destroy the American profit system."66 
The Cooperator pointed out that Matthews, previous to his job 
with the H.U.A.C., had been vice president of Consumers Re­
search, a private group opposed to the consumer cooperative 
movement.57 The paper endorsed President Roosevelt in 1940. 
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In those years the Greenbelt Cooperator was the rarest of sub­
urban newspapers—interested in national and international af­
fairs and their relation to the local community. It was the de­
fender and conscience of Greenbelt—attacking the community's 
critics, praising, scolding, and preaching to the pioneers. 
The Greenbelt Consumer Cooperative founded in January, 
1940, was the keystone in Greenbelt's structure of mutual aid. 
It survived the sale of the town and through careful manage­
ment, has expanded into Baltimore, Washington, and northern 
Virginia.68 A consumer co-op to operate the retail establish­
ments at the three towns had long been planned by the Resettle­
ment Administration. The R.A. hoped to loan the residents 
funds repayable through the sale of stock and the proceeds of 
sales. No action was taken, however, and the R.A. was merged 
with the Department of Agriculture. The solicitor of the de­
partment noted that no loans could be made to the town co-ops 
because all funds allocated to the R.A. and transferred to the 
F.S.A. were for "'rural rehabilitation." He regarded the retail 
co-ops as contributing to the rural rehabilitation of the resi­
dents ""only by a very tenuous line of argument."89 The F.S.A. 
then turned to the Consumer Distribution Corporation fi­
nanced by the Boston merchant, Edward A. Filene. Filene's 
organization agreed to establish a subsidiary called Greenbelt 
Consumer Services, which received the exclusive right to oper­
ate all commercial facilities in Greenbelt. These included a su­
permarket, valet shop, barber shop, beauty parlor, motion pic­
ture theater, and a gasoline station. Rent for the buildings was 
based on a percentage of the sales and was comparable to the 
ratio for privately rented stores.60 The G.C.S. was a nonprofit, 
self-liquidating subsidiary. It would return all profits to the con­
sumers and turn over ownership to Greenbelt residents by De­
cember 31, 1940.81 
On October 3, 1937, the grocery store opened in temporary 
quarters and sold $11.45 worth of food to twenty-four custom­
ers. By 1939, after the opening of the permanent supermarket 
and the other establishments, G.C.S. was doing an average 
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daily business of almost $l,000.00.62 During 1938 and 1939, 
Walter Volckhausen and a large number of Greenbelt residents 
organized a Greenbelt Consumer Co-op, selling $5,000 worth 
of stock at $10.00 per share to over 400 residents.63 On January 
2, 1940, Greenbelt Consumer Services was sold to the resident 
stockholders for $40,000 of which $5,000 was paid in cash and 
the balance, in the form of a Consumer Distribution Corporation 
loan at four percent interest, was paid off over the following 
six years. Volckhausen, a mathematics instructor at the Univer­
sity of Maryland, was selected as the first president.64 
A survey of the Greenbelt Co-op by the University of Mary­
land in 1940, revealed that sixty-seven percent of the residents 
had purchased stock. Generally, it was in a strongfinancial po­
sition. The beauty parlor, however, was losing money because 
few Greenbelt women patronized it regularly and almost one-
third of them had never patronized one. The supermarket ac­
counted for half the co-op's revenue. Average food prices were 
nine percent lower than District of Columbia chain stores and 
9.3 percent lower than independent food stores.65 It could have 
changed even lower prices had it not been for Maryland's re­
tail price maintenance law.66 All members (stockholders) of the 
co-op, of course, received dividends on their purchases—in 1940 
these amounted to 3.85 percent.67 The strength of the co-op's 
financial position was due, not only to lower prices and the de­
sire to succeed on the part of the residents, but to a monopoly 
position in Greenbelt. The nearest private competitors were in 
Beltsville, three miles away. 
In 1943, after the completion of 1000 defense homes in 
Greenbelt, the co-op stores expanded, and a second food store 
opened adjacent to the new homes.68 The government also de­
pended on G.C.S for new services such as operation of a swim­
ming pool opened in 1939 and a local bus service in Greenbelt 
from 1945 to 1951. A large turnover of residents, and thus of 
shareholders, weakened the institution. By May, 1944, mem­
bership had dropped from sixty-seven percent of the popula­
tion in 1940 to approximately fifty percent, and attendance at 
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shareholder's meetings was far below quorum.69 The addition 
of the defense home residents, however, increased member­
ship in absolute numbers, and, in November, 1944, the co-op 
had the good fortune to obtain the services of Samuel F. Ashel­
man as general manager. Under his imaginative and careful 
administration the Greenbelt Consumer Services launched an 
expansion program that helped it survive the sale of the town 
and the opening of competitive private retail stores. 
The Greenbelt Federal Credit Union also survived the sale 
of the town and vigorous private competition. Founded in part 
to fill the need for banking facilities, it was granted a charter on 
December 13, 1937, by the Farm Credit Administration. Begin­
ning with twenty-four members, it grew in one year to a mem­
bership of 334 with total assets of $6,175. By 1945 assets rose to 
$54,800 and in 1964 to $66,752. It has continued to grow in spite 
of competition from the Twin Pines Savings and Loan bank, 
established in 1957, and a branch bank of the Suburban Trust 
Company. Part of the reason for its success has been the excel­
lent administration by a number of Greenbelt's leading citizens. 
Its current president, Benjamin Rosenzweig, was an original 
resident, a leader in the community for thirty years, and a 
charter member of the credit union.70 
The Greenbelt Health Association, like the Credit Union, 
was established to serve immediate needs. There was no doctor 
in Greenbelt and no hospital in Prince George's County. The 
Health Association was patterned after a consumer-owned 
clinic in Washington, founded in 1937 by federal employees. 
It began with seventy-five families each contributing a $5.00 
entry fee and a monthly payment of $1.50 for a single person to 
$2.25 for a family of six. By December, 1938, 212 families had 
joined.71 On April 1, 1938, the Greenbelt Health Association 
opened a clinic and employed a doctor whose salary was paid 
to treat members, although he could treat nonmembers on a 
fee-for-service basis.72 This arrangement was not satisfactory 
to the doctor, and he resigned. Two more were hired in his place, 
one of whom, Dr. Joseph Still, was an enthusiastic supporter 
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of cooperative health associations. Through his efforts Green­
belt was able to open a small twelve-bed hospital in May, 1939.73 
Unfortunately disagreements arose regularly between the doc­
tors and the association board. One resigned but Dr. Still 
remained—fighting the board to the point of beingfired. Mem­
bership pressure on his behalf was exerted resulting in the res­
ignation of the board and the rehiring of Dr. Still. He was appar­
ently the only doctor committed enough to Greenbelt and the 
association to persevere. His loss to the Army Medical Corps 
in 1941 was a great one.74 A husband and wife team was hired 
and resigned in November, 1941, having worked less than a 
year.75 In January, 1942, the F.S.A. dealt the association a severe, 
probably mortal, blow, by refusing to pay $23,000 to cover the 
hospital expenses for fiscal 1942. The town council held a ref­
erendum to determine if the residents wanted to pay the cost 
themselves. Two plans were presented, one calling for annual 
payments of $12.00 and one calling for annual payments of 
$6.00. The $12.00 plan lost 347 to 175 and the $6.00 plan lost 
285 to 260. One reason given for rejection of both plans was 
that the county was constructing a hospital in nearby Riverdale. 
Despite protests to the F.S.A. and an appeal to Mrs. Roosevelt, 
the hospital closed its doors on January 31, 1942, and its only 
doctor left two months later.76 The health problems of Green­
belt became even more serious after the construction of the de­
fense homes; and the G.H.A., even with its declining member­
ship, succeeded in hiring two more doctors. Again there was 
feuding. Both doctors resigned as did the board members. In 
March, 1944, after the sudden resignation of one of two remain­
ing doctors and membership had dropped to 300 from the 1940 
peak of 377, the Federal Public Housing Administration ruled 
that private doctors could open offices in Greenbelt. Soon 
thereafter the last G.H.A. doctor resigned and opened a private 
office in the town. Several more doctors came and went and the 
membership, which rose to 350 in November, 1944, declined 
after the war until the last 180 members dissolved the organiza­
tion in June, 1950.77 
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The women of Greenbelt, noting that public schools pro­
vided nothing for preschool children, organized a cooperative 
nursery school, which, like the kindergarten, was the first in 
Prince George's County. They also organized a Better Buyers' 
Club which studied products, labeling, and consumer legisla­
tion. The elementary school children even organized a co-op 
for selling candy, pencils, and other small items—it was report­
edly dubbed the "Gum Drop Co-op" by the local press. 
The residents also organized a wide range of clubs and spe­
cial interest organizations. One of the earliest was the American 
Legion Post No. 136, which was to play an important role in 
the negotiations over the sale of the town. Cultural interests 
flourished in three groups—the Greenbelt Community Band, 
the Greenbelt Players, and the Bi-Weekly Book Club. The com­
munity band became familiar to many Washington area resi­
dents. Under the direction of Paul Garrett, a striking man with 
a goatee, the band performed concerts throughout the area and 
played sacred music for churches and popular music for pa­
rades and other events. There was also a Choral Society and 
Chamber Music Society, the latter composed of members of the 
Navy Band and the National Symphony. The theater group 
presented classic and contemporary plays such as Clifford 
Odets's "Awake and Sing." The book club reviewed such books 
as Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls, Hans Zinsser's As I 
Remember Him, and John F. Kennedy's While England Slept. 
There were, of course, Boy Scouts, Cub Scouts, Girl Scouts, 
and many special interest clubs to serve athletes, camera bugs, 
bridge players, riflemen, radio operators, and gardeners. The 
garden club was the largest of these. Almost half the families 
joined during the summer of 1938 and received portions of a plot 
on the edge of town.78 
The spirit of cooperation in the early years was strong 
enough to exercise unusual influences. In November, 1939, the 
Citizens' Association and the town council firmly rejected the 
suggestion of a group of residents that Negroes be excluded 
from the supermarket lunch counter. This is more remarkable 
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in light of the rigid segregation in Prince George's County and 
the rest of Maryland. Also surprising for the time was the deci­
sion of the co-op board of directors not to show the racist film 
"Birth of a Nation" at the Greenbelt Theater.79 There was, on the 
other hand, no record that residents ever considered the pos­
sibility of opening the town to Negroes.80 
Another example of the influence of cooperative effort was in 
religion. Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Mormon ser­
vices began shortly after the town opened. In May, 1939, the 
heads of these four denominations formed a Permanent Con­
ference on Religious Life in Greenbelt, the purpose of which was 
to "foster a clearer understanding of religious principles among 
various groups serve as a clearing house for interdenomi­
national differences and curb religious prejudices and to partici­
pate jointly in efforts to achieve social justice and to aid in com­
munity improvements."81 Reverend Kincheloe, the Protestant 
minister, began a movement to build a single structure for all 
denominations.82 This ecumenism was short-lived. In January, 
1940, the Catholics, who were part of the Berwyn, Maryland, 
parish, voted unanimously to seek F.S.A. approval for the con­
struction of their own church. The Cooperator said the move 
caused keen disappointment among a number of citizens who 
thought that "in these days of intolerance and persecution 
and segregation . . we had hoped for cooperation here, at 
least in the field of religion."83 In a reply to the article Reverend 
Leo J. Fealy, the Berwyn-Greenbelt parish priest, wrote: 
Speaking of cooperation, we Catholics would like to find 
some spirit of cooperation on the part of the Cooperator— 
yes, and on the part of some others in Greenbelt. The 
Catholics of Greenbelt are going ahead with plans for a 
church building. Whether it be a separate building or a part 
of a combined building depends on future developments 
and on the decision of His Excellency, the Archbishop of 
Baltimore.84 
During the spring of 1940, Reverend Kincheloe negotiated with 
the archbishop on the question and led a group which drew up 
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blueprints for a religious center to serve all the denominations. 
The war crisis stopped all plans for the construction of 
churches or other facilities at Greenbelt. Reverend Kincheloe 
left Greenbelt in June, 1941, to become an army chaplain and 
never returned. Greenbelt's churches all built separate houses 
of worship, and the Catholic church built its own primary 
school in 1949.85 
The Greenbelt schools provided a more lasting source of 
community participation for people of all ages. The community 
centered school, as Cedric Larson called it, offered education 
for the children during the day, and served as an adult educa­
tion and community center at night. The elementary school 
was the focus of this activity since it was located adjacent to 
the commercial center and also contained the library.86 The 
kindergarten was promoted by a committee of eight Greenbelt 
women who convinced the F.S.A. to hire a teacher in the fall of 
1938.8T The elementary students, it will be remembered, insti­
tuted a co-op in the fall of 1939. Shares were sold for ten cents, 
and the first profits were distributed by the end of the first half 
of the year.88 The curriculum was labeled progressive, and the 
teaching staff was of a high quality.89 
Considering the size of Greenbelt, adult educational oppor­
tunities were great. Art instruction was given both to the chil­
dren and the adults by graduates of the Maryland Institute 
of Art under an instructional grant from the Federal Arts Proj­
ect. Also, the F.S.A. employed a man and a woman as full-time 
directors of recreation. They taught physical education in the 
day schools and directed athletic activities for the adults in the 
evening. The best educational asset was the Greenbelt exten­
sion of the University of Maryland which opened in 1939. Two 
courses were offered the first year—accounting and contempor­
ary American political problems. The latter was described in a 
brochure as dealing with "a select list of problems the 
conflict between government and business, housing, social se­
curity, freedom of the press, labor relations, etc."90 
The $142,000 regional high school at the west end of Green­
belt served the town and the surrounding rural area. In 1939, 
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forty percent of the students came from outside Greenbelt. 
Vocational training, a general course, and a college preparatory 
program were provided. School officials expected ten to fifteen 
percent to attend college.91 Since the entire Greenbelt public 
school system was administrated by the Prince George's County 
Board of Education, there were continual disagreements—usu­
ally about money for the high school. The elementary school 
was supported entirely by the F.S.A. through payments-in-lieu­
of-taxes to the county; but the high school budget was jointly 
supported. In 1937 the F.S.A. paid three-fourths of the $36,000 
and was anxious to have the county pay a slightly larger share 
in 1938.92 The two parties could not agree on which would pay 
the telephone bill so the school operated the first few months of 
the 1938-39 year without a telephone. The same delay occurred 
in bus service for the Greenbelt students. The county refused 
to offer bussing until it received equitable compensation.93 The 
county and the F.S.A. had just begun to cooperate more easily 
when the war and the addition of 1000 new families upset all 
the educational programs. 
The cooperative spirit flourished in the other two towns but 
failed to maintain its initial momentum to the degree seen at 
Greenbelt. The Greendale Cooperative Association was 
launched by the residents in the summer of 1938 at the sugges­
tion of Sherwood Reeder.94 A cooperative committee was 
formed in July which decided to follow Greenbelt's example 
and establish a consumer cooperative to operate Greendale's 
commercial facilities. The Co-op was incorporated on August 
22, 1938, with a loan from the Consumer Distribution Corpora­
tion (the same organization that financed the Greenbelt co-op) 
and staff members borrowed from the Midland Cooperative 
Wholesale Corporation. The Greendale Cooperative Associa­
tion leased the commercial center from the F.S.A. A food store 
and a variety store opened on September 17,1938. A drug store, 
movie theater, shoe repair and valet shop, barber shop, beauty 
parlor, tavern-restaurant, and a gasoline station were all subse­
quently opened by the G.C.A.95 
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At its third annual meeting in March, 1941, the Greendale 
Cooperative Association, which had remained a subsidiary of 
the Midland Cooperative Association, became independent. At 
that time all its enterprises were earning a net profit. The Co-op 
had angered some residents in the early years by refusing to give 
credit, but it remained a vital and popular institution through­
out the war.96 After the war the Public Housing Administra­
tion leased several of the stores to private proprietors because 
the Co-op no longer wished to operate them. In 1948 the P.H.A. 
refused to renew the leases on remaining Co-op businesses and 
opened them to competitive bidding. The Co-op lost the food 
store, the variety store, and the barber shop—retaining only 
the tavern-restaurant and the gasoline station. The Co-op dis­
banded in December, 1948.97 
Co-op directors blamed the P.H.A/s action for its failures, 
but this is not entirely fair. Greendale was the smallest of the 
greenbelt towns and was located closer to private stores than 
any of the other towns. While the Co-op stores sold to a few 
people outside Greendale, the town residents traded in much 
larger numbers with outside competitors.98 
Greendale also attempted to establish a cooperative medical 
organization. Two groups were established in 1938. The Green­
dale Medical Union failed after several months of trial opera­
tion. The Greendale Health Association, founded with the aid 
of the Milwaukee Medical Center, operated successfully until 
after the war when, hampered by pressure on its doctors from 
Milwaukee hospitals, other area doctors, and P.H.A. sanctioned 
competition from private physicians in Greendale, it merged 
with the Milwaukee Medical Center.99 
The Greenhills Consumer Services survives today, but on 
a much smaller scale than of the Greenbelt co-op. As in the 
other two towns, a consumer cooperative was established, this 
time, with the aid of the Co-Operative League of Cincinnati 
and a loan from Filene's Consumer Distribution Corporation. 
In April, 1938, when there were only one hundred families in 
the town, a meeting was held at which, at the suggestion of 
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Community Manager Carlton Sharpe, a committee presented 
the co-op plan. It was immediately adopted by a unanimous 
vote. In 1939, the Co-op signed a ten-year lease with the F.S.A. 
for the commercial center and opened a food store, service sta­
tion, barber shop, valet shop, beauty shop, drug store, and gen­
eral merchandise store. By 1940, approximately four hundred 
residents were members of the Co-op. Not all were pleased with 
the Co-op, however, and a number perferred private chain 
stores. During the war the Co-op ran into financial trouble and 
divested itself of all businesses except the food and drug stores. 
In 1954 the food store built a new and larger structure and in 
1960 opened a second store in the neighboring community of Mt. 
Healthy. By 1962 its total sales had risen from $200,000 in 1940 
to $2,200,000.10° This is, of course, small compared with the 
Greenbelt co-op sales which in 1962 were over $20,000,000. 
Why did cooperative enterprise disintegrate at Greendale, 
decline at Greenhills, and expand at Greenbelt? One reason 
was the smaller size of the latter two towns compared to 
Greenbelt, which made it much harder to support the variety 
of business operated by the co-ops. Had Greendale's co-op con­
solidated its efforts in the food and drug stores during the war 
as did the Greenhills co-op, it might have survived. Also, the 
Greenbelt co-op met its competition by the expansion of its 
own facilities, through a stock sale to the residents in 1945 to 
1947 resulting in the construction of a larger and more modern 
supermarket in 1948. In 1951 it opened another supermarket in 
nearby Takoma Park. During the years 1954-56, when Green­
belt was adjusting to its sale, the co-op made some basic deci­
sions which have since guided its policies. All its Greenbelt 
business except the food, drug, and general merchandise stores 
which were consolidated in the supermarket through a $200,000 
extension of the building, were ended. The small service sta­
tion in the commercial center was also abandoned, but in its 
place the Co-op opened a $100,000 automobile service plaza. 
Thus while divesting itself of less profitable businesses, the 
total operation of the Co-op expanded, as did its membership. 
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Finally, the Co-op absorbed the Westminister Cooperative in 
neighboring Carroll County in 1956 and in 1959 merged with 
the Rochdale Cooperative in Prince George's County, which 
brought not only more members, but two more supermarkets. 
By 1967, Greenbelt Consumer Services had become a major 
business enterprise with 17,000 members and fourteen retail 
stores in the Baltimore-Washington area.101 
The Greenbelt Co-op appears to have attracted far wider 
support from the residents than did the other two ventures, par­
ticularly during the years following the war. In 1945-46, there 
was an attempt to discredit G.C.S. by a small group of local 
citizens. In 1947, the group was aided by a Subcommittee of the 
House Small Business Committee in its August hearings. The 
subcommittee, composed of two Republicans (Walter Ploeser 
of Missouri and R. Walter Riehlman of New York) and one 
Democrat (Wright Patman of Texas), heard a number of wit­
nesses condemn the exclusive control of G.C.S. at Greenbelt. 
In a two to one party line vote the committee's report stated 
that the lease between the P.H.A. and G.C.S. was "monopo­
listic'" and recommended that it be revoked.102 The G.C.S. held 
a special meeting and voted 400 to 0 to adopt a resolution charg­
ing the subcommittee with bias against cooperatives, inaccurate 
and prejudiced press releases, and use of witnesses who were all 
opposed to G.C.S.103 The Greenbelt town elections on Septem­
ber 23,1947, reflected the struggle between the antico-op group, 
organized as the Greenbelt Improvement Association under 
Mayor George Bauer, and the proco-op group called the Com­
mittee for Better Government. The latter group controlled the 
editorial board of the Greenbelt Cooperator and charged that 
the Improvement Association was in collusion with Congress­
man Ploeser and other outsiders to sell Greenbelt to private 
real estate interests. The Improvement Association waged a de­
fensive campaign claiming that it was not really against the co­
op, but merely wanted private business in Greenbelt also.104 
The group was embarrassed by its association with James 
Flynn, whose accusations of disloyalty and of being a commu­
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nist against one of the town's most respected citizens, Walter 
Volckhausen, plus his physical assault on another citizen at a 
town meeting in 1945, won him the disfavor of all groups in­
cluding the American Legion.105 Also, it appears that the towns­
people reacted as they had in 1937-40 to attacks from the out­
side and closed ranks in defense of their institutions. The 
entire slate of Co-op candidates won.106 The opposition group 
started publication of a newspaper called the Greenbelt Inde­
pendent dedicated to "further the principal of the American 
way of life here in Greenbelt. In order to achieve this end, the 
town must be opened to private enterprise. Competition is the 
essence of our country's success. It is the American way."107 
The editorial stated that the recommendation of the Small Busi­
ness Subcommittee should be supported and the G.C.S. monop­
oly broken. The newspaper soon died and G.C.S. remained the 
sole commercial outlet in the town for another five years until it 
independently gave up control. There seems little doubt that 
G.C.S. was strengthened by the attacks against it as a majority 
of residents rallied to its support. In Greendale only the 
Greendale Review supported the Co-op, and there were no mass 
meetings in its defense. In the postwar years, therefore, only 
Greenbelt evidenced a continuing interest in the democratic 
cooperatives founded in 1937-38. But even Greenbelt, it will be 
recalled, opened its doors to private businesses after the war-
business which soon outdistanced the growth of the Greenbelt 
co-op. 
It appears that cooperative democracy atrophied as a result 
of special circumstances in each community, but there were also 
common underlying causes. Basically, the residents were unwill­
ing, perhaps unable, to devote the time and energy necessary 
to establish and to maintain the highly participatory democracy 
required by the political, economic, and social institutions; and 
they lacked the money to hire enough agents to handle the ad­
ministration. The cooperative businesses particulary required 
continuous citizen support. Participatory democracy and eco­
nomic cooperation thrived in the early years, one suspects, be­
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cause it was new and exhilarating for those who had never 
experienced such things before; but it soon became institution­
alized and therefore less emotionally satisfying. What was a 
joy to plan and build became a dull burden to administrate. 
The structure was also weakened by families moving in and 
out of the towns faster than they could be assimilated into the 
unique and demanding community institutions. Permanence of 
residency was made difficult by the F.S.A., as has been stated; 
but the coming of the Second World War made it impossible. 
If local democracy and economic cooperation require a rela­
tively stable population, this factor alone would explain the 
devolution of the greenbelt towns into more traditional sub­
urban communities. 
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$k NEW FRONTIER 
OR FEDERAL MENACE 
Favorable public reaction to the greenbelt towns was 
the crucial goal of the entire program. Unless public pressure 
could be generated, Congress would not expand the program 
and private builders would continue to construct disjointed lit­
tle housing developments. The R.A. failed to achieve this essen­
tial goal. It is obvious that the majority of those who wrote and 
spoke about the towns reacted negatively. 
Opponents of an expanded greenbelt town program based 
their objections on three arguments. First, it put the federal 
government in unnecessary competition with private enterprise; 
second, it was part of a broad trend towards socialistic regi­
mentation disguised as cooperative planning; and third, there 
was the refusal to accept the fact that one-third of the nation 
was ill housed. Herbert Hoover said flatly that it was "statisti­
cally false."1 Many local officials, when presented with a New 
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Deal housing plan, declared they had no need of help since all 
their citizens were adequately sheltered. Such was the case with 
the city council of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, where the 
P.W.A. wanted to build a project.2 Similar views were expressed 
by some citizens in Bound Brook, New Jersey. The Cincinnati 
Enquirer, referring to Greenhills, implied that the Suburban 
Division would have to make a real effort to rent the homes.3 
Many who believed that a large number of Americans were 
inadequately housed felt that private industry could and should 
do the job. This was the position of the National Association 
of Real Estate Boards and the Building and Loan League 
which opposed all public housing programs until 1937. A writer 
in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce magazine stated that ill-
housed citizens deserved their fate in most cases. 
Some are satisfied with their condition. They are doing noth­
ing to improve it. Others do not have sufficient means to live 
as well as they would like. Initiative spurs them to better 
their condition. Others are engaged in wishful waiting.4 
Hugo Parth, one of the leading directors of the Milwaukee Real 
Estate Board, objected to Greendale and Parklawn (the P.W.A. 
project) on the grounds that the low rents would impede a re­
covery of the private home building industry. This recovery 
could only happen when "Venters get squeezed hard."5 Parth 
further argued that Greendale did not serve the really low in­
come groups, which, amazingly, he admitted did exist and did 
need publicly subsidized housing. Greenbelt, too, was accused 
of being "merely a smoke screen to conceal a reckless venture 
in a field of construction that should be left to private indus­
try."6 The R.A. was even reproached for competing unfairly 
with private industry for the profits to be made from the $800­
$1,440 income group.7 
The United States Building and Loan League did back a 
plan to build planned communities—a plan that depended on 
private industry. It was a proposal made by the Committee for 
JOSEPH L. ARNOLD IQ3 
Economic Recovery (a business group) to form forty housing 
companies, each to raise at least $1,000,000 through public 
stock sales, which would build several planned communities at 
moderate cost. Unfortunately, no group ever got far enough to 
sell stock and the proposal was abandoned.8 
Herbert U. Nelson, chief spokesman for the N.A.R.E.B., 
represented the view that the towns were impractical and of 
little value. Testifying before a Senate committee in 1936, Nel­
son said, "We have had a number of demonstration projects 
erected and are somewhat at a loss to know what has been dem­
onstrated."9 After returning from Europe in the fall of 1937, 
Nelson declared, "Our subdivisions with their wide streets, gen­
erous lots and complete municipal improvements are far in ad­
vance of anything that is known in these countries."10 Admitting 
that Europe "has its garden cities here and there, as, for ex­
ample, Letchworth and Welwyn" which were built as a single 
unit "in a roomy fashion," Nelson concluded that "the idea of 
planning houses by neighborhoods, as well as community plan­
ning on a large scale, is stronger in the United States than is 
the case in any other country."11 
A more revealing comment on the thinking of the N.A.R.E.B. 
is seen in its response to the regional planning reports of the 
National Resources Committee. The N.A.R.E.B. Confidential 
Weekly Letter reflects the extent to which planning was advo­
cated. 
The real unit of community life is the neighborhood. Until 
we learn how to plan the neighborhood, the planning that 
might be undertaken for cities, regions, states and the nation 
would appear to have a weak foundation. The average good 
citizen can comprehend the logic and purpose of neighbor­
hood plans, because they come within the scope of his daily 
experience. They are concrete, not abstract.12 
The N.A.R.E.B. was, of course, the servant of its thousands of 
members, most of whom dealt only with single houses or very 
small developments and could not easily move very far in ad­
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vance of them. The days of the Levitts, Rouses, and other large 
scale private builders lay ahead. It was only at their 1930 con­
vention that the N.A.R.E.B. supported, for the first time, a policy 
of planning entire neighborhoods, or ""subdivisions," as they 
were called. Business Week labeled this a "Drastic Change in 
Residential Development."13 
The greenbelt town program appeared too Utopian for se­
rious consideration—if, indeed, it was understood at all by those 
who wrote or commented on it. Even in 1960 the architect Carl 
Feiss wrote that the phrase "new towns" is 'meaningless to 
most of us, or it is considered part of Cloud Nine, or it is simply 
misunderstood."14 Felix Bruner's series of articles in the Wash­
ington Post on the Resettlement Administration was entitled 
"Utopia Unlimited."15 Gordon Ames Brown, in a similar series, 
used the word "utopian" to describe the towns, and T. A. Hunt­
ley, in another article, compared Tugwell to Bellamy, Howard, 
Moore, and Plato, who all "dreamed of a better order, of a world 
made over."16 The architects and planners were ridiculed along 
with Tugwell. Nations Business reported sarcastically that to 
plan the towns "Men of Vision were called in—Social Engineers, 
Planners, Builders, outriders of the March of Progress."17 The 
N.A.R.E.B. said Greenbelt cost $10,000 per unit because "dream 
boys" were building "a little Utopia of their own."18 
The cost of the greenbelt towns—no aspect of the suburban 
town program caused more confusion or was more consistently 
misinterpreted. As was mentioned earlier, the cost cannot be 
satisfactorily computed. The first official figures released by the 
government on the final cost of any of the towns were those for 
Greenbelt, Maryland, given in June, 1937, by the General Ac­
counting Office in response to a request by Senator Byrd. The 
cost was slightly over $14,000,000 which meant, by the senator's 
count, $16,182 per unit. On the fourth of July, Byrd said reset­
tlement spending was approaching a national scandal for its 
'sinful and absurd waste. Every Congressman and Sena­
tor in Washington should visit Tugwelltown and see where more 
than $14,000,000 of public money has been spent."19 The final 
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report of project costs at Greenbelt was published August 30, 
1937, and set the total cost of $14,016,270.61. There was, of 
course, no deduction for relief labor, excess land and facilities, 
farm improvements on the greenbelt, or furniture sold to the 
residents.20 'Newsweek interpreted the total figure as the cost of 
housing Greenbelt's families.21 Time, calling Greenbelt the 
"most spectacular" of all the R.A.'s "'grandiose ventures," said 
it was also a fitting monument to the R.A. because it cost 
$14,227,000, although, later in the article, the cost of relief 
labor was deducted and the cost of the towns was reduced to 
$8,500,000.22 
The most complete breakdown of costs was given by Na­
tion's Business which stated that the R.A. deducted $4,902,000 
for inefficient relief labor, $643,000 for excess land, and $284,000 
for leftover materials, which brought the unit cost down from 
$16,000 to $9,600. When the cost of the community center, 
school, streets, and lake and recreational areas was deducted 
the unit cost fell to $5,423. The article, however, was titled 
"$16,000 Homes for $2,000 Incomes: Greenbelt, Maryland."23 
Thus, the national news magazines, while noting the relief na­
ture of the project, generally judged the cost of Greenbelt as 
though it had been built by a private developer. Even some 
architects of low-cost housing criticized the cost of the towns. 
Corwin Wilson, writing in the progressive journal Shelter in 
1938, called Greenbelt's cost an "extravagance" which was 
"slyly shunted onto the backs of Montana and Texas farmers 
by ambidextrous accountants in order to prettify the stage set 
for a few hundred families."-4 
While some of the Suburban Division planners believed the 
towns could be financed as self-liquidating projects, Tugwell 
was never so sanguine. As far back as February, 1936, he said, 
Let me frankly admit there may be some element of subsidy 
if we are to maintain building and maintenance standards 
and keep rents down. Of course, subsidies for workers' 
home are no new thing in our American economy, though 
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we have generally preferred not to recognize them as such. 
Housing for low income groups is not paying its way in 
America today. . The lowest-cost housing areas in large 
cities pay in taxation scarcely one-fourth the cost of essential 
services which their inhabitants receive from the municipal­
ities. This is a form of hidden subsidy of which we do not 
avail ourselves in Resettlement communities. 
It may be that there will turn out to be an element of subsidy 
in our charges. But it will be an open one, not a hidden one; 
and I, for myself, shall not pretend to like it in any instance. 
. I do not believe in throwing the poor a basket of gro­
ceries; I do not believe in keeping them in subsidized poor­
houses. I am, however a realist for now either wages 
are too low or monopolized materials and processes are held 
at too high a price.25 
The degree of subsidy was not apparent then, but few people 
outside the R.A. were prepared to defend the cost figures. One 
year later, Tugwell wrote that until there was mass production 
of houses with prefabricated sections there would never be any 
really low cost housing in America.26 Walter H. Blucher, di­
rector of the American Society of Planning Officials, rejoined 
that criticism of the cost of the towns was foolish because any­
thing built with relief labor was expensive.27 Likewise, Edith 
Elmer Wood concluded that the high cost "proves only that re­
lief labor is expensive."28 
Along with allegations that the towns were unnecessary, 
impractical, and expensive, the argument was made that they 
were part of a sinister plan to impose foreign, socialist, or com­
munist ways of life on the American people or at least that they 
forced unwanted regimentation by being planned.29 Albert 
Mayer understated the case when he said that "the impression 
has gotten around that they are in some vague way radical."30 
In this respect, the towns suffered heavily from their association 
with the New Deal and Rexford Tugwell, and were often tagged 
"Tugwelltowns" in the press and in Congress.31 
Tugwell's popularity with the public and with Congress 
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was, as several historians have noted, less than cordial.32 Dur­
ing the 1936 campaign, he was often labeled a communist mas­
termind who, like Lenin, would soon dispose of his Kerensky 
(Roosevelt).33 While few credited Senator Davis's accusation 
that Tugwell was really a communist, many congressmen com­
plained about the R.A.'s supposed plans for "shifting people 
around from where they are to where Dr. Tugwell thinks they 
ought to be."34 Some newspapers added to these fears by enti­
tling articles such as "First Communist Town in U.S. Nears Com­
pletion" and "Tugwell Abolishes Private Property."35 One land­
lord, contacted by the Suburban Division for a reference on a 
prospective Greenbelt resident, refused to give out any infor­
mation saying he would not participate in projects which were 
un-American and tend to Communism."36 
The fact that the towns had drawn on intellectual theories 
and European designs made them suspect. Bruner warned that 
the R.A.'s housing program was "like all things Tugwellian 
far different from accepted ideas—at least far from those ac­
cepted in America."37 The New York Sun found the architec­
tural style of Greenbelt un-American and wondered why the 
Cape Cod or Nantucket style cottage was not used. "But the 
Tugwell outfit wanted nothing in the American Tradition. 
They found their inspiration in Europe and the Near East and 
the result was a collection of houses that look like hideous bar­
racks."38 Bruner deprecated the towns, writing that Greenbelt 
houses would surround a "campus'' and that "there is always 
something collegiate about Tugwell schemes."39 An article 
called "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters: Dr. Tugwell Makes 
America Over," traced the "fantastic" ideas behind the Tug-
well programs to the fact that "the Sweetheart of the Regi­
menters was seventeen years a pedagogue."40 
Fear of regimentation and coercion on the part of the govern­
ment was easily exploited. Nation's Business was convinced 
that tenants would be treated like inmates in a poorhouse. 
"Much emphasis is placed on the 'spirit of cooperation'. The as­
sistant manager, like Professor Tugwell, went to Russia to ob­
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serve the Great Experiment and learn new ways of dealing with 
individualists and dissenters."41 An interview with Greenbelt's 
town manager, Roy Braden, allegedly revealed that the govern­
ment would "hold a whip hand over society," and that the R.A. 
would "invite" (the paper put the word in quotation marks) 
residents to form a citizen's association in an attempt to "social­
ize" (also in quotation marks) them.42 When the R.A. announced 
that residents of the towns would not be permitted to have dogs, 
there was a storm of protest. The New York Times sympathized 
editorially with prospective residents who would be forced 
to give up their pets and suggested that "before it plans any 
more Utopias, perhaps the government would do well to draft 
a bit of human nature into the blueprints."43 Every new rule 
in the towns was reported, often in headlines; "Greenbelt Bans 
Display of Wash After 4 P.M. And On Sundays—Private Mut­
terings of 'Regimentation* Are Heard As New Rules Go Into 
Effect—Tricycles Regulated."44 This type of press coverage ex­
emplified what Nathan Straus, first administrator of Public 
Housing, called a double standard of judging public and private 
housing. Editorials seldom rise to the support of tenants forced 
to give up pets to move into private housing; few articles con­
demn landlords who regiment their tenants through more de­
tailed and arbitrary regulations than were imposed on the 
Greenbelt residents.45 
Another ominous possibility raised by the greenbelt town 
program was the prospect of the government resettling Negroes 
in the suburbs. This was, of course, speculation since the an­
nounced policy of the R.A. was to exclude them from the towns; 
but there seems little doubt that it was on the minds of a num­
ber of people. Alva Johnston, a conservative critic of Tugwell 
and the New Deal, wrote, 
Among the largest Tugwell towns is the Greenhills project 
near Cincinnati and the Berwyn project near Washington, 
D. C. There is a large Negro population in both cities. There 
is a constitutional question whether the government, no mat­
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ter what incorporation tricks it employs, can exclude Negroes 
from these communities.46 
The N.A.R.E.B. never publicly expressed concern over the 
greenbelt town program opening suburban areas to Negroes, 
but its members were continually informed of the attempts of 
Negroes to move into white suburban areas. In the highly pub­
licized attempt of Joshua Cockburn, a West Indian Negro, to 
move into a $20,000 home purchased in Westchester County, 
New York, in an area restricted to whites, the N.A.R.E.B. stated 
that if the court decided in favor of Cockburn, "the results 
would be serious to many protected neighborhoods."47 The re­
sistance of suburban communities and fringe areas of cities to 
the outward movement of Negroes hardly needs documenta­
tion. Nathan Straus, in the early 1950s, stated that fear of Negro 
migration had set white suburbanites against any dispersion of 
public housing from the old slum districts.48 Martin Meyerson 
and Edward C. Banfield have detailed the continual policy of 
the Chicago Housing Authority program to keep public housing 
with its Negro residents out of all middle-class white areas of 
the city.49 
The Resettlement Administration carefully followed press 
accounts of the projects, attempting to counter the hostile ones 
with a stream of press releases and illustrated pamphlets.50 A 
Legal Division report warned that most newspaper coverage 
would be unfavorable and therefore the government literature 
would "serve to combat any unfounded attacks."81 Neverthe­
less, most Americans learned about the towns through confus­
ing newspaper and magazine reports. There was an inability, 
for instance, to recognize that the towns were complete com­
munities as distinguished from ordinary housing developments. 
On June 11, 1936, eight months after the Greenbelt, Maryland, 
plans had been announced, the Washington Post used "Green­
belt, Maryland" as the dateline for an article, and Lansill noted 
beside it—"This is the first recognition given in the dateline of 
Greenbelt as a town."62 The Evening Star, in September of the 
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same year, was still referring to Greenbelt as the "Berwyn Hous­
ing Project"—Berwyn being the closest town to Greenbelt.63 
Some who were enthusiastic while studying the plans of the 
towns were disillusioned at their first sight of the actual con­
struction area. At Greendale, reporters found "'streets that go 
nowhere, front yards in the back, back yards in the front, little 
space between the houses hilly land left ungraded and a 
hundred and one other things never before seen."64 The editors 
of the Cincinnati Times-Star toured Greenhills in October, 1937. 
What they had thought was a "nice idea1' dismayed them. "For 
instead of the comely, rustic little village we had thought of, we 
saw the once beautiful countryside desecrated, and on its tor­
tured surface a confused jumble of box-like shacks, looking for 
all the world like an ill-designed army barracks."35 
Newspapers favorable to the New Deal public housing pro­
grams found it difficult to separate the greenbelt program from 
the subsistence homesteads program. The St. Louis Star-Times 
inaccurately described the towns as "'garden homesteads on 
the fringes of industrial communities where workers can have 
decent low-cost housing with an acre or two of land on which 
to raise their own food."56 The Milwaukee Journal breaking, 
for the first time, the news of a resettlement project of the Mil­
waukee area, said that Milwaukee's Tugwelltown" would fol­
low the pattern of the subsistence homesteads—providing land 
for each family to raise food "and keep a goat or cow or pig."67 
It is ironic that the greenbelt towns should have suffered 
from a confusion with the subsistence homesteads, for the ad­
vocates of the towns were some of the severest critics of the 
subsistence homesteads. Beginning with Ebenezer Howard the 
garden city movement was urban centered; aimed at fostering 
a better urban environment including within it the open spaces 
and vegetation of the countryside. The essential factor in the 
agricultural belt or greenbelt was not that it preserve farms 
and fields, but that it remain open land. In the United States, 
Josiah Strong, one of the earliest supporters of the garden city 
movement, had been a most outspoken opponent of the back-
to-the-land movement.58 
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Albert Mayer, one of the architects of Greenbrook, thought 
the subsistence homesteads program was utterly foolish, being 
based on a "misapplication of the real meaning of decentraliza­
tion with overtones of sentimentalism and nostalgia."59 Cather­
ine Bauer, whose 1934 study, Modern Housing, was a standard 
reference for public housing administrators, said that subsis­
tence homesteads were certainly not modern housing. She 
feared that these defeatist ''schemes" would create "'a new Amer­
ican peasantry with a standard of living and an outlook for the 
future probably about equal to that obtainable in the Balkan 
rural regions."60 
Rexford Tugwell was certainly the most widely quoted 
spokesman for the Resettlement Administration. He based the 
suburban resettlement program on studies of population move­
ments in the United States which indicated that both the coun­
tryside and central city were losing population to suburban 
areas. Suburban resettlement "'accepted a trend instead of try­
ing to reverse it."61 Building entire suburban communities ac­
cording to a fixed plan could prevent overcrowding within the 
towns and encroachments from without.62 Slum clearance could 
not begin to provide adequate space for homes and recreation. 
While Tugwell admitted that the towns would not be less ex­
pensive than slum housing, he believed that slum dwellers 
would strain to meet the slightly higher rents and would find, 
under improved conditions, the incentive to work harder for 
what they had.63 The cities, Tugwell argued, would fight to 
retain the residents by opposing the suburban towns, but the 
Resettlement Administration had shown how well the federal 
government could do the job. "There ought to be 3,000 such 
projects rather than three," he concluded.64 
Several new ideas inherent in the program interested pro­
fessional planners. Unfortunately, this interest was generally 
limited to discussion in professional journals with specialized 
circulations. The Architectural Record stated that the compre­
hensive nature of the town plans "are commencing a new 
chapter in American town planning and community architec­
ture."65 The article hoped one result of the program would be 
202 THE NEW DEAL IN THE SUBURBS

knowledge of exact initial costs and maintenance expenses for 
a whole town, since a typical American community could not 
be so measured, and the information could be of tremendous 
value to planners.68 Walter Blucher agreed with critics that 
some aspects of the plans could be improved, but they neverthe­
less "show to Americans for the first time how communities 
providing for adequate living can be constructed according to 
a plan."67 Blucher optimistically wrote, "We laugh at the early 
models of the Ford, but I believe it is fair to say that the first 
attempts in a new form of city building in America are much 
more advanced than was the first Ford."68 
The towns also attracted attention in professional planning 
journals outside the United States.69 Richard L. Reiss, vice-
chairman of Welwyn Garden City, stated that the greenbelt 
towns were a valuable contribution to rational urban decentral­
ization and called particular attention to the significance of the 
federal role in the construction of the towns in a nation "where 
the prejudice against any form of public enterprise which ap­
pears to conflict with ordinary business, is still very strong."70 
He was surprised that "these projects should have been started 
at all."71 From a British point of view he saw the program as a 
first step towards publicly directed regional planning. Not all 
American planners and housing experts agreed with this assess­
ment, but the program did provide a concrete example for those 
advocating a radically new type of decentralized public hous­
ing. 
The most vivid and beautiful presentation of the greenbelt 
towns is Pare Lorentz's film "The City," which was shown at the 
New York World's Fair in 1939 and later throughout the na­
tion. Lorentz, who had directed "The Plough that Broke the 
Plains' for the federal government, engaged Aaron Copland to 
write the musical background and Lewis Mumford to write 
the script. The film was financed by a $50,000 grant from the 
Carnegie Foundation through the American Institute of Plan­
ners.72 It portrays the city's dirt, smoke, noise, confusion, and 
demoralizing slums. Only a temporary escape can be found in 
JOSEPH L. ARNOLD 203 
the drab monotony of jerry-built residential neighborhoods be­
cause creeping blight soon reduces them to slums. Greenbelt, 
Maryland, is shown in all its grassy splendor as the decentral­
ized city of the future. "The City" was universally praised in the 
press, but Time magazine alleged the film lost impact by using 
Greenbelt as an example of the future city since the town was 
financially impractical.73 
The most extensive discussion of decentralized public hous­
ing occurred during a symposium at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Institute of Planners in January, 1939. Harland Bar­
tholomew, one of the nation's leading authorities on urban plan­
ning, presented the case for downtown locations contending 
that "American cities are not congested."74 He believed that 
extension of public services to fringe and suburban develop­
ments would, in the long run, prove more expensive than build­
ing in the central city even with its higher land costs. Also, 
downtown residents do not expend their time and money com­
muting. He concluded that the decentralized city was "a beau­
tiful idea, but like all such theories is largely if not wholly im­
practical and unsound."75 
Clarence Stein spoke for the new town advocates. He as­
serted that construction of adequate housing projects in exist­
ing cities was almost impossible due to archaic street patterns, 
high land costs, and obsolete municipal laws. Adequate hous­
ing could only be provided in "'complete new neighborhoods 
knit together by a new pattern of streets and open spaces."76 
He presented statistics to show that raw land could be im­
proved with all utilities as was done at the greenbelt towns for 
less money than it cost to build a number of the housing proj­
ects in New York City. He closed saying that new towns could 
not be built in the old cities primarily because of the "high but 
false value placed on land by unrealized hopes for expansion."77 
The only hope for new towns within cities would be for these 
values to fall to their "'use value" and "either the real estate 
owners or the entire community will have to pay for it."78 
Bartholomew answered that while he agreed on the need 
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to develop neighborhood patterns, he still believed that decen­
tralizing cities "into isolated sectors is a theoretical ideal but a 
practical impossibility*' and that such an occurrence would be 
both foolish and expensive for urban America.79 In the general 
discussion that followed, it was apparent that most of the 
speakers doubted the usefulness of new towns. Even Roland 
Wank, one of the architects of Greenhills, said he hoped sub­
urban towns would not wipe urban agglomerations off the map 
because it takes a certain size city to support many functions of 
civilization. Frederick L. Ackerman agreed with Bartholomew 
that suburban new towns were a form of "escapism" from the 
problems of the central city. Arthur Comey feared that building 
entire towns would result in their becoming obsolete in a few 
years and thus very expensive to remold to new conditions.80 
While a number of planners and housing experts did agree 
that some form of decentralization was needed, few saw the 
greenbelt program solving that need. Mabel L. Walker, whose 
Urban Blight and Slums was published in 1938, devoted a chap­
ter to the subject "Siphoning Off Slum Population," but gave 
only passing comment to the greenbelt towns and did not fore­
see them as a solution.81 The Committee on Urbanism of the 
National Resources Committee endorsed the greenbelt idea 
without ever mentioning the towns by name, but it was not a 
major focus of their report.82 Frederic Delano, chairman of 
the National Resources Planning Board's Central Housing Com­
mittee, recommended privately a program of federally financed 
purchases of large tracts for the purpose of "planning commu­
nities or large scale neighborhoods."83 However, when he re­
stated his view in The American City in January, 1937, he said: 
The municipality, usually through a Housing Authority, 
might properly purchase entire neighborhoods in blighted 
areas or perhaps in suburban or undeveloped territory. 
Sometimes slum conditions can be made tolerable by drain­
ing off part of the population through . the purchase of 
convenient outlying land. The orderly development of 
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residential neighborhoods, of adequate size to guarantee 
their stability, would thus be possible on cheap land.84 
Apparently Delano chose to discuss only neighborhood devel­
opments rather than community developments with internal 
governments and institutions. This difference is crucial to the 
whole garden city and greenbelt town concept. Richard Fern­
bach explained it in regard to Greendale: 
The vision of the Greendale planners extended far beyond 
the mere physical plan of the town. It recognized govern­
ment housing as more than the provision of shelter—it is the 
creation of communities in which democratic processes of 
living can best be developed.85 
The only other aspect of the greenbelt town program that 
interested professional planners and administrators was the 
purchase of excess land around the site of each town. The ac­
quisition of such large amounts of vacant land was, it will be 
remembered, somewhat of an accident when the Suburban Di­
vision discovered after the land purchases were made, that 
money was not available to build towns as large as originally 
contemplated. However, the opportunity was presented to ex­
periment with the holding of what was called "urban land re­
serves.' The cities of Europe had been purchasing undevel­
oped land for future expansion since the start of the 20th 
century. Raymond Unwin had suggested a similar policy to 
Americans as early as 1914 and it had been recommended in 
1935 by the Committee on Research in Urban Land Policies of 
the National Conference on Planning.86 Jacob Crane was a 
member of this committee; and when he became one of the 
chief planners of Greendale, he was able to present a concrete 
example of urban land reserves using Greendale's tract for de­
tailed analysis.87 The resulting report urging the purchase of 
urban land reserves was met with little comment and no 
action.88 
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The American Society of Planning Officials numbered only 
ninety-one members in 1938. They were not united in support 
of the new towns, and their influence was circumscribed by pub­
lic indifference or suspicion towards their profession. The Na­
tional Association of Real Estate Boards maintained that twenty 
years of city planning had had no beneficial effect on cities and 
further, 
until city planners have shown more wisdom and foresight 
than they have to date, any demands on their part, whether 
voiced through the National Resources Board or through 
their associations, for a further extension of city planning 
functions and powers should be received with considerable 
caution and scepticism.89 
America's city councilmen agreed with the N.A.R.E.B. by refus­
ing city planners money or authority. A 1936 survey found that, 
of 933 city and county planning commissions, only sixty-four 
had annual budgets over $1,500. The other 869 could not em­
ploy full-time planners, much less give them projects to plan.90 
Planning commissions were run by part-time amateurs who 
were not taken seriously by municipal officials.91 
Another deterrent to public enthusiasm for the greenbelt 
towns was lack of interest on the part of public housing groups 
such as the National Association of Housing Officials, the Na­
tional Public Housing Conference, and the Labor Housing 
Conference. Members of these groups together with leading 
figures in the public housing movement met in Baltimore in 
October, 1935, and issued a report called "A Housing Program 
for the United States," which became the basis of the Wagner 
Housing Act of 1937.92 That act prohibited the establishment 
of housing projects with their own legal governments and police 
powers. Judging by the difficulties incurred in passing the act 
at all, the inclusion of powers to construct new towns might 
very well have blocked the entire piece of legislation. Senator 
Byrd, a leading opponent to the bill, attacked it for opening 
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yet another door to federal construction of costly housing proj­
ects. 
What assurance has the Senator Wagner that the same ex­
travagances which existed under the Resettlement Adminis­
tration at Tugwelltown, when that unit was built as a low 
cost housing unit, will not continue? At Tugwelltown the 
unit cost was $16,000 per unit. What guaranty can the Sen­
ator give that the same extravagances will not appear in 
connection with the program under his bill?93 
Intimation of this kind of attitude was noted in the Baltimore 
report which stated that the building of complete new towns 
"involves much more than housing" and could not be initiated 
by the federal government in the immediate future. Further it 
stated that while the concept was a good one, "the provision 
of adequate housing cannot wait until the satellite type of de­
velopment is generally adopted."94 
Organized labor supported the greenbelt town program both 
locally and nationally. The building trades councils and other 
A.F. of L. affiliated unions in the town locations passed resolu­
tions supporting the projects both as work relief and housing 
programs.95 The Trade Unionist published an enthusiastic ar­
ticle on the greenbelt towns emphasizing that moderate-income 
families could purchase low-cost homes because of the savings 
resulting from "bulk purchase and large scale cooperation."96 
However, the A.F. of L. devoted its primary efforts to the hous­
ing program as suggested in the Wagner Act and merely en­
dorsed a resolution supporting the greenbelt town program.97 
Labor's view was that, while understanding the advantages of 
garden cities, a slum clearance program presented fewer prob­
lems.98 
President Roosevelt championed the towns as a demonstra­
tion of what American communities should be doing but did 
not suggest that the government would build any more such 
projects.99 Will Alexander remembers Roosevelt's visit to 
Greenbelt vividly. 
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F.D.R.'s first trip away from the White House after his elec­
tion in '36 was to Greenbelt. He was very excited about it 
and had wanted to go earlier but was too busy with the cam­
paign, but soon after he called the office and said he wanted 
to see it. There was a crowd of 6,000-7,000 around the White 
House gate and people lined the streets all the way to Green­
belt. F.D.R. asked, "What are all these people doing here?" 
Tugwell told him it had probably been in the papers that he 
was going out. He had the time of his life with that crowd 
that afternoon. Oh, he was happy. He just glowed under the 
response of the people.100 
The president toured Greenbelt for two hours, stopping six 
times to look at various projects. He was accompanied by all 
the top officials of the Resettlement Administration and the Sub­
urban Division, along with Maryland's Senator Radcliff, Repre­
sentative Gambrill, State Delegate Kent Mullikin, and many 
other officials. F.D.R. said that no effort should be spared to 
give people easy access to the town because it was "too good an 
exhibit of what can be done in planning not to make it easy for 
visitors to come and go and for residents to get to their work 
without danger and delay."101 He asked how the local bodies 
had cooperated with the project and was told they had cooper­
ated very well. At his request he was shown areas set aside for 
Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and 4-H Clubs. He wanted the streets, 
water system, electrical system, and playgrounds explained. 
Roosevelt was impressed with the savings resulting from overall 
planning of streets and utilities and noted that application of 
the same principles in other towns would reduce municipal 
debts.102 While touring the school and community building, the 
president asked architect Douglas Ellinton about the materials 
and construction, remarking, "Very nice, very nice indeed."103 
As he left one of the apartments he told reporters, 
I have seen the blueprints of this project and have been 
greatly interested, but the actual sight itself exceeds any­
thing I dreamed of. This is a real achievement and I wish 
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everyone in the country could see it. The homes being 
built here are to serve primarily the low income group of 
citizens. It is an experiment that ought to be copied by every 
community in the United States.104 
While there appears to be no direct connection between 
the president's visit to Greenbelt and Tugwell's resignation 
four days later, the R.A. administrator may have wanted Roose­
velt to see what he, Tugwell, considered the single most signif­
icant R.A. project. This possibility is suggested by Tugwell's 
concurrent effort to convince Roosevelt and Wallace to transfer 
the R.A. to the Department of Agriculture.105 The transfer was 
effected on December 31, 1936, the same day that Tugwell left 
the government. The R.A. was placed under the administration 
of Will Alexander.108 One of his first actions was to fire the entire 
publicity staff, saying that he didn't want any more publicity. 
Nor did he and the Suburban Division staff consider building 
any more towns. "They had been terribly criticized," said Alex­
ander. "We all believed in them but we felt that three was as 
many as we could get away with."107 
The most plausible reason for the unpopularity of the green­
belt towns is that the leaders of the building industry, real 
estate, finance, mass media, and many others were wedded 
to individualistic private enterprise in housing and commu­
nity planning. They were almost all critical of the state of the 
American metropolitan areas, but believed that planning by 
thousands of individual land owners and builders—the free mar­
ket—was preferable to the regimentation involved in public 
planning. Sir Raymond Unwin, lecturing at Columbia Univer­
sity in 1937, said that "rugged individualism" was instinctive in 
Americans and was the most serious obstacle to "planning for 
the common good of all."108 An editor of Plan Age noted that 
Americans seemed to prefer the "disguised coercion" of an in­
dividualistic system and shuddered at the suggestion of a small 
degree of regimentation through government planning.109 After 
his experience with the greenbelt towns and subsequently with 
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the Regional Plan Association of New York, Tugwell decided 
that Americans refuse to support government planning primar­
ily out of "fear of regimentation."110 Marquis W. Childs said 
that after listening to Tugwell and the other planners explain 
the programs of the Resettlement Administration, 
I remembered being exhilarated and at the same time dis­
turbed after a dinner or a lunch with the pioneers of the 
brave new world. I felt that somehow they didn't know the 
Middle West that I knew and the people in the Middle West. 
The whole process seemed far removed from the deeper cur­
rents of American life. In many respects it was typical 
of the effort to superimpose from Washington a ready-made 
Utopia . . without some political nourishment. As Doctor 
Tugwell found out, it is impossible to lay down a blueprint 
for even a small section of society in this vast, powerful well-
nigh ungovernable country.111 
^Lawrence Hewes, more charitably, believed that many Ameri­
cans supported the R.A. program; but, after listening to Con­
gressional committees attack the R.A., he realized that "our 
support consisted of the President and a great number of un­
vocal, unimpressive, unimportant non-voters."112 Edward Mc-
Kernon, publicity advisor in 1937 to the New York Regional 
Plan Association as well as the state planning boards of New 
York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, avowed that planning 
could only be "sold" to the nation as a profitable business pro­
gram which will appeal to the selfish interest of powerful indi­
viduals. While recognizing that most planners are great human­
itarians, planning could never appeal in that manner because 
"society as a whole is not interested in society as a whole."113 
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THE WAR YEARS

The strains of the Second World War fell unevenly on 
the three greenbelt towns. Greenhills and Greendale felt the 
loss of their young men who went to the armed forces, but the 
wives, children, and parents remained in the two communities. 
The original residents of Greenbelt, most of them federal em­
ployees, were scattered throughout the nation, and one thou­
sand families were added to the town when a defense housing 
project was constructed there in 1942. Thus the town with the 
most vigorous cooperative democracy was the most severely 
disrupted. 
Citizens of Greenbelt were overwhelmingly opposed to the 
Fascists. The editors of the Cooperator gave increasing atten­
tion to the international scene in 1938-39, lamenting the 
Munich Agreement and condemning the neutrality legislation 
prohibiting aid to the "people of Spain in their struggle against 
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foreign fascist agression."1 On December 5, 1938, the citizens' 
association agreed not to purchase any goods produced by agres­
sor nations.2 The "'peace politicians" and "peace societies" were 
scored for their failure to see that the only way to keep oppres­
sion out of the Western Hemisphere was to increase our mili­
tary strength. The Cooperator was opposed, however, to send­
ing U.S. troops to defend European nations.3 A strong military 
defense program at home and aid to the allies short of troops 
was the position taken by eighteen out of the twenty leading 
citizens polled by the Cooperator. Isolationist citizens had their 
views presented in early June, 1940, when Senator Gerald P. 
Nye visited Greenbelt to debate a professor from the Univer­
sity of Maryland. A crowd of over 300 heard Nye state that we 
should have nothing to do with the war in Europe, a comment 
which "brought a stirring round of applause from the audi­
ence."4 However, a resolution to that effect which was to be 
sent to the president was discussed briefly by the 100 people 
who remained after the debate and the final vote to send it was 
only 59-26.B The debate continued at Greenbelt until December 
7,1941. 
Greendale was much more clearly opposed to American 
entry into the war. The Greendale Review, commenting on the 
Munich crisis, believed the answer to world peace lay in the 
development of "cooperative principles applied to world af­
fairs."6 The development of an international cooperative econ­
omy would eliminate the primary cause of international hostil­
ities.7 The current European conflicts were mainly economic and 
the paper suggested that the United States stay out of that war 
and spend its money on public housing instead of battleships. 
Armistice Day was celebrated in Greendale in 1938, with a 
world peace pageant by Greendale Junior High School, high­
lighted by the crowning of a goddess of peace. In June, 1940, 
while the Germans invaded France, the citizens of Greendale 
sent a resolution to Congress and the president, stating that 
while they would defend their nation if it was attacked, they 
urged the government to "exert every effort to keep the United 
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States from armed participation in the war."8 The attack on 
Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war by Germany on the 
United States ended further debate at Greendale. A large num­
ber of its men fought in the war—five of them lost their lives in 
battle.9 
Greenbelt was the only one of the three towns to be signif­
icantly altered by the Second World War. Long before Pearl 
Harbor the community began to feel the effect of the war. Im­
portant residents who had built the close cooperative society 
that characterized Greenbelt left the town. In October, 1940, 
567 Greenbelt men registered for the selective service, and fif­
teen days later nine of them were drafted.10 Mayor Henry 
Maurer resigned his post when his government agency trans­
ferred him in January, 1940. George A. Warner was elected to 
replace him, but was also transferred in February, 1941. The 
same happened to the next replacement, Arthur Gawthorp, who 
served only seven months. An even larger number of council­
men were likewise forced to resign. The high turnover in local 
government officials was not as damaging as it might have been 
without the excellent guidance of Roy Braden and his staff—but, 
of course, that changed too. O. Kline Fulmer, the assistant man­
ager, was transferred to work on defense housing in February, 
1941. Vincent Holochworst, the recreation director since 1938, 
left for the Navy in June, 1942. In 1943 Braden himself resigned. 
Fortunately his replacement, James T. Gobbel, proved to be an­
other efficient and well-liked manager.11 The turnover in other 
institutions was even greater. The Cooperator had nine differ­
ent editors between May, 1940, and July, 1945. Three of the 
five directors of the Greenbelt Consumer Services elected in 
August, 1941, had to resign by October. Francis Fosnight, not­
ing in his editorial on June 6, 1941, that the latest announce­
ments of people included an unusually large number of past and 
current community leaders, asked sadly, "Who will replace 
these men? We can only hope that we will be able to find others 
who can at least carry on the fine tradition each of these men 
has established in his own sphere."12 Fifteen months later, 
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September, 1942, editor Fosnight and 661 of the other original 
residents of Greenbelt were gone.13 Those who remained 
awaited the arrival of the families which would move into the 
nearly completed one thousand unit defense homes project, 
which would more than double the size of the town. 
As the government expanded its facilities to accommodate 
the administration of a gigantic defense program in 1940, resi­
dents of Greenbelt, many of them government employees, dis­
cussed rumors concerning the future use of the townsite. In 
July, 1940, when the F.S.A. switched from an annual lease to a 
monthly one, the rumor spread that the residents would all be 
evicted and the town "converted into a barracks."14 In October, 
1940, Congress passed the Lanham Defense Housing Act, which 
permitted the construction and management of housing for de­
fense workers by the federal government. The following month 
the Greenbelt town engineer let slip that the government 
planned to build defense housing at Greenbelt, and the citizens 
again pressed the F.S.A. for confirmation—without success. 
When the 1000 unit project was finally announced in February, 
1941, it elicited a mixed response. On the one hand, Mayor 
Warner said it would be a great asset by reducing service costs 
and providing more potential membership for Greenbelt organ­
izations and more business for its cooperative stores. On the 
other hand, Dayton Hull, president of the citizens' association, 
questioned whether the new housing units would be "of the 
present Greenbelt quality." Both men were correct. 
The project, officially called MD-1811, was built under the 
direction of the Federal Works Agency at a total cost of 
$4,481,023. The net construction cost of the dwellings was 
$3,900 per unit.15 Ground was broken in May, 1941, and the 
first families moved in eight months later.16 The defense homes 
were only for employees of the War and Navy Departments, 
but were managed by the Farm Security Administration until 
the towns were all transferred to the Federal Public Housing 
Authority.17 They were of inferior quality compared to the 
original Greenbelt homes. A government appraiser in 1948 re­
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ported that the defense housing was built with inferior mate­
rials, but was better than most other war housing classified as 
"'permanent."18 It was said that the insulation was so thin be­
tween apartments that you can hear your neighbors break an 
egg."19 Street and utility systems had been installed during the 
original construction, but landscaping was put off until the com­
plaints of the residents produced some small effort in that di­
rection. In 1947 the residents were still petitioning for shrubs, 
hedges, and trees, but nothing was done until after the sale of 
the town.20 Also inferior to the original parts of town was the 
site planning by the architects and engineers of the Federal 
Works Administration. While the street plan dictated place­
ment of the row houses fronting on interior parks, the system 
of internal parks and sidewalks with underpasses was aban­
doned. This resulted in numerous traffic hazards unknown in 
the original town. The first child in Greenbelt to be killed was 
run over by a truck as she played in a defense home parking lot. 
Maintenance costs on the defense housing units became a signif­
icant problem in the years following the war.21 
The prediction that the town institutions would benefit 
from the presence of the new families was fulfilled. The Co-op 
business flourished with the influx of new customers. On the 
other hand, Greenbelt's schools were almost drowned in a 
tidal wave of new students. When school opened in the fall of 
1941, the classes were overcrowded. The number of first-grad­
ers jumped from forty-three to eighty-seven, and classrooms 
built to hold thirty-six students contained up to forty-nine.22 
The relative youth, and therefore the larger number of chil­
dren, of the original residents had been underestimated in the 
beginning, so when even more children moved in the facilities 
proved totally inadequate.23 In June, 1942, the town council 
threatened to seek an injunction to prevent more families from 
moving into the defense homes until the government provided 
more classrooms. Jointly with a reluctant Prince George's 
County Board of Education, the government financed conver­
sion of a row house into a temporary school for two hundred 
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kindergarten and elementary school children, but it was not 
ready until the autumn of 1943. In 1942 schools had to open on 
a double shift. In the fall of 1943 the high school had to use the 
cafeteria for classrooms and due to lack of an instructor there 
was no physical education program. The elementary school was 
overflowing with seven hundred students, two hundred fifty 
more than in 1941. It operated on a double shift for all grades 
except kindergarten, which had a triple shift for its one hun­
dred seventy^five children. There were no qualified teachers for 
the seventh and eighth grades.24 
In March, 1944, General Philip Flemming of the Federal 
Works Administration announced that $282,000 had been ap­
propriated for the construction of a twelve-classroom elemen­
tary school and an addition of five classrooms to the high school. 
The new facilities, scheduled to be ready by the autumn of 
1944, were finally completed in May, 1945.25 
An important factor in the maintenance of stability and con­
tinuity in Greenbelt was the nucleus of three hundred original 
families who remained during the war years.26 After three 
mayors in a row were called away from Greenbelt in 1940-41, 
the office went to Allen D. Morrison, a member of the first town 
council in 1937. He served from September, 1941, to September, 
1945. Francis Lastner, another original resident, with substan­
tial experience in municipal administration, served as a council 
member from 1941-45 and from 1947-55.27 Some initial resent­
ment towards the defense home families was gradually dis­
pelled. When Dayton Hull, an original resident, resigned as 
president of the citizens' association to serve in the Army in 
April, 1944, he was replaced by Wells Harrington, who had 
moved into the defense homes only eighteen months earlier.28 
With the influx of new people, there were obvious changes in 
interests and emphasis. The Greenbelt Chamber Music Society 
and the Greenbelt Players folded during the war, and the an­
nual Greenbelt Town Fair was abandoned in 1940.29 A notice­
able difference in the editorial policies of the Cooperator oc­
curred. Articles on the cooperative spirit disappeared along with 
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those on public housing. National and international issues were 
no longer presented, and no comment was made on the 1944 
presidential election. The paper still presented wide coverage 
of local news, but it no longer expressed the crusading zeal of 
the prewar years. The need for town identification seemed past. 
On the other hand, a new cooperative service was founded 
during the war to satisfy new needs. The child daycare center 
for 150 to 250 mothers who took full-time jobs in Washington 
began with a grant from the government and continued on a 
cooperative basis when the funds were withdrawn after the 
war.30 Also, the Greenbelt town council appropriated funds for 
a youth center in 1944 after several incidents of vandalism tem­
porarily closed the soda fountain at the drug store. The Green­
belt Woman's Club also contributed to the center.31 
A sociological study of Greenbelt conducted during the war 
indicated that enthusiasm for the cooperative idea had declined. 
Thirty percent of the men in 1943 belonged to no organization 
at all, and only forty-five percent belonged to two or more. 
Interviews with a sample group of residents revealed that thirty-
one percent endorsed the cooperative idea without reservation, 
forty-eight percent had some reservations, nine percent thought 
both co-op and private business should be allowed, and thirty-
nine percent preferred private business over co-op business. 
Few residents considered Greenbelt their home. The personal 
columns of the Cooperator were filled with articles about fam­
ilies who ''go home" for vacations and to be married. Only six 
of the sixty people who died in Greenbelt between 1937 and 
1944 were buried in the town cemetery. Finally Greenbelt had 
developed a complex status system similar to that of an average 
suburban community. Seven "status groups'' were identified 
ranging from the federal administrators and residents with 
professional occupations to the maintenance laborers and Negro 
janitors. Those who comprised the leadership of Greenbelt's 
institutions were found to be individuals whose occupations had 
more prestige, whose family background was white collar and 
middle class, and whose tenure in the community was longer. 
It was noted, however, that members of lower status groups 
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(not the maintenance or janitorial groups) could achieve more 
status through active participation in local affairs than in the 
typical American town.32 
The war years were also marked by change in the admin­
istration of Greenbelt. While there were no precise policy 
changes, there was an increased tendency on the part of the 
new administrators—including the new community /town man­
ager, to regard Greenbelt "more as a housing project than a so­
cial experiment."33 In April, 1943, the Federal Public Housing 
Administration announced that after June 1, 1943, rents would 
be raised from the old scale of $18.00-$42.00 per month to 
$24.00-$65.00, and the income requirements would be raised 
to a scale of $1,400-$4,000. In practice, the F.P.H.A. allowed all 
residents to stay throughout the war, regardless of how high 
their incomes went. The citizens' association, which had only 
twelve people in attendance at the March, 1943, meeting, 
called a special meeting in May to discuss the rent increase and 
over five hundred attended. Roy Braden, the community/town 
manager, explained that while the average rent was increasing 
from $31.50 to $44.00, the percentage of incomes spent on rent 
would actually be lower than it had been in 1939. The $31.50 
in 1939 comprised twenty-four percent of the average resident's 
income of $2,962. After an emotional discussion, the justice of 
the increase was acknowledged by the majority. A second meet­
ing, several days later, intended to arouse further protest, drew 
only two hundred people. A Rent Protest Committee was 
formed, but dissolved after four months. In December, 1943, 
the F.P.H.A. made a concession to residents in the original town 
by agreeing to allow wives of those serving in the armed forces, 
whose incomes were naturally reduced, to pay rent either on the 
old scale or at a rate of twenty percent of their gross income, 
whichever was higher.34 The new administrators showed good 
sense and liberalism in small matters too. James Gobbel became 
extremely popular when, having replaced Braden, in October, 
1943, he lifted the clothes line curfew' on hanging up wash 
after 4 P.M. and on Sundays.35 
V-J Day saw town residents, after a heated campaign, vote 
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four to one to reject a proposal permitting a liquor store in the 
town. Greenbelt, its 8,000 residents comprising the largest com­
munity in Prince George's County, looked forward to the re­
opening of the Town Fair on August 30th—the first since 1940. 
Overcrowding due to wartime expansion was finally alleviated 
with the completion of the new school facilities. Greenbelt 
Consumer Services planned major expansion. The only cloud 
on the horizon was a rumor which had appeared in the Wash­
ington papers that Greenbelt was going to be put up for sale. 
It was denied by all government officials.36 But the announce­
ment of the F.P.H.A.'s decision to sell the town finally came in 
September, 1945, plunging the town into another period of ma­
jor change. 
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# GREENBELT TOWNS 
FOR SALE, 1945-1954 
For more than ten years the Federal Public Housing 
Authority, which managed the Greenbelt towns, attempted to 
dispose of them in a manner satisfactory to Congress, the resi­
dents, and the original planners. The F.P.H.A., created prima­
rily as a war housing authority under the National Housing 
Agency, received control of the towns in June, 1942, as part of 
a general consolidation of federal housing agencies ordered by 
President Roosevelt in February of that year.1 F.P.H.A. officials 
have been charged with treating the greenbelt towns as housing 
projects rather than social experiments.2 Such does not appear 
to be the case regarding the sale. A number of F.P.H.A. officials 
-Oliver C. Winston in particular—attempted to expand the 
towns to the size contemplated by the original planners and/or 
sell them to institutions which would do the same. It was hoped 
the enlarged towns would adequately support their municipal 
229 
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services and commercial facilities, thus making their entire 
property more attractive for potential purchasers. Winston be­
lieved the completed towns "should be maintained as at least 
three outstanding examples of good community planning 
which could do much to influence future developments by pri­
vate enterprise throughout the country."3 
The F.P.H.A. believed it had a clear obligation to sell the 
greenbelt towns. Congressional Appropriations Committees 
from 1939 to 1942 had construed Title IV, Section 43 of the 
Bankhead-Jones Act as providing for the liquidation of the en­
tire F.S.A. community program—including the greenbelt towns.4 
The commissioner of the F.S.A., Oliver Winston, director of 
the F.P.H.A. General Field Office, gave the job of expand­
ing and then liquidating the towns.5 During 1944 and 1945 he 
discussed the question confidentially with Greenbelt's town 
councilmen.6 He decided, however, to use Greendale as the 
pilot project in his disposition program. In the summer of 1944 
initial plans were made for the expansion of the town.7 F.P.H.A. 
officials met with Greendale Manager Walter Kroening, War­
ren Vinton, and a Greendale Tenants Advisory Committee.8 
Also consulted were Elbert Peets, planners from the F.P.H.A. 
who reviewed literature on the English garden cities, and the 
research director of the British Association for Planning and 
Regional Reconstruction who happened to be in Washington. 
Alexander Bing, the builder of Radburn, discussed the plans 
and asked to be informed when the time came to seek a de­
veloper. The proposal resulting from these studies recom­
mended the sale of the town, together with the entire tract, 
to a single corporation or syndicate. The village of Greendale 
should retain ownership of all public property plus the com­
mercial center, industrial sites, and the area set aside for the 
greenbelt—the last three could then be leased to private de­
velopers as the village saw fit.9 The preliminary development 
plan drawn up by Peets in January, 1945, contemplated four 
new villages approximately the same size as the original one. 
In addition there were to be an expanded commercial area and 
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an industrial park, but over half of the undeveloped tract was 
to remain either as parks or farmland.10 
When the plans were first unveiled, the Greendale Tenants 
Advisory Committee was pleased with them. The committee's 
recommendation that the town be sold to a tenant cooperative 
received little support from the residents, who preferred to 
purchase their present dwelling individually or to build in one 
of the four new proposed villages.11 Winston's office made con­
tact with possible buyers, several of whom showed interest. 
During the summer and fall of 1945, however, construction costs 
in the Milwaukee area rose so rapidly that prospective buyers 
became unwilling to make the required investment.12 Winston, 
therefore, gave up immediate plans to sell the town. 
During 1945 and 1946 both Congress and residents pressed 
F.P.H.A. to dispose of the towns. Greenbelt townspeople, an­
gry that their town councilmen had kept plans to sell the prop­
erty secret, unanimously voted to form a mutual homeowner's 
corporation to buy Greenbelt. In January, 1946, Councilman 
Allan Morrison, one of the organizers of the American Legion 
in Greenbelt, suggested the town be turned over to returning 
veterans and renamed Veteran, Maryland.13 There were no sug­
gestions, however, as to how the residents or the returning vet­
erans could purchase the town which was valued by the govern­
ment in 1945 at almost $19,000,000.14 The congressional appro­
priations committee, from which the F.P.H.A. received its 
funds, was perplexed when the towns were not sold at once. 
Committee member Ben F. Johnson thought the towns had been 
abandoned.15 Representative Albert Gore wondered why the 
F.P.H.A. "procrastinated" when the project could be sold "over­
night" at a price which would almost recover the initial invest­
ment. F.P.H.A. Commissioner Philip Klutznick replied that the 
projects presented many complex disposition problems and that 
to determine the real value of the property and the best method 
to dispose of them would cost time and money.18 The F.P.H.A. 
received $99,500 (derived from management receipts of the 
three towns) to facilitate further study of the problem, but 
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only $60,000 of it was used during fiscal 1947.17 The funds were 
used to plan for the expansion of the other towns in a fashion 
similar to the plan for Greendale.18 In January, 1947, Hale 
Walker presented the Greenbelt version of expansion to the 
residents. Accompanied by Winston, Walker painted a glowing 
picture of the future with two thousand additional homes sur­
rounded by extensive parks and open lands.19 "The only fly in 
the ointment," commented the Greenbelt Cooperator, "is the 
question of who is to do this and how it is to be done."20 
All plans were altered by President Truman's announcement 
in May, 1947, to seek congressional reorganization of all federal 
housing agencies under a single Housing and Home Finance 
Administration.21 Under this reorganization plan the General 
Field Office of the F.P.H.A. was to be abolished. Winston de­
cided to leave government service to become executive director 
of the Baltimore City Housing Authority.22 Before leaving, how­
ever, he tried to find a private foundation willing to purchase 
the towns and develop them as model communities. He con­
tacted the Rockefeller Foundation and the Russell Sage Foun­
dation, neither of whom was interested.23 His attempt to have 
the Social Science Research Council undertake a study of the 
greenbelt towns also failed to stir any action.24 
A week after the General Field Office was abolished, Ray­
mond Foley, the new administrator of the Housing and Home 
Finance Administration, issued Public Regulation No. 1, which 
declared that in order to encourage home ownership by small 
investors, all properties being sold by the agency "should be 
subdivided into the smallest feasible units of sale consistent 
with a practical plan for their disposition."25 Preference was to 
be given to veterans occupying the homes, then to veterans 
intending to occupy a home for sale, and finally to nonveterans 
occupying a unit to be sold. Within each of the preference 
groups, sales were to be made for cash to the highest bidder 
after public advertising—the method long established by Con­
gress.26 Fortunately, John Taylor Egan, commissioner of the 
Public Housing Administration, was committed to the sale of 
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the towns as a unit to "safeguard the educational and demon­
strational value of these examples of community planning."27 
Egan prevailed on Foley to exclude the towns from sale under 
the Public Regulation No. 1, thus allowing the Public Housing 
Administration to sell them for cash on a competitive bid basis, 
with restrictions to protect the character of the existing com­
munities.28 
For tenants hoping to purchase the towns, the chief prob­
lem was inability to obtain financing. In order to aid them, 
Congress enacted legislation authorizing F.H.A. insured loans 
on greenbelt town mortgages. Charles P. Taft, brother of Sen­
ator Robert A. Taft, drafted the bill. Veterans and other tenants 
at Greenbelt, who had formed a purchasing group in 1946, 
were imitated by similar groups in Greendale and Greenhills. 
Early in 1948 the Greenhills Homeowners Corporation, com­
posed of two-thirds of the town residents, many of whom were 
veterans, employed Charles Taft to negotiate purchase of the 
property.29 Taft's bill authorized the F.H.A. to insure mortgages 
on the towns at four percent interest and to cover up to ninety 
percent of the mortgage with a maturity of twenty-five years. 
Taft discussed the measure with Philip Glick, general counsel 
for the H.H.F.A., who sent it on to Administrator Foley. After 
minor revisions, Foley sent the bill to Congressman Jesse Wol­
cott, who introduced it in the House.30 The Eighty-first Con­
gress passed it as Public Law 901, on August 10, 1948.31 
The requirement that the towns be sold for cash to the 
highest bidder impeded purchase efforts of the resident and 
veteran groups. Not only would the process take a long time, but 
there was no assurance that mortgage loans could be obtained 
even with F.H.A. insurance. To obviate these problems, the 
Greendale group, called the American Legion Community De­
velopment Corporation, sought legislation to allow sale on terms 
through direct negotiations with the Public Housing Commis­
sioner.32 Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin introduced a 
bill providing for the sale of the three towns through negotia­
tion rather than competitive bidding. A similar bill was intro­
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duced in the House by Representative Monroney, a member of 
the Committee on Banking and Currency, which was to hold 
hearings on the resolution. 
When hearings began on February 22, 1949, only the Green­
dale group had contacted the Public Housing Administration 
in regard to the proposed legislation, but subsequent hearings 
were attended by veterans groups in Greenbelt and Green-
hills.33 The Greendale American Legion Community Develop­
ment Corporation appeared to be the most thoroughly pre­
pared—presenting elaborate plans for the development of the 
entire tract.34 The most serious problem, the committee was 
told, was raising the capital because banks were reluctant to 
make even F.H.A. insured loans to veterans' groups for fear of 
bad publicity in the event the loan had to be foreclosed.35 Com­
missioner Egan testified that the House and Senate bills were 
slightly different, but he was satisfied with the general provi­
sions.36 Senator Paul Douglas was concerned that the develop­
ment groups protect the undeveloped lands from haphazard 
growth and was assured by a member of the Greenhills Home 
Owners' Corporation that no such thing would be allowed.37 
Douglas was the only congressman showing interest in the pres­
ervation of the towns' heritage of imaginative planning. In the 
House hearings Representative Wright Patman and Representa­
tive Lansdale Sasscer wanted assurances that the veterans' 
groups would not immediately evict the present residents after 
the sale; and Senator McCarthy, appearing on behalf of the 
Milwaukee group, agreed heartily.38 The bill was reported out 
of the House committee on April 6,1949. It was amended first to 
allow purchasers to pay ten percent down, the balance to be 
amortized over a period of not more than twenty-five years— 
essentially the same terms insured by the F.H.A. Also, a provi­
sion was added allowing present occupants of the towns to re­
tain their homes by joining the veteran development groups.30 
H.R. 2440 was brought to the House floor on April 13,1949, 
by Representative Brent Spence of Kentucky, chairman of the 
House Committee on Banking and Currency, and author of 
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House Report No. 402. He told the House he was pleased to see 
the towns sold to veterans' groups and noted that Charles P. 
Taft was interested in Greenhills as the representative of a 
group that was anxious to buy the town immediately. Repre­
sentative Smith of Wisconsin agreed that the sale of the towns 
to veterans "is a fine way for the government to get out of the 
real estate business."40 The bill passed unanimously and was 
sent to the Senate where Senator Douglas amended it in his 
committee report to allow the Public Housing Commissioner 
to transfer streets, public buildings, playgrounds, parks, and 
open land surrounding or adjacent to the towns to nonfederal 
government agencies under terms he considered to be in the 
public interest.41 The Senate bill, containing both the House 
amendments and the Senate committee amendments passed 
unanimously on May 6, 1949. The House accepted the Senate 
version passing it on May 10. President Truman signed it on 
May 19,1949.42 
Public Law 65 was intended to transfer the towns to private 
ownership, aid veterans in finding homes, protect occupants in 
the homes, and allow the P.H.A. commissioner to retain some 
of the green open spaces from which the towns derived their 
names. In Greendale only the first goal was achieved. The 
potential purchasers, American Legion Community Develop­
ment Corporation, failed to purchase any portion of Greendale. 
After initiating the legislation and presenting its formal appli­
cation to qualify as a negotiator for the sale of Greendale, the 
group ran into serious problems.43 The corporation expected 
financial support from the city of Milwaukee, but was never 
able to reach a lasting agreement.44 Also, the group was over­
whelmingly distrusted by other Greendale residents, who 
formed a rival housing group called the Greendale Coopera­
tive Veterans Homes Association, which was supported in a 
special referendum on August 23, 1949, by 621 residents, as 
against ninety-eight for the corporation. The most serious blow 
to the corporation was the sudden death of its organizer, Arthur 
Marcus, who had originally interested Senator McCarthy in the 
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project.45 As a result of the divisions between the two rival vet­
erans' groups, each blamed the other of bad faith and scared 
off local mortgage bankers. As a result neither group was able 
to purchase the town, and the P.H.A. prepared to break up the 
property and sell it in any size parcels which would bring the 
most money. Even the village hall was to be sold off for private 
use.46 The residents were allowed to make offers to the P.H.A. 
on their own houses. During 1952 ninety-seven percent of the 
residents purchased their own homes for a total price of 
$4,666,825.47 The 2,280 acres of undeveloped land and all the 
commercial facilities including the town hall were advertised 
for sale to the highest bidder in 1952, but the bids received 
were so low that the P.H.A. rejected all of them. Shortly there­
after, the Milwaukee Community Development Corporation, 
one of the bidders, entered into negotiations with the P.H.A. 
and purchased the entire property for $825,727,*a 
The Greenhills Home Owners Corporation told the Senate 
committee, in 1949, that it was prepared to purchase the entire 
4,000 acre tract.49 Unfortunately, the corporation was only able 
to purchase the town site. In 1950, the P.H.A. transferred title to 
all the houses, the commercial center, the town hall, and 601 
acres of land at a price of $3,511,300. Approximately four hun­
dred acres of land along Mill Creek were transferred to the 
Hamilton County Park Commission and the remaining 3,378 
acres of undeveloped land was sold to Cincinnati Community 
Development Corporation for $1,200,000.50 
The Greenbelt Mutual Home Owners Corporation, which 
had been formed in 1947, represented a majority of the residents 
and their hopes to continue the original concept of cooperative 
ownership and careful planning.51 Their attitude toward the 
sale of the community is clear. R. J. Wadsworth, who had 
helped plan Greenbelt in the 1930s and was now aiding in its 
disposition, made the following observation: 
There is deeply rooted in the thinking of most tenants the 
original conception upon which the planning of the commu­
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nity was based, namely, that it would be held in one owner­
ship, preferably a local public agency, to which the Federal 
Government would transfer title . . but there is a great 
lack of understanding on the part of the tenants as to what 
disposition may mean to them.82 
The Greenbelt Mutual Home Owners Corporation was organ­
ized by several hundred tenants to carry out the community's 
intentions. While the organization occasionally pressured re­
luctant residents to join, it had no rivals and enrolled the great 
majority of families by the spring of 1949.53 It employed Colonel 
Lawrence Westbrook, the former director of the R.A. Rural 
Rehabilitation Division, to negotiate the sale and direct plan­
ning for furture community expansion using Hale Walker's 
master plan of 1946. Westbrook told the House committee that 
the corporation intended to purchase the entire Greenbelt prop­
erty, but did not think it could finance it with less than a forty 
year mortgage.54 
To meet the requirements of Public Law 65, the G.M.H.O.C. 
was reorganized as the Greenbelt Veteran Housing Corpora­
tion. At the time of the congressional hearings in 1949, half the 
members of the corporation were veterans.55 By 1952, the num­
ber grew to fifty-five percent, of which one-fourth were not 
residents of Greenbelt.56 The corporation entered into negotia­
tions with the P.H.A. in 1950. The government decided to trans­
fer to the town of Greenbelt, the community building, Green­
belt Lake, and the swimming pool, the roads, sewers, and 
other government properties. The entire southeast quarter of 
the tract (1,362 acres) was transferred to the National Park 
Service. Offerred for sale was the original town, the war housing, 
the commercial center, and approximately 2,000 acres of unde­
veloped land. The total price was $8,886,700.57 Negotiations 
were halted in June, 1950, by the Korean War and did not re­
sume until 1952. By then, the G.V.H.C. decided to purchase 
only the row houses and 800 acres of undeveloped land.68 A 
canvass of residents showed little interest in cooperative owner­
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ship of the apartment units or of the commercial center. The 
balance of the undeveloped land was not purchased because 
the corporation was unsure it could develop it. Its financial 
backing was almost entirely drawn from nonresident sources 
—the residents provided only one-fourth of the down pay­
ment. The mortgage was financed by a subsidiary of the Nation­
wide Insurance Company.59 The 1,580 housing units and 708 
acres of land were purchased in December, 1952, for a total 
price of $6,995,669.60 
The twelve apartment buildings in the original town con­
taining 306 units were sold at public auction to the highest 
bidder. Six individual purchasers bought them in April, 1953, 
for a total price of $914,342.61 The last undeveloped land was 
sold to private real estate developers in June, 1954. The com­
mercial area was sold in October to the highest bidder—the 
Gilbert Realty Company of Philadelphia.62 With the transfer 
of the commercial center on January 1, 1955, the federal gov­
ernment severed its last connection with the New Deal experi­
ment begun twenty years before by Rexford Tugwell. The dis­
memberment of Greenbelt under the auctioneer's hammer was 
a fitting end for a project which cut so deeply against the Amer­
ican grain. 
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CONCLUSION

The history of the greenbelt towns is the story of a 
road not taken. The most important fact in this history is that 
the suburban town program was rejected by Congress and ig­
nored by the real estate and construction industries. The failure 
of the greenbelt towns to impress either government officials or 
industrial leaders is rather easily traceable to the program's 
radical challenge to fundamental patterns of urban growth and 
real estate practice. That the program was sponsored by the 
New Deal and thus became a partisan political issue only sealed 
its doom. 
In assessing the greenbelt program it is important to separate 
the physical planning from the socioeconomic planning. In 
terms of the physical plan the three towns have little to offer 
community builders of the 1970s. Their overall design, site 
planning, and architectural innovations are now antique. They 
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certainly contribute to the realization that comprehensive pre-
planning does indeed result in long term savings, although the 
point is more usefully made by larger and more balanced new 
towns. Even the opponents of the program agreed that the 
greenbelt towns produced a residential and commercial envi­
ronment superior to most suburban "developments," but were 
financially infeasible for all save the affluent. Nevertheless, in 
their comprehensive planning and large scale construction, the 
greenbelt towns were at least moving with the tide of the pri­
vate housing and construction industries. Since the end of the 
Second World War, increasing numbers of very large, compre­
hensively planned suburban communities have been built, 
many of them of a size that dwarf the greenbelt towns. 
On the other hand, when the history of community building 
is examined for socioeconomic experimentation, the greenbelt 
towns still stand disturbingly close to the urban frontier. It is 
clearly the Suburban Division's social, economic, and political 
experimentation that stirred the greatest suspicion and opposi­
tion in the 1930s. It is also the only part of the greenbelt pro­
gram which, regardless of its sponsorship by the government or 
a private builder, directly countered long developing urban 
patterns. First, the towns aimed at reversing the trend towards 
increasing economic and social segregation of metropolitan 
areas. By raising the spector of suburban areas containing poor 
as well as affluent families, the program threatened one of the 
most fundamental attractions of suburban areas. Though the 
Suburban Division itself failed to resettle a full spectrum of 
socioeconomic families in their towns, the program was basi­
cally oriented in this direction. In addition, the creation of an 
interrelated system of cooperative institutions to operate stores, 
care for preschool children, deliver medical services, provide 
transportation, and arrange a host of educational and social 
activities is without parallel in twentieth-century American 
cities. Finally, the establishment of a new community in which 
the residents were given a municipal charter allowing them a 
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degree of legal control over their government-owned commu­
nity was a bold experiment which no other public housing 
agency has seen fit to imitate even in modified form. 
Fifty or a hundred little greenbelt towns scattered around 
the suburban fringes of our metropolitan areas, no matter how 
modest the housing and landscaping, would have cost no more 
than our typical monolithic public housing projects in the cen­
tral cities. Certainly not all public housing should have been 
built in the suburbs, but enough could have been to give the 
less affluent something of the choice open to the average citizen. 
The greenbelt experiment giving public housing residents a 
local government as a counterweight to the housing authority 
might have saved our current authorities from their habits of in­
sensitive and oppressive administration. Community organiza­
tion among the tenants of public housing projects is next to 
impossible if "the project" is not recognized as a physical or 
legal community. 
But even these solutions are ultimately unsatisfactory. Poor 
house islands in the central city or the suburbs—even when they 
are as attractive as the greenbelt towns—are inherently demoral­
izing for the residents. They remain separated from the larger 
community and stigmatized by it. Such a program merely per­
petuates the unhealthy segregation which lies at the root of 
many of our urban problems. If the nation's cities are ever 
going to reverse this pattern of economic and racial segrega­
tion, it will have to be carried out on a metropolitan-wide 
scale. Planting patches of segregated low-income housing in 
suburban areas is politically impossible and inevitably results 
in the deterioration of the surrounding neighborhood. Perma­
nent integration can occur only when low-income housing is 
scattered in very small numbers throughout the entire commu­
nity—a community with the will and the power to prevent any 
tipping of the economic balance in any single neighborhood. 
New towns offer the best opportunity to produce this stable 
economic mixture. They can initiate a land use pattern that 
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provides housing priced for every income group without threat­
ening any one of them with the uncertainty of who the majority 
of their neighbors will be. 
The three greenbelt towns have by accident developed into 
small examples of economic integration since the original mod­
est housing units have been infiltrated and surrounded by 
newer, larger, and more expensive homes. It is fitting that just 
a few miles from Greenbelt, Maryland, the unique new town of 
Columbia is making the first large scale experiment with racial 
and economic integration. Developed by the Rouse Corpora­
tion, a private mortgage and land development firm, Columbia 
is composed of an interlocking network of small neighborhoods 
called villages, each containing a wide spectrum of housing 
prices. The town has living accommodations ranging from sub­
sidized, low-income row houses to $70,000 estates and a propor­
tion of Negro residents approximately equal to that of the nation 
as a whole. If Columbia points the way for future suburban 
developments, the poor and the nonwhite may finally gain ac­
cess to the trees, grass, and jobs which grow in the suburbs. 
The affluent may be freed to live in the central city without 
fear of being surrounded by slums. If this is the road we are 
now traveling, the greenbelt towns of the 1930s were the first 
faltering step. 
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cities, new and complete towns that, at a com­
paratively low cost, would provide superior 
safety, convenience, and beauty, and that would 
generate a deep sense of community spirit and 
create a pleasant and healthful environment for 
the habitation of those families that heretofore 
had been condemned to live in urban slums. 
The greenbelt town program reflected the fun­
damental character of the New Deal in several 
important ways. In addition to giving evidence 
of an abiding concern with the necessity of re­
form in architectural and city planning, real 
estate and construction practices, and social and 
economic cooperation, it aimed at stimulating re­
covery of the building industry and relieving un­
employment. It exemplified, furthermore, a deep 
devotion to a concept of society in which the 
competition of individuals was in some measure 
tempered by the cooperative enterprise. 
If, like other reform programs coming under 
the auspices of the New Deal, the program failed 
ultimately of execution on the scale envisioned 
by its authors, it embodied, for a substantial time, 
the kind of vigorous optimism that characterized 
the president himself — an optimism and an ex­
citement that were common to those who became 
connected with the greenbelt towns. For all who 
did, from the architects who designed them to 
the families who lived there, spoke of the thrill 
brought about by participating in what was 
clearly seen as a historic and noble endeavor. 
Joseph L. Arnold is assistant professor of his­
tory at the University of Maryland Baltimore 
County. 
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